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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CIVILIZATION.

The Encyclical Letter, "Humanum Genus," of Our Holy Father Pope Leo XIII., on the Sect of the Freemasons.

IN his great and instructive Encyclical Letter, *Humanum genus*, our Holy Father Leo XIII. traces out with a master hand the evils that afflict modern society, exposes its wounds and sores, and points out the destructive forces that are arrayed in wicked warfare against the Church of Christ and the Christian civilization which she has created and fostered. This magnificent document is so luminous in style, so irresistible in argument, so irrefutable in its deductions and statements of facts, that any words of ours would add nothing to its power or to the salutary and lasting impressions its perusal must make on all candid and unbiassed minds. Naturalism, which is the denial of the supernatural, and, therefore, of all revealed religion, is the curse of the age and the canker worm that is gnawing at the very vitals of society. Its doctrines are most destructive of public and private virtue, and aim at the overthrow of the whole Christian order.

The fundamental doctrine of the Naturalists, says the Holy Father, "is that human nature and human reason ought in all things to be mistress and guide." Laying this down, they care little for duties to God, or pervert them by erroneous and vague opin-

ions. For they deny that anything has been taught by God; they allow no dogma of religion or truth which cannot be understood by the human intelligence, nor any teacher who ought to be believed by reason of his authority. And since it is the special and exclusive duty of the Catholic Church fully to set forth, in words, truths divinely received, to teach, besides other divine helps to salvation, the authority of its office, and to defend the same with perfect purity, it is against the Church that the rage and attack of the enemies are principally directed. According to the gospel of the flesh, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, which the light of unaided reason points out as certain and fundamental truths, are to be regarded as questionable and uncertain; and consequently the foundations of law and order, of all justice and morality, are shaken and undermined. God, the Creator and provident Ruler of the world, is outlawed from His own creation. Law is stripped of all divine sanctions. The political order is supreme and independent of all responsibility to a higher law. Man in society is the source of supreme civil power, and therefore can appoint or displace the chief magistrate according to his good pleasure. The education of youth must be Godless, and marriage, the bond of domestic life and the basis of society, must be reduced to the genus of commercial contracts. Says the Holy Father: What refers to domestic life in the teaching of the Naturalists is almost all contained in the following declarations: That marriage belongs to the genus of commercial contracts, which can rightly be revoked by the will of those who made them, and that the civil rulers of the State have power over the matrimonial bond; that, in the education of youth, nothing is to be taught in the matter of religion as of certain and fixed opinion; and each one must be left at liberty to follow, when he comes of age, whatever he may prefer. To these things the Freemasons fully assent; and not only assent, but have long endeavored to make them into a law and institution.

For in many countries, and in some nominally Catholic, it is enacted that no marriages shall be considered lawful except those contracted by the civil rite; in other places the law permits divorce; and in others every effort is used to make it lawful as soon as may be. Thus the time is quickly coming when marriages will be turned into another kind of contract—that is, into changeable and uncertain unions which fancy may join together, and which the same, when changed, may disunite. With the greatest unanimity the sect of the Freemasons also endeavors to take to itself the education of youth. They think that they can easily mould to their opinions that soft and pliant age and bend it whither they will; and that nothing can be more fitted than this to enable them to bring

up the youth of the State after their own plan. Therefore, in the education and instruction of children, they allow no share, either of teaching or of discipline, to the ministers of the Church; and in many places they have procured that the education of youth shall be exclusively in the hands of laymen, and that nothing which treats of the important and most holy duties of men to God shall be introduced into the instruction on morals.

Then come their doctrines of politics, in which the Naturalists lay down that all men have the same right, and are, in every respect, of equal and like condition; that each one is naturally free; that no one has the right to command another; that it is an act of violence to require men to obey any authority other than that which is obtained from themselves. According to this, therefore, all things belong to the free people; power is held by the command or the permission of the people, so that, when the popular will changes, rulers may lawfully be deposed; and the source of all rights, and civil duties, is either in the multitude or in the governing authority, when this is constituted according to the latest doctrines. It is held also that the State should be without God; that in the various forms of religion there is no reason why one should have precedence of another; and that they are all to occupy the same place.

Such are the destructive doctrines and forces that are now in active operation in the world, and which have for aim the destruction of civil society as at present constituted, the ruin of Christian civilization and the overthrow of the Catholic Church, which is the firm prop of the one and the fruitful mother of the other. These terrible anti-Christian doctrines, if put into successful operation, would result in Communism, Socialism, and Anarchy, in desecrated homes, in faithless peoples and Godless states; in other words, Christian society and Christian civilization would be utterly destroyed, the work of Christ and of His Church in the world would be undone, and the devil, the world and the flesh would once more reign in Paganism, revived, restored and triumphant. Now, the great aim of Freemasonry and of cognate societies is to bring these doctrines and principles to a successful and triumphant issue; and therefore they wage a fierce and unrelenting war against the holy Catholic Church, which is the great obstacle to the realization of their wicked and diabolical purposes. Hence it is that the Holy Father raises his voice in warning against these wicked anti-Christian confederations, and from the chair of Peter calls upon the Christian world to rally around the banner of the Cross and to hold fast to the saving truths and holy laws which it symbolizes.

The many evils that afflict modern society and menace it with ruin, are the logical consequences of the Protestant "Reformation,"

and of the action of its principles and teachings. Naturalism and its allies are the progeny of Protestantism. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, is the foster-mother and saviour of Christian society and Christian civilization, and she alone has the divine remedies for the healing of the nations and for the removal of the moral and social evils that, like a wasting plague, ravage and threaten them with death. This it is proposed to prove to some extent in this article; but, it would, of course, be impossible within the space at our disposal to do full justice to the subject in all its bearings. There are no moral evils for which the Church has not a remedy, no human sorrows for which she has not a heavenly consolation, no wounded, broken hearts for which she has not a healing balm; there are no dark problems of life for which she has not a solution, no questionings of the human soul for which she has not satisfactory answers, no dark despair for which she has not the blessed light of assured and immortal hopes. In her the sick and afflicted have a mother of consolation, the poor a friend and benefactor with an ever open hand, the oppressed a powerful protector that in all ages has never failed to shield them with the power of her influence and laws, whilst she smote with her banns and anathemas the tyrants and enslavers of their fellow-men. To the king and his subjects, to the master and his servants, to the employers and the employed she teaches the just relations that should exist between them, the reciprocal rights and duties which, like the nicely adjusted works of a clock, should in their harmonious action and reaction regulate all social grades and interdependencies, and bind all members of society in the golden bonds of justice, charity, good rule and friendly offices, thus establishing in this fallen world the reign of law and order, and of peace and good will to all men. Were the voice of the Church listened to and obeyed, and her teachings reduced to practice in individual and social life, the world would have been spared the existence of those organizations which, under the pretence of exercising philanthropy and benevolence, have been the fruitful source of innumerable evils, and modern civilization would not be forced to shudder with fear at the apparition of such associations as Communism, Socialism and Nihilism, which desperate men in their despair have framed to right their political and social wrongs, whether real or imaginary, and which threaten civil society and christian civilization with ruin and overthrow. Within the Church's pale all rights are protected, all duties enforced, and the just relations and subordinations of the social hierarchy are based on true and firm foundations. She is the friend of the poor, the protector of the orphan, the defender of the weak and the oppressed. She is the firm support of legitimate authority and the promoter of civil liberty. Hers is, in fine, the fruitful womb whence

has sprung Christian civilization, with its unnumbered blessings and sweet and tender charities.

The poor have been at all times the object of her special solicitude and affection, following in this the example and the precepts of her divine founder.

A considerable portion of Church revenues was by her direction to be set aside for the maintenance of the poor, and in various councils laws were passed making provision for their support. Thus, the Council of Tours, held in 566, by its fifth canon orders every town to maintain its poor; and the priests in the country as well as the faithful were required to maintain their own poor in order to prevent the abuses of unrestricted mendicancy. The Church had a register of the poor for the purpose of ascertaining their wants and of regulating the distribution which was made to them of a portion of the ecclesiastical property.

No form of human misery and suffering was a stranger to the all-embracing charity and Christ-like compassion of the Church. The lepers, excommunicated from the society of their fellow men, were embraced by her with a mother's affection; the ordinary sick poor were tenderly nursed and cared for; and even prisoners were visited and consoled, and their physical as well as their spiritual well-being was carefully considered and looked after.

It would, in fact, be too long to enumerate in detail even a small part of the laws and provisions which prove the Church's holy zeal for the comfort and consolation of the unfortunate. Amongst her canons may be found one directing that priests should refuse to accept the gifts of those who oppress the poor.

In the midst of the awful solemnities of his consecration, the bishop-elect, standing in the presence of God's altar, is made to promise that he will be affable, kind, and compassionate to the poor for the sake of God's holy name. The Church, like her divine Founder, respects and dignifies, whilst she compassionates, poverty, and she impresses her children with reverence for what the Fathers call "the Sacrament of the Poor," that is, recognizing Christ under the rags of the poor man as faith recognizes Him under the sacramental species. She exclaims with Bossuet: "Let no one any longer scorn poverty or treat it as a vulgar thing." True, it was once of the dregs of the population, but the King of Glory, having espoused it, He has ennobled it with His alliance, and henceforth He grants to the poor all the privileges of His empire. We therefore in very deed may say of the holy Church,

> "For she is still the poor man's friend,
> The poor man's heart, the poor man's hand,
> And all the oppressed who have no strength
> Have her at their command."

Veronica-like, she has never ceased to wipe the blood and sweat and tears from the face of suffering humanity; nor has she ever failed to act as an angel of consolation in every Gethsemane of human sorrows. In every centre of population she has raised hospitals and institutions of charity like blessed probaticas for the relief and comfort of the sick, the suffering and the poor, and she has entrusted the care and administration of these institutions to holy men and women who have embraced the virginal life, and who have renounced all property and all rights to property in order to live for the poor and suffering, to expend themselves in their service, and to bestow upon them their undivided care, their tender commiserations and their unselfish and Christ-like charities. We may, therefore, say of the Church what Solomon said of the mother of the disputed child, "Haec est vera mater." She is the true mother of suffering humanity. It would exceed the limits of this article to dwell on all that the Church has done to alleviate human sorrows, to relieve distress, and to care for the sick and suffering. We venture, however, to quote the following striking testimony on the subject from a Protestant journal, the *Saturday Review*, written apropos of the Pope's intention to establish a hospital for cholera patients, should that dread plague visit the Eternal City:

"The proverb about 'an ill wind' appears to have been illustrated by the terrible visitation of cholera in Italy, even more fully than was known last week, and in the same sense which we then pointed out. The Pope himself has openly come forward, not to thwart, but to praise and to second, the efforts of 'those at the head of public affairs' in Rome, as is testified by his letter to Cardinal Jacobini on 'the dreadful scourge of the Asiatic malady' which has attacked Italy. His Holiness is not content with commending 'the zeal and prudence' of the Government; he finds it impossible to remain an indifferent spectator, and announces his intention of himself co-operating in this work of charity by founding a hospital at a cost of a million francs, in the close neighborhood of the Vatican, so that he may himself be able to visit and console those attacked by the malady. That such a step is a very fitting, as well as a politic and a gracious one on his part, is obvious enough, and it appears to be generally appreciated as such on the spot, except by 'Liberals' of the irreconcilable class. But it is also the course which might have been expected from the antecedents and general character of Leo XIII., who has all along manifested a special anxiety both to emphasize and, so far as circumstances permit, to emulate the nobler historical traditions of the Papacy. The name and notion of a hospital is to us so trite, and so much a matter of course, that we are sometimes apt to forget how comparatively new in the world's history such institutions are. There are probably some who will even be surprised to learn that the idea and the fact are alike of purely Christian origin, and form part of our large indebtedness to the early and mediæval Church. Milman is quite within the mark when he says that, 'in institutions for the poor, hospitals, leper houses, charity was not only reckoned as a duty specially incumbent on churchmen, but was a duty ostentatiously discharged.' He adds that Latin Christianity may point to her hospitals and brotherhoods, as well as to her universities, schools, and churches, 'as in great part owing to the munificence or the active agency of her universal hierarchy.' But we must go further back than the date of distinctively 'Latin Christianity' for the origin of hospitals. It is really one aspect of the striking contrast

which challenges attention in many different ways, whether in art, in literature, or in life, between the civilizations of the Pagan and of the Christian era. And it may be said without exaggeration to reveal the radical nature of that contrast. A modern writer has justly observed that 'there is no feature of the old (Pagan) civilization so repulsive as its indifference to suffering.'

"The weaklings of mankind could neither contribute to the joyousness of life nor bear its burdens; they were out of place equally in court or camp, and were better out of the world altogether, seeing that they were not of it. And therefore, as was only natural, charitable institutions were absolutely unknown. The almost entire ignoring of all sympathetic reference to childhood in classical poetry, as compared with the prominent place it occupies in the poetry of every Christian age—which is somewhere dwelt on by Dr. Farrar—illustrates one side of this contrast. It finds a more ghastly illustration in the fact, noted by Mr. Lecky, that 'the infant was entirely unprotected, and infanticide was regarded by no one as a crime.' But the sacredness of human life and the sentiment of compassion so conspicuous in Christian ethics speedily produced a marvellous change. Even during the ages of persecution the hospital and the refuge (*Xenodochion*) had already come into existence, and the catacomb epitaphs bear abundant witness to the multitude of foundlings supported by Christian charity. After the conversion of the Emperor, one of the first changes in the law was to provide for the care of infants, and under Justinian we find mention of public *brephotrophia*. . . . . If we pass on to the Middle Ages, Innocent III., one of the ablest and most representative of the Popes, founded both the Hospital of Santo Spirito at Rome, for patients of all nationalities, and a Foundling Hospital, and Gregory IX. not long afterwards founded the Lateran Hospital, which is still kept up. Every monastery, moreover, as a rule, had its infirmary, not only for the use of its own members, but for the care of invalids and convalescents generally, and the nursing of the weak, the blind, and the aged; and these infirmaries were in fact the originals and patterns of our modern hospitals. The earliest record of the establishment of a separate hospital in England is in the time of Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, who founded two in 1080, one for leprosy, and one for general purposes. St. Bartholomew's, Smithfield, founded in 1102; St. Thomas's, in the Borough, in 1213; and Bethlehem, in 1247—converted under Henry VIII. into a receptacle for lunatics—were all originally connected with religious houses.

"The curious fact, which has been noticed by historians, that so few names comparatively have come down to us signalized for what yet was from the first so widely spread a work of Christian philanthropy, is in itself significant. And hence it comes to pass that the men who, at a later date, covered Europe with a network of hospitals after the Crusades, have passed from recollection, though in another and most important sense the good they did 'lives after them.' But this really shows how entirely that has become a matter of course, a necessary and universal incident of Christian civilization, which under the previous *régime* had been altogether unknown. If, to cite Milman's words, 'the haughtiest Popes condescend to imitate the Lord in washing the feet of poor men,' the ceremony, however perfunctorily it may sometimes have been performed, had a background of meaning which was never lost sight of in the Church. It is no doubt a satisfaction at once to the piety and the historical sense of Leo XIII. to know that, in his proposed foundation of a cholera hospital at Rome, he is emulating the best example of some of the grandest of his predecessors in a matter where they—to use his own phrase—trod most closely in the steps of their divine Master. Rome, Athens, Alexandria, in their old heathen days, took no heed of suffering, or only recognized it as an eyesore to be concealed or even a crime to be suppressed. The question has been debated from various points of view in our own day, whether Christian morality can be maintained in the absence of Christian belief. A Pope may at all events be pardoned for the amiable weakness of adhering in this respect to the old-fashioned ethics of Christendom.

It is in this way the Church has solved the problem of poverty as a social question. She has ever treated poverty as our Lord

prescribed, with reverential respect, kindly sympathy, and tender compassion.

Let us now briefly consider the beneficent action and influence of the Church on the condition of the laboring and artisan classes. At the time of the advent of our Blessed Lord, the civilization of the pagan world had reached its height, but it was a cold, heartless civilization; it was like a marble statue by Phidias, exquisitely beautiful, and seeming to breathe and palpitate with life, but yet hard, cold, unfeeling, and pitiless. There was then no pity for the poor, and no consideration for the toiling masses. Labor had fallen into contempt, was a badge of degradation, and considered as only fit for slaves. Workingmen were deprived of the rights of manhood, were robbed of their liberties and civil rights, and were reduced to the position of slaves. Both in Greek and Roman civilization work had been made servile, and workingmen slaves. At the time of Augustus Cæsar there were upwards of sixty millions of slaves in the vast empire over which he ruled. And those slaves were not men on whose brows an Indian or an African sun had burnt the brand of slavery; they were, in blood and race, the equals of their masters. In Roman law a slave was not a person, but a thing; he had, of course, no civil or political rights; he had no power to receive a legacy, no power of civil action, and was entirely beyond the pale and protection of law; he had not even religious duties or hopes. He was in everything absolutely subject to his master's will, who had the power of life and death over him. Such is the frightful condition to which millions of workingmen were reduced in ancient civilization, when they were described by Seneca as having "fettered feet, bound hands, and branded faces."

Our divine Saviour became a workingman, was a carpenter, and the reputed son of a carpenter, and for years labored and toiled with St. Joseph for his daily bread.

He thus made labor sacred, He exalted it in human estimation, and gave it a dignity in the eyes of men and a power of merit in the eyes of God. In the Christian system, labor having become ennobled by the action and example of Christ, the workingman rose in the scale of human estimation; he ceased to be regarded as a thing, and was looked upon as a man possessing human rights and liberties and duties. Men, whether free or bond, were taught the doctrines of equality before God, who was their common father; they were taught the doctrine of human and Christian brotherhood, that, in the language of St. Paul, "in one spirit they were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether *bond* or *free*" (1 Corinthians xii., 13); "that they were all children of God by faith in Jesus Christ, that there was neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, but that they were all *one* in Christ Jesus"

(Galatians iii., 27–28). These blessed sounds broke with the power and magic of delightful music on the ears of the fettered slaves. Millions of human beings, bowed down under the intolerable burdens and unspeakable sorrows of slavery, lifted up their heads, raised their eyes towards heaven, and began to hope.

Gradually, under the blessed and fruitful influence of the example and teachings of our Saviour, the fetters began to fall from the festering limbs of the slaves, men learned their rights and dignity as well as their responsibilities, labor was ennobled and sanctified, and the curse of slavery was condemned and in principle destroyed. Who can estimate the value of this mighty result, this great moral revolution! What blessings has it not conferred on mankind! What fountains of tears has it not dried up! What broken hearts has it not healed! What unspeakable sorrows has it not banished! What burdens of grief has it not lifted up from the heart and soul of man! With what hope, what joy, what sunshine of liberty and gladness has it not flooded the world, transforming it from a pen of slaves into a home of Christian freemen.

The Church, the bride of Christ, followed His blessed example in her treatment of slavery and in her care of the laboring classes. She exerted herself to correct false ideas regarding the character of slavery, and to create and foster a public opinion condemnatory of the institution. In order to estimate correctly her beneficent action in this respect, it would be necessary to have an adequate knowledge of the gigantic and almost insurmountable difficulties that stood up against her in her efforts to better the condition of the slaves, and gradually to remove and destroy the system. False notions and doctrines regarding human rights, the prejudice of race and of caste, the immense material interests that were connected with the institution of slavery and that grew out of it, the break-down of the Roman Empire and the tremendous social and political convulsions that resulted from it, the irruption of the northern barbarians sweeping like a destructive and irresistible inundation over the civilized world, the fierce onslaught of heresy on the very life of the Church, and the hostility and jealousy of emperors and kings,—all these opposing influences and forces compelled the Church to halt in the work of undermining the system of slavery and of emancipating the slaves, and not unfrequently forced her to contend for her own existence and preservation. Nevertheless, the broad and indisputable fact stands out on the face of history, that the gradual abolition of slavery and its final disappearance from the civilized world are due, in the main, to the teaching, the legislation and the constant action of the Church. Besides, two of her religious orders, viz., the "Trinitarians" and the Order of Mercy,

redeemed about one million of Christian men from the horrors of captivity in Mahometan countries, spending millions of money in their release, and shed the blood of many of their members in martyrdom for this Christ-like cause. Labor, in the Catholic Church, has been ennobled and dignified; it has its rights as well as its duties. Imposed originally as a penalty, the law of labor has become sacred, meritorious, and elevating, has been lifted up to a species of worship. "Workman," says the Church, "whoever thou art and to whatever toil thy strength is devoted, contemplate thy Master and thy God, occupied for many years in the workshop of a mechanic, sawing, planing, and polishing wood, permitting Himself to be called the son of a carpenter, and stamping for the future, upon all manual labor, which His example had sanctified, not merely a consideration appreciable by human estimation, but also a divine value." Such is the high ideal which she has held up to the world of the character and sacred dignity of labor. Her monks sought to earn heaven by labor sanctified by prayer. At a very early age we find her busied about the welfare of the laboring classes. In 372 St. Basil founded a workshop for poor mechanics. In the Middle Ages the Church organized trades into honorable corporations, and in every way encouraged, directed and assisted men in the pursuit of a laborious life. In A. D. 1202 an order called "of the Holy Trinity" was founded, the object of which was to teach all sorts of trades to boys. In those ages, when the Church was powerful, and when she was free to exercise her beneficent and civilizing mission, and to mould social institutions according to her ideals, she bestowed on workingmen the most precious privileges and immunities, she assigned to each trade-corporation a patron saint and protector, and blessed and sanctified their members by her holy teachings and ministrations.

Trade-corporations sprang up under her sanction in immense numbers in every great city. Seville alone contained sixteen thousand tradesmen. In Venice there were sixty-one trade-associations, and they were to be found in proportionate numbers in every large city.

The members of these associations were contented with their lot, proud of their craft, and were satisfied and happy. Now, the Church by encouraging and fostering these associations sought not only to promote the interests of their members and to protect them against rapacity and injustice, but she also took care to procure legislative enactments to promote honesty and practical integrity in the workmen, and thus to protect against fraud and imposition those who employed or patronized them. In these legislative enactments we easily discern the blessed influence of the holy Church protecting the workman and artisan in his just rights,

and at the same time safeguarding the interests of his employer or patron, thus establishing the harmonious play of rights and duties, of reciprocal claims and interests. We proceed to quote some of those enactments and rules that governed the trade-associations of the Middle Ages as we find them cited by Digby, from a curious old book, called *Livre des Métiers*, which contains the registry of the trades of Paris in the 13th century and the rules enacted for their government. The simplicity of some of these rules is combined with a most useful discretion.

But let us hear them as they are delivered. "Any person," says one of them, "can exercise this trade in tin vessels at Paris freely—"pour tant qu'il face bon œuvre et loial."[1] He must never work at night, on pain of a fine to the king, "quar la clartez de la nuit n'est mie si suffisant que il peussent faire bone œuvre et loial de leur mestier. Nus cordiers ne puet œuvrer de nuit pour les fausses œuvres que on i puet faire."[2] The bucklemakers ordain "que nus mestre ne doit souffrir entour li vallet qui ne soit bons et loiaus, ne réveur ne mauvès garçon de quelque lieu qu'il soit, soit de Paris ou d'ailleurs."[3] The lacemakers ordain that no one shall work by night "pour les fauses œuvres que en i feit, et pour ce que la clartez de la chandoile ne suffist mie à leur mestier."[4] The general condition required in all the trades is expressed thus: "pour tant que il face bone œuvre et loial."[5] The silk-mercers ordain "que nul ouvrier soit vallet ou mestre qui soit blasmés de houlerie ou de mauvése renommée, ou qui auroit esté banis d'aucun mestier ou d'aucun pays, ne puist ouvrer ou dit mestier,"[6] before being punished. Generally, in all trades, masters could employ their sons as apprentices, but "seulement nez de loial mariage."[7] Of stonemasons, Master Guillaume swore, "que il le mestier garderait bien et loiaument à son pooir ausi pour le poure come pour le riche, et pour le foible come pour le fort."[8] Every mason and plasterer swore that he would himself loyally observe the rules,

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1 "As far as he makes good work and lawful."

2 "For the light of the night is not by half so sufficient that they can make good work and lawful of their trade. No rope-makers may work by night, on account of the false works one may then make."

3 "That no master must suffer around him workmen who are not good and loyal, nor idler, nor bad boy, from whatever place, whether from Paris or elsewhere."

4 "On account of the false works one does in it, and because the light of the candle is not half sufficient for their trade."

5 "As far as he makes good work and loyal."

6 "That no workman, whether apprentice or master, who is blamed for irregularity or bad fame, or has been banished from any trade or country, can work at the said trade."

7 "Only born of lawful marriage."

8 "That he, the tradesman, should care well and lawfully, according to his power, as well for the poor as for the rich, and for the weak as for the strong."

but that he would inform the master if he should ever find any one in fault in anything. The stonemasons and plasterers must swear that they will put nothing in the plaster but the best materials and that they will give good and loyal measure, that the mortar shall be made of good lime and that if it be made of other stone they shall pay a fine. The linen-draper swears that he cannot have an apprentice "se il n'est si fil de léal espouse, ou ses frères ou ses niès nès de léal mariage."[1]

No draper should suffer near him, or near any other of the trade, any workman who lives immorally; and if any workman should be discovered, having a vicious connection in the suburbs, the provost of Paris should be informed, and he will make him leave the city or have him chastised for his folly. In the trade of "tapiz nostrez," or coarse carpeting, no one shall employ any thread, "fors que de file de laine bon et loial. Et ce ont establi li preudomes du mestier pour le commun profit de touz et pour léauté."[2] Of the foulons (fullers), if any workman in the trade should discover that there is any fellow-servant who has been a bad character, he should make it known to the master under pain of a fine. The stocking makers swear that they will use strong thread, which has not been rotted by the dye; for, if the thread should be thus rotted, the stockings shall be burned, and the maker must pay a fine of five sous; four to the king, and the rest to the guardians of the trade for their trouble. No glover shall work by night, "à clartez de feu ne de lumière, quar l'uevre qui est fête par nuit n'est ne bone ne léal."[3] In the bridle trade, if any old work be painted over and regilt, or mended and exposed for sale, the work must be burned, and the seller fined. Of linen drapers, "nule qui soit eslongiés de son paiis por mauvès cas l'en ne le doit recevoir on dit mestier."[4] In the trade of "tapiz Sarrassin" no one shall employ a strange workman until he knows that he is a "preudome et loial." Tailors were obliged to cut their cloth in an open shop, "à la veue du peuple,"[5] to prevent any suspicion of fraud.

It is in this admirable manner that the Church, in the days of an undivided Christendom, regulated the relations between capital and labor, between the employers and the employed. The rights of both were well defined and secured. The artisan was awarded

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[1] "If he is not son of lawful spouse, or his brothers or kindred born of lawful marriage."

[2] "Except woollen thread good and lawful. And this the inspectors of the trade have established for the common profit of all and for loyalty."

[3] "By light of fire nor of torch, for work made by night is neither good nor lawful."

[4] "None banished from his country for bad causes may be received into the said trade."

[5] "In the sight of the people."

just compensation for his labor and skill, and his patron was certain to obtain good work and just value for his money. There were no harsh separations, no exasperating inequalities, no heart burnings between class and class, but on the contrary there prevailed peace, harmony and good-will. The Church, to a great extent, reigned supreme over men's consciences; her teachings were, on the whole, listened to and obeyed; her authority as the divinely appointed teacher and guide was generally acknowledged, and the result was the reign of justice, of right and order amongst the various classes of society. Of course, in this fallen world the Church will be always the Church militant and not the Church triumphant; and hence, even in the Middle Ages there were several dark spots which she was unable to remove, in consequence of the opposition of human passions and self-interests; but from all that she accomplished in the teeth of the tremendous difficulties created by the exceptional social and political circumstances of the period, we can easily picture to ourselves the glorious reign of "peace on earth and good-will to men" she would have established, had she not been impeded and thwarted in the perfect fulfilment of her divine mission to mankind by the events of the sixteenth century.

In the ages of faith the spectral hand of "Proletariat" had not yet appeared on the walls of the social fabric writing the sentence of its doom, and making kings' faces change and grow pale with affright. Such a dread apparition was reserved for our days, when the principles and teachings of the so-called Reformation are working out to the bitter end their logical but destructive consequences. If the ripe fruit of the Protestant revolt is bitterness and ashes to the taste, it is because the tree that produced it is radically bad, from root to branch, and is in very deed the wild olive of Scripture that has not been grafted on the good olive which is Jesus Christ living in His Church.

Another peril of our times pointed out and deplored by the Holy Father in his Encyclical letter, *Humanum genus*, is the pernicious and subversive doctrine now in vogue regarding civil authority, its origin and rights, and the rights and duties of subjects. Says the Sovereign Pontiff:

"From the disturbing errors which we have described the greatest dangers to States are to be feared. For the fear of God and reverence for divine laws being taken away, the authority of rulers despised, sedition permitted and approved, and the popular passions urged on to lawlessness, with no restraint save that of punishment, a change and overthrow of all things will necessarily follow. Yea, this change and overthrow is deliberately planned and put forward by many associations of *Communists* and *Socialists;* and to their undertakings the sect of Freemasons is not hostile, but greatly

favors their designs, and holds in common with them their chief opinions. And if these men do not at once and everywhere endeavor to carry out their extreme views, it is not to be attributed to their teaching and their will, but to the virtue of that divine religion which cannot be destroyed."

It will be in order here to consider briefly Catholic teaching and action as regards the question of civil power and the duties and rights of subjects. It will be seen that she holds the scales equally poised between the correlative rights and duties of authority and allegiance, that whilst she protects and upholds the just rights of kings and rulers, she at the same time provides for the largest measure of rational liberty for subjects.

She has ever taught the divine origin of civil power. She anointed her kings and made their persons and their office sacred in the eyes of their subjects, and inculcated the duty and obligation of obedience to them for the reason that they were God's ministers. With St. Paul she said: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore, he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist purchase to themselves damnation. Wherefore, be subject of necessity, not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake" (Romans, xiii.).

She condemns disobedience, disloyalty, and rebellion to just laws and legitimate government, as most grievous sins, and she bans and excommunicates from her pale all members of secret societies that have for aim the overthrow of governmental authority and the destruction of the State. Hence, the Holy Father in his Encyclical Letter teaches: "As men are by the will of God born for civil union and society, and as the power to rule is so necessary a bond of society that, if it be taken away, society must at once be broken up, it follows that from Him who is the Author of society has come also the authority to rule; so that whosoever rules, he is the minister of God. Wherefore, as the end and nature of human society so requires, it is right to obey the just commands of lawful authority, as it is right to obey God, who ruleth all things; and it is most untrue that the people have it in their power to cast aside their obedience whensoever they please." On the other hand, the Church has not failed to impress on kings and rulers the duty of governing with justice and for the welfare and happiness of their subjects. With St. Thomas, she told them that the people were not for the kings, but the kings for the people. Liberty of the subject, mild government, economy in regard to public revenue, maintenance of justice, peace and order, the responsibility of kings, were the lessons she constantly inculcated.

In this connection it will be useful to call attention to the teach-

ings of some of the most eminent and representative Catholic theologians on the origin of civil power and on forms of government. St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that civil governments are not "jure divino," but "jure humano," and that to "ordain anything for the common good is the right of the people, or of some one representing the people."

Bellarmine says: "It is false that political princes (civil rulers) have their power from God only; for they have it from God only so far as He has planted a natural instinct in the minds of men that they should wish to be governed by some one. But whether men should wish to be governed by kings or by consuls, by one or by many, by a perpetual or a temporary magistrate, depends on their own wishes; as also it is not the special command of God, but the wish of men which determines that this person should be king rather than that. Wherefore St. Thomas, in the cited passage 22, quaes. x., art. 10, and quaes. xii., art. 2, lays it down as a matter certain and decided that political governments and kingdoms are not founded on divine, but on human, law,—a proposition which no scholar would contradict." (*De Potestate Sum. Pontif.*, cap. 21, p. 203.) This doctrine of the delegation of civil authority from the people, Suarez states, was the common opinion of his day, and he goes on to say "that the civil power, whenever it is found in a man or in a prince, has emanated, according to usual and legitimate law, from the people and the community, either directly or remotely, and that it cannot otherwise be justly possessed" (*De Leg.*, lib. iii., cap. 4.) And the same illustrious theologian, in his work against James I. of England, declares that the opinion of Bellarmine, cited above, was "*ancient, received, true and necessary.*" And this has continued to be the doctrine of Catholic theologians down to the present day. The king or supreme magistrate is, in Catholic teaching, but the executor of the will of the nation or people whom he governs; and should he abuse his trust, or employ the supreme power with which he has been invested to the public detriment; should he, in other words, rule his people with injustice and tyranny, and trample on their rights and liberties, he could be lawfully dethroned and torn down from his place of power.

The following is a synopsis of Catholic teaching on this subject:

1st. Civil society is a divine appointment.

2d. In all societies there must be a governing power.

3d. This power, in all its just laws, must be obeyed, not only for fear but for conscience' sake, for it is an ordinance of God, and they who resist purchase to themselves damnation.

4th. The form of human government is founded on human and not on divine right.

5th. The king or chief magistrate must rule for the common weal and not for his personal interest or gratification.

6th. The subjects cannot obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the divine law.

7th. When laws are unjust they are not binding in conscience. It may, however, become necessary to obey such laws from motives of prudence, that is, in order to avoid scandals and commotions.

8th. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes:

(1.) When they are opposed to the common weal.

(2.) When the laws have not for aim the good of the common weal.

(3.) When the legislator outsteps the limits of his powers.

At the coronation of a Catholic king, the bishop, after admonishing him to defend the Christian religion, says to him: "Justice, without which no society can last long, thou shalt unwaveringly exercise towards all. Widows, orphans, the poor and the weak thou shalt defend from all oppression.

"According to thy royal dignity thou shalt show thyself benignant, mild, and affable to all approaching thee.

"And thou shalt so carry thyself that thou mayest appear to reign not for thine own utility, but for that of all thy people, and to expect the rewards of thy good deeds not on earth, but in heaven."

For the cause of justice and peace, says Digby, the Holy See was invoked by all nations in common until the sixteenth century; and no power was too secure of its own sufficiency to set the Pope's counsels at defiance. Its great judgment when censuring the unjust seemed to long ages like Heaven's dreadful thunder. "The stones heard the voice and the trees of the wood trembled."

It is in this way the Church of God sought to establish the just equilibrium between responsibilities and duties, between rights and obligations, between the authority and responsibility of supreme power and the rights and duties of subjects, thus ensuring as far as in her lay the reign of liberty without license and of authority without despotism.

On the subject of the respective influences of the doctrines of Catholicity and Protestantism on civil liberty, a Protestant writer, in the *Christian Examiner* for January, 1865, makes the following acute and, for the most part, correct observations:

"That the Catholic dogma is more congenial with democratic institutions than the Protestant dogma, is a fact too clear to be disputed; and if this consideration were of any vital moment, we might leave the case here on the threshold. The principle that lies at the foundation of democratic institutions is *man's capability for self-government.* This principle implies the essential rectitude of human nature, in all its spheres of faculty. It implies that man is possessed of reason and of free-will; that he knows

what is wise, just, orderly, beneficial, that he is at liberty to elect it, and that he has power to enact it. It implies that his natural ideas of what is right, equitable and obligatory are correct, or may be made so by suitable study, care and attention. All this the Catholic theology asserts; all this the Protestant theology denies. The Catholic dogma maintains that human nature preserved its essential goodness after the fall of Adam. The Protestant dogma contends that human nature, in consequence of the fall of Adam, became totally depraved. The Catholic dogma accommodates itself to human reason, assuming its capacity to receive truths presented to it; the Protestant dogma almost vilifies reason in its jealousy for faith, and allows it no power of judgment in matters of moral truth. The Catholic dogma acknowledges man's moral freedom; the Protestant doctrine affirms predestination. The Catholic ought, therefore, to be a democrat; the Protestant ought to be a monarchist. Neither can logically be anything else.

"This logical necessity is confirmed by other peculiarities of the two systems. The Protestant Church makes a radical distinction between different orders of mankind, by classifying them as regenerate and unregenerate, elect and non-elect, children of God and children of the world. It divides by palpable barriers the sheep from the goats. The church member is a person set apart from the general congregation, as an object of peculiar consideration in the sight of God and man,—a sacred person specially illuminated, guided, upheld by the Holy Spirit. Here, it would seem, is a basis something more than speculative,—a basis actually laid in institutions,—for the most absolute of all governments, a theocracy,—a government of priests ruling in the name of God—a spiritual oligarchy. The Catholic Church, on the contrary, puts all mankind in the bosom of the Church on an equality. The sacraments and the symbols are for all on the same terms; the same articles of faith satisfy the wise and the simple. All social distinctions disappear at the foot of her altar. Her priesthood is not a caste; no one of the faithful is disqualified by his obscurity for the office of Supreme Pontiff. Side by side, the rich and the poor, the noble and the plebeian, the lord and the serf, bend in worship and kneel on the pavement to receive the consecrated elements."

Whilst it is undeniably true, as this writer affirms, that many of the doctrines of Protestantism tend to absolutism in civil government, it is equally true that its radical principle of private judgment leads to anarchy and revolution.

With the "Reformation" there came into play a new philosophy of life and new doctrines and principles of action that aimed at the removal of the landmarks of Catholic civilization. In proportion as the influence and authority of the Church were diminished, the balancing power of her laws and teachings was removed, and history tells the result. Voluntary poverty for Christ's dear sake was denounced as a mean superstition; Dives was reëstablished in his place of honor, and poor Lazarus, with his sores and rags, was left begging and scorned at the door. Alms-houses and charitable institutions were suppressed, monasteries were destroyed, the abbey-lands—the patrimony of the poor—were confiscated, and religious orders of holy men and women, Christ-consecrated, were themselves reduced to beggary. Poverty had lost all its sacredness and became an object of scorn and contempt, and was treated as a crime; and the old pagan adage of Juvenal was again verified, viz.,

"that poverty has nothing so repugnant as this, that it makes men objects of ridicule and scorn."

Poverty was regarded as a crime, and mendicants were punished as criminals. When the Catholic monasteries were suppressed in England, the poor wandered in hungry crowds over the country. To suppress this nuisance, so condemnatory of the teachings and policy of the "Reformers," the first parliament that assembled under Edward VI. enacted "that whosoever lived idly and loiteringly for the space of three days came under the description of a vagabond, and was liable to the following punishment: Two justices of the peace might order the letter V to be burned on his breast, and to adjudge him to serve the informer two years as his slave. His master was bound to provide him with bread and water, but not meat; might fix an iron round his neck, arm or leg, and was authorized to compel him to labor at any work, however vile it might be, by beating, chaining, or otherwise. If the slave absented himself for a fortnight, the letter S was burned on his cheek or forehead, and he became a slave for life; and, if he offended a second time in like manner, his flight subjected him to the penalties of felony."

Let us listen to the testimony of a Protestant historian, Cobbett, regarding the misery and ruin brought on the poorer classes of England by the so-called Reformation:

"330. Returning, now, to paragraphs 50, 51 and 52, just mentioned; it is there seen, that the Catholic Church rendered all municipal laws about the *poor* wholly unnecessary; but, when that Church had been plundered and destroyed; when the greedy leading 'Reformers' had sacked the convents and the churches; when those great estates, which *of right belonged* to the poorer classes, had been taken from them; when the parsonages had been first well pillaged, and the remnant of their revenues given to *married men;* then the *poor* (for poor there will and must be in every community) were left destitute of the means of existence, other than the fruits of beggary, theft, and robbery. Accordingly, when '*good* Queen Bess' had put the finishing hand to the plundering of the Church and poor, once happy and free and hospitable England became a den of famishing robbers and slaves. STRYPE, a Protestant, and an authority to whom HUME appeals and refers many hundreds of times, tells us of a letter from a Justice of the Peace in Somersetshire, to the Lord Chief Justice, saying: 'I may justly say, that the *able men* that are abroad, seeking the spoil and confusion of the land, are able, if they were reduced to good subjection, to give the greatest enemy her majesty hath a strong battle, and, as they are now, are so much strength to the enemy. Besides, the generation that daily springeth from them *is likely to be most wicked.* These spare neither rich nor poor; but, whether it be large or small, all is fish that cometh to net with them; and yet I say, both they and the rest are trussed up a-pace.' The same Justice says: 'In default of justice, many wicked thieves escape. For most commonly the most simple countrymen and women, looking no farther than to the loss of their own goods, are of opinion that they would not procure any man's death for all the goods in the world.' And while the '*good* Bess' complained bitterly of the *non-execution* of her laws, the same Protestant historian tells us that '*she executed more than five hundred criminals in a year,*' and was so little satisfied with that number, that she threatened to send private persons to see her penal laws executed '*for profit and gain's sake.*' It appears that she did not threaten in vain; for, soon after

this, a complaint was made in Parliament that the stipendiary magistrate of that day was 'a kind of living creature, who, for half a dozen of chickens, would dispense with a dozen of penal statutes.' She did not, however, stop, with this '*liberal*' use of the gallows. Such was the degree of beggary, of vagabondage, and of thievishness and robbery, that she resorted, particularly in London and its neighborhood, to *martial law*. This fact is so complete a proof of the horrible effects of the 'Reformation' upon the moral state of the people, and it is so fully characteristic of the government, which the people of England had, in consequence of that Reformation, become so debased as to submit to, that I must take the statement as it stands in HUME, who gives the very words of '*good* and *glorious* Bess's' commission to her head murderer upon this occasion. 'The streets of London were very much infested with *idle vagabonds* and *riotous persons;* the Lord Mayor had endeavored to repress this disorder; the Star-chamber had exerted its authority, and inflicted punishment on these *rioters*. But the Queen, finding these remedies ineffectual, revived' [*revived?* What does he mean by REVIVED?] '*martial law*, and gave Sir THOMAS WILFORD a commisssion as Provost-martial; 'Granting him authority, and commanding him, upon *signification* given by the justices of the peace in London or the neighboring counties, of such offenders, *worthy to be speedily executed by martial law*, to take them, and, *according to the justice of martial law*, to execute them *upon the gallows or gibbet*.' And yet, this is she whom we have been taught to call '*good* Queen Bess;' this is she, of the '*glories*' of whose reign there are men of learning base enough to talk, even to this day!

"331. But, such were the natural consequences of the destruction of the Catholic Church, and of the plundering of the poor, which accompanied that destruction, and particularly of lodging all power, ecclesiastical and civil, in the same hands. However, though this terrible she-tyrant spared neither racks nor halters, though she was continually reproving the executors of her bloody laws, for their *remissness* while they were strewing the country with the carcasses of malefactors or alleged malefactors, all would not do; that hunger, which breaks through stone walls, set even *her* terrors and torments at defiance: at last, it was found to be absolutely necessary to make some general and permanent and solid *provision for the poor;* and, in the forty-third year of her reign, was passed that Act, which is in force to this day, and which provides a maintenance for indigent persons, which maintenance is to come from the land, assessed and collected by overseers, and the payment enforced by process the most effectual and most summary. And here we have the great, the prominent, the staring, the horrible and ever-durable consequence of the 'Reformation,' that is to say, *pauperism established by law*."

The teachings and principles, in relation to poverty and wealth respectively, brought into play by the "Reformation," have been in operation in the world for the last three hundred years, and have borne bitter fruit, and leave the question of pauperism one of the most difficult problems of political economy. Protestantism has stripped poverty of the sacredness given it by Christ and recognized by his Church, and exalted wealth in human estimation. It has, in fact, constituted temporal prosperity as the test of Gospel truth. Through the mouths of its theologians and apologists it has again and again pointed to the alleged prosperity and wealth of Protestant nations as an irrefutable proof of the heavenly origin and truth, as well as the elevating influences, of Protestant teachings, and it has pointed the finger of contemptuous scorn at the alleged unprogressiveness and comparative poverty of Catholic States as the most undeniable proof of the corrupting and degrading influences of the Catholic faith.

The Gospel of Protestantism is not that of Him who said: "Blessed are the poor," and who denounced woes against the rich. It has covered poverty with contempt; it has belauded wealth; it has thereby served to intensify into fierce activity the desire for riches and love of gain inherent in the human breast, and consequently it has directly tended to beget that intense selfishness, that rage for money, which characterize modern society, and which have created those wealthy monopolies that under the wheels of the juggernaut of commerce are grinding and crushing the poor and toiling masses, and are more or less responsible for the heart-burnings and fierce discontent of the lower orders with society as at present constituted, and which find their expression and embodiment in Socialism, Communism and kindred associations that threaten to rend asunder the body politic, and tear it into shreds.

The principles of the "Reformation" had two opposite tendencies in relation to government and civil liberty—that is, towards absolutism on the one hand, and revolution on the other. In Protestant countries the state subjected the spiritual order to the temporal or secular, and sought to govern the souls and consciences as well as the bodies of its subjects. It became a despotic Cæsarism and attempted to reduce to practice the false and tyrannous doctrine expressed in the formula: "*Cujus regio illius et religio*;" the people of the country must be of the same religion as are the rulers. The absolutism of Protestant states was on the one hand the result of their revolt against the authority of the Church, which asserted and maintained the independence of the spiritual order and the subjection of the governing power to the laws of eternal justice; and on the other hand it was the effect of their recoil from the logical tendencies of the licentious and anarchical principle of private judgment which constituted private opinion and individual reason the judge of religious and civil authority, and which, as it created revolution in the spiritual order, tended also to beget revolt and rebellion against the State. Government in England became a tyranny of the most pronounced type; for one hundred and fifty years after the "Reformation" in that country the liberties of the people were crushed, the privileges secured by the Catholic *Magna Charta* were trampled under foot, and the royal prerogative swallowed up almost every other element of government. It was only at the Revolution of 1688 that the principles of the great charter were partially asserted and revived. Political freedom shared the same fate in the other Protestant countries.

"In the Roman Catholic religion," says a Protestant writer, "there is a resisting principle to absolute civil power from the division of authority with the head of the Church of Rome, but in the north of Europe the Lutheran church is entirely subservient to

the civil power, and the whole of the northern peoples of Protestant countries have lost their liberties ever since they changed their religion." On the other hand, it is undeniable that the logical tendencies of the principle of private judgment are necessarily in the direction of revolt and anarchy. The most striking effect of the first preaching of the "Reformation," says Hallam, was that it appealed to the ignorant; and though political liberty cannot be reckoned the aim of those who introduced it, yet there predominated that revolutionary spirit which loves to witness destruction for its own sake, and that intoxicated self-confidence which renders folly mischievous.

Macaulay institutes a comparison between the "Reformation" and the French Revolution—the one was a revolution in religion, the other in politics, but both were the outcome of the Protestant principle of private judgment.

"The only event," he says, "of modern times which can be properly compared with the Reformation is the French Revolution; or to speak more accurately, that great revolution of political feeling which took place in almost every part of the civilized world during the eighteenth century, and which obtained in France its most terrible and signal triumph. Each of these memorable events may be described as a rising up of human reason against a caste." —(Review of Nares's Memoirs of Lord Burghley, Miscell., p. 173). It is, then, the Protestant principle of private judgment, not the Catholic principle of authority, that begets revolutions, overturns thrones, and sends kings into exile or to the scaffold. Revolution and Communism are political Protestantism, for they are the application of the principle of private judgment to civil government, social order, and the rights of property. It may be said that Communism has invaded Catholic countries, and has therein more fully displayed its diabolical character. Granted; but it has invaded and flourished in those countries in spite of the Catholic principle which condemns it, and not because of it. The flood of burning lava that flows from the crater of a volcano is the direct issue of the volcano which vomits it forth; but should it flow down to the underlying villages and destroy them, those villages will be its victims and not its generating cause. And so it is with the Catholic countries that are cursed by the presence of Communism: they are its only victims, but the volcano from which it has burst forth in a wasting burning flood is the Protestant principle of private judgment. We gladly admit that Protestants have no sympathy with the wickedness of Communism, but that is because they are better than their principle.

It may be objected that the most equitable laws and the best regulated liberty obtain in England and America—Protestant na-

tions. The answer is that these nations inherit their just laws and their broad and ennobling liberties from their Catholic forefathers, and that the great charter of their rights and liberties was won for the English speaking races by the Catholic bishops and Catholic barons assembled on the field of Runnymede. Besides, the natural and political qualities and characteristics of a people count for much in the matter of self-government and political liberty. We find, therefore, that Protestantism has been by turns the friend and flatterer of despotic rulers, and the ally and associate of rebellious mobs. Janus-like, it has had two faces, one of which smiled approvingly on absolutism and the other on revolution and civil war. It has, therefore, been in principle neither the support of just government nor the friend of civil and rational liberty. It has powerfully contributed to destroy the just equilibrium established by the Church between the reciprocal rights and duties of rulers and their subjects, and must, therefore, be rightly held responsible for the present unsettled state of civil society, where kings rule, not by the grace of God, but by the power of "big battalions;" and subjects grudgingly obey, not for the love of God, but because they cannot help themselves, and are habitually ripe for the work of revolution and social anarchy.

Another pernicious and destructive evil which is eating at the very vitals of modern society, and which the Holy Father, in his Encyclical Letter, so earnestly condemns and deplores, is the doctrine and practice of divorce. The respective teachings of Catholicity and Protestantism on this fundamental question are too well known to require to be here detailed at any length. In her teaching and action in this matter, the Church has been the saviour of the family and the bulwark of civil and religious society. The family is the germ and matrix of all other societies. The state is but a collection of a certain number of families organized under the authority of a common chief for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the pursuit of happiness; and the Church is in a certain sense but the organization of a certain number of Christian families under the guidance and authority of a common father for the protection and development of their spiritual life. Hence, what the root is to the tree that grows from it, what the foundation is to the house that rests upon it, what the well-spring in mountain solitudes is to the river that rises and flows from it, that the family is to the State and to the Church. From it the former receives its citizens, and the latter her children. It follows, therefore, that whatever tends to break up and desecrate the family inflicts the same injury on society as he who poisons the river-head inflicts on the healthfulness and purity of its waters, or as he who gashes and hacks the roots of a tree would inflict on the trunk and branches. Now, as society rests

on the family, so the family rests upon marriage and draws from it the character and purity of its life. The Church, then, by insisting on the unity of marriage and its indissoluble character, has guarded and protected the honor and integrity, the purity and sacredness of family life, and has thereby guarded and secured the best and most sacred interests of society at large. Even her enemies admit and extol the saving action of the Church in relation to this matter. In order to obtain some idea of the immense benefits and blessings for which society is indebted to her for her holy and inviolable guardianship of the sanctities of marriage, let us glance for a moment at the effects of divorce. Divorce is a violation of the sacredness of home, it is a desecration of the sanctities and purity of family life, and a wicked invasion of the inalienable rights of the family and children. It is a rending asunder of the unity of marriage, and it establishes successive polygamy. It destroys the indissolubility of marriage by dissolving the bond of matrimony; it desecrates the sanctity of home, for it encourages conjugal infidelity, and puts a premium on adultery. It breaks down the barriers raised up by Christ and His Church against the headlong tide of human passions, and lets this impure tide loose in a destructive flood on society. It is a violation of the dignity of Christian womanhood, and pulls it down into that state of shame and degradation to which it was reduced in Paganism. It is, for the most part, a conspiracy against the rights of woman both as wife and mother, and robs the children of such broken marriages of that moral training and home education to which they are entitled, and makes them practically orphans even during the lifetime of their parents.

Now, what has been the attitude of Protestantism on this momentous question? Has it been true to the teachings of Christ? Has it been loyal to the highest interests of the family and to the sacred cause of Christian morality and civilization? History emphatically answers—No. It is an undoubted historical fact that Luther, Melanchthon, and the other leaders of the "Reformation" officially permitted Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, to have two wives at once. It is an undoubted historical fact that Henry VIII. of England broke with the Holy See because of its stern refusal to allow him to discard his legitimate wife, and during her lifetime to take to himself another. It was on this account, and on this account alone, that Henry VIII. became the head of the "Reformation" in England. Thus it may truly be said that the doctrine and practice of divorce have been the parents of the Protestant revolt. Protestantism has been wittily defined as the emancipation of the flesh; and the definition is certainly true of it in its relation to the marriage question, for it has emancipated the flesh and its lusts from the holy and salutary restraints put upon them by the doctrine of the unity and indisso-

lubility of marriage. Accordingly, it is found that the practice of divorce is, under certain conditions, sanctioned by the civil laws of every Protestant state with the most destructive results to the best interests of the family and society as well as to the sacred cause of Christian morality. So widespread has this evil become in the United States, and so detrimental to public morality and to social well-being, that several State legislatures have had under consideration the necessity of passing more stringent laws in regulation and restriction of it.

But it is time to conclude. The Holy Father, towards the end of his memorable Encyclical on Freemasonry, exhorts the clergy and laity "to strive by their united efforts to make men thoroughly love the Church; for, the greater their knowledge and love of the Church, the more will they be turned away from clandestine societies." It is in compliance with this exhortation, which comes with such force to all true and loyal Catholic hearts, that this article has been written. Would that we could do full justice to the inspiring theme. Enough, however, has been written to show that the Catholic Church is the mother of Christian civilization and the friend and saviour of society; whereas, Protestantism, in its teachings and influences, is principally the cause of the terrible evils that afflict modern society and menace it with ruin. Other evil agencies, such as Freemasonry and kindred associations, have taken up the destructive forces brought into life and action by Protestant principles, and are energetically carrying them out to their sad and fatal consequences.

If, then, Christian society is to be saved, and Christian civilization is to be awakened into a new life and given a new power for the welfare and happiness of mankind, the world must return to the teachings of the Catholic Church, and must embody its divine principles in its life and conduct. Protestantism cannot undo its destructive work. It has been able to pull down, but it is not able to build up again. Freemasonry has neither the power nor the will to save Christian society and social order; it would rather surround itself with the ruins and the wrecks of both. Communism, Socialism, and other human organizations serve but to aggravate the evils which they have been ostensibly established to remove. God has made the nations of the earth curable, "sanabiles fecit nationes orbis terrarum" (*Wisdom I.*, 14), but He has given the healing power to but one institution here below, and that is the Church—Catholic, Apostolic and Roman; and she is, indeed, like her divine Founder, and by virtue of His indwelling presence and power, the healer of the sick nations and the saviour of society. May God hasten the day of the universal triumph of the Church for His greater glory and for the salvation and happiness of the human race, which He has redeemed in the Precious Blood of His

Adorable Son—Christ our Saviour. "*O Emmanuel, rex et legifer noster, expectatio gentium, et salvator earum; veni ad salvandum nos, Domine Deus noster!*" "O Emmanuel, our King and our Lawgiver, the longing of the nations, yea and the salvation thereof, come to save us, O Lord our God!"

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC HABITS OF THOUGHT.

THE philosophical problems that come up for solution at the present day are very ancient. We find them all debated in Plato; and in the light of modern issues his pages become instinct with life. Whether we sit with Socrates in the forum and listen to him discussing with Theætetus the limits of science and the relativity of knowledge; whether we recline with him under the lofty and widespreading plane-tree by the cool fountain, whilst he talks with Phædrus of love, and art, and beauty, and the soul in its relations to these things; whether we laugh at the inimitable irony with which he brings Gorgias and his disciples to confusion; or, whether with bated breath we listen to his sublime discourse on immortality, delivered to his devoted followers in the prison in which he is about to drink the poisoned cup; be the occasion when it may, we still meet with the same questions that face us today. Then as now, it is the human intellect beating against the bars of its limitations and seeking to compass the unattainable. It is the ever-recurring problem of knowing, in which men forget the very circumscribed limits within which thought moves. And after traversing a dreary waste of controversy with wrecks of systems scattered through the pages of Plato and the schoolmen, of Locke, and Hume, and Berkeley, and Kant, and of Herbert Spencer in our day, we inquire, what is the outcome of it all? We have gotten no nearer to the solution. And in all earnestness we ask, is there a solution at all, or rather, is there a problem to be solved? We know; and after we shall have known how we know, we still only know. There is no going back of this. The mental labor of five and twenty centuries has been expended on that one problem of knowing; ought this not suffice? How long, maelstrom-like, will it continue to whirl within its eddy all issues? To our mind, the only practical solution to this problem—if problem there be—is, as

has been hinted at in the following paper, to accept things as they are, to take upon trust our faculties with all their shortcomings, and to recognize both shortcomings and limitations in all our thinking.

I.

There is a wide difference between the habits of thought engendered by literary pursuits and those begotten of scientific studies. The difference is as marked as are the diverse objects of thought. Literature we know to be personal in its nature, in its method, and to a great extent in its object. Science is impersonal, both in its subject-matter and in its treatment. Literature deals with persons and things, so far as they affect our humanity; every piece of written composition that appeals to the emotional element in our nature may be regarded as literature. Science deals with persons and things as they are in themselves, or in coördinated relations. It examines, investigates, discusses from an impersonal point of view; utterly regardless of individual bias, it gropes its way through the entanglements and environments of a subject-matter, and cautiously passes from the known to the unknown. Science, in a word, is concerned with the true as true. Its object is truth. Literature, on the other hand, ranges over a wider field. It may be personal and impersonal, subjective and objective, as best suits its inclinations. It accepts the true and the false, the good and the evil, the beautiful and the deformed, and moulds them all to its own purposes, ultimately with the view of acting upon man's feelings—now arousing his curiosity, now exciting his wonder and admiration, again working upon his sympathies and stirring his soul. Its object is the ideal of all that is sublime and beautiful in nature.

Entering the interior of the thinking-subject, we may note the process the mind goes through in developing a definite course of thought upon some object. Is the object one of a scientific nature? See how cautiously the mind proceeds. It lays down its postulates; it runs over the principles that it holds within its grasp; it casts about among the laws and facts already demonstrated and recognized as certain truth; these it groups together into classes and sub-classes; it compares them with one another; it considers their various properties; it views the modes and properties and behavior of other facts, or groups of facts, in the light of those well-known and well-understood; it applies to them its demonstrated formula, and draws its conclusions. Throughout this process the scientific mind remains unimpassioned, and regards persons and things as labelled abstractions, rather than concrete realities. It works within narrow and closely defined lines. It grows impatient of all that does not bear upon the question under consideration, and rejects it as a distraction. The habit of mind thus developed is

rigid and exclusive, and unfits its possessor for grasping and treating with facility other subjects than those upon which it has had life-long practice.[1] It lacks in extension what it gains in comprehension.

Is the object of thought one of a literary nature? Here the mind follows a process the reverse of that employed in a scientific pursuit. Its first effort is to grasp the conclusions and work backward to the starting principles. Nothing comes amiss to it. The thought apparently farthest removed from the main idea may throw upon it additional light. All that science, or art, or nature can contribute, the literary mind makes its own, not for the sake of science, or art, or nature, nor by way of determining some unknown truth, or reaching some scientific discovery, but as so many illustrations drawing out, exemplifying, clearing up more vividly the ideal which it has grasped, and which it labors to express. To every literary mind may be made, and made as little to the purpose, the reproach that the sophist Callicles addressed to Socrates: "By the gods, you never stop talking about shoemakers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as though our discourse were of these."[2] All such illustrations are the material out of which the literary mind constructs a body for its conception. Literature is an art, and the process of literature is the process of all art. Note that process. The soul conceives a thought. The thought grows into a central idea, around which group other subordinate ones. It becomes for the soul an ideal. That ideal is nourished by reading, or reflection, or study, or experience, or all of these combined, and quickens into life, and waxes strong, and takes possession not only of the intellect, but of the whole man, and gives him no rest till he finds for it an adequate expression according to the bent of his genius, be it that of a poem, a novel, or a historical study, a painting, a statue, or a musical composition.

In all this the literary mind experiences, with a thoughtful writer, "how hard it is to think oneself into a thing and to think its central thought out of it."[3] It is not the work of a few days or a few weeks. It is a slow and elaborate process. At the age of four Goethe first witnessed the puppet-show of Faust. He was still a child when he read the legend.[4] From the start, the idea enters

[1] Since writing the above, we find a striking confirmation of its truth by the experience of Professor Tyndall. Speaking of his student-life in Germany, about the year 1851, he thus describes the state of his mind: "In those days I not unfrequently found it necessary to subject myself to a process which I called depolarization. My brain, intent on its subjects, used to acquire a set resembling the rigid polarity of a steel magnet. It lost the pliancy needful for free conversation, and to recover this I used to walk occasionally to Charlottenburg, or elsewhere. From my experiences at that time I derived the notion that hard-thinking and fleet-talking do not run together." ("My Schools and Schoolmasters," in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January, 1885.)

[2] Plato, "Gorgias," cap. xlv.

[3] Hare, "Guesses at Truth," p. 275.

[4] In an abridgment of Wedemann's "Faust-Book."

his soul, and takes possession of it, and grows into a thing of life; and forthwith it becomes the ruling idea of his life, and he makes it the inspiration of his activity, and moulds upon it in many respects both thought and conduct, and picking up all the traits and characteristics of his age, he weaves them into this legend, not hastily, but slowly, studiously, in the spirit of true art, till, finally, in his eighty-second year he pens the last line of his great Faust-poem. The first conception in his fourth, the last line in his eighty-second year; this is a lesson that who runs may read. The example of Goethe illustrates the spirit of artistic genius. It takes the old and remodels it into a new artistic whole. The scientific genius builds upon the foundations already laid. A Newton or a Descartes may add to the sum of mathematical knowledge; he may give new methods of demonstration and calculation; but he leaves untouched every principle and every proposition that science had previously established. Even when such a scientific genius grasps by anticipation a new law or a new truth, he co-ordinates it with other known laws, and corrects his first impressions accordingly. Not so the literary genius; for, whilst both have this in common, that the terms they use possess a recognized value, still he of the literary habit makes not—nor does he seek to make—a connection or a continuity with aught of the past; having grasped the ideal, he labors to give it full and adequate expression independently of any other ideal, past or present. He lives and breathes in an atmosphere of opinion and assumption that permeates his thinking, and colors both thought and language; he takes it all for granted; he draws from it the material with which to shape and strengthen his own creation. Richter, in contemplating this literary habit of thought, is filled with admiration: "I fear and wonder," he says, "at the latent almightiness with which man orders—that is, creates his range of ideas. I know no better symbol of creation."[1] It is, indeed, the process of moulding something entirely new and distinct out of material hitherto used for other purposes. It is a creation because it is a launching into existence of an artistic type that pre-existed only as an ideal in the author's mind. It is an imitation—as indeed is all art—in a finite manner, and within the limits belonging to finiteness, of the creative act by which the Infinite First Cause drew all things from nothingness.[2]

But there are certain habits of thought in which literary and scientific methods interlace and overlap to the detriment of both letters and science. Here is a case in point. Science pretends,

[1] "Wit, Wisdom and Philosophy of Jean Paul Friederich Richter," § xi., p. 129.

[2] See Gioberti, "Del Bello," cap. vi. Del Modo in cui la Fantasia Estetica si può dire Creatrice del Bello, p. 105.

and even seriously undertakes, in the study of things, to discover the laws according to which they are, and move, and act. But does science always succeed? Are the laws it claims to have discovered really and indeed in the things themselves, or in the mind of the observer? Let us see. In the natural sciences, a law is a generalized experience. Its validity depends upon the range of experience or observation which it covers. Now, that range is frequently very limited. Not unfrequently is it inadequate. Oftener still is it confined not so much to things themselves as to certain aspects of things. Imagination, at a single leap, transcends the facts within the range of observation and experience, and under the same generalization includes all possible facts and all possible experiences. Sometimes imagination hits the truth, and discerns the order governing a certain number of phenomena. Sometimes, also, it misses reality; and, after establishing so-called laws, and erecting theories upon a plausible hypothesis, some unexplained phenomenon reveals the underlying fallacy, and science reconstructs another theory, and announces another law, that may or may not be more correct. And sometimes again, the explanation is inadequate. A wider range of experience informs us that the so-called law is only a half-truth, or one aspect of a larger law regulating the order and harmony of things. A glance at the history of chemical, physical and geological theories will suffice to bear us out as to these various modes in which so-called laws of nature proved to be only false translations of nature's language. Instance Newton's law of gravitation in physics;[1] the phlogiston and atomic theories in chemistry; and in geology the revelations made by the deep-sea dredgings of Carpenter and Thomson.[2] This issue leads to many interesting lines of thought; but the point we would here make is this: That scientists are apt to forget that what they call the laws of nature may be really such only to a very limited extent; that some of them may be simply their interpretation of certain aspects of certain sets of phenomena falling within the narrow range of their experience; that these interpretations may, as likely as not, be fabrications of their imagination; that, therefore, it ill-becomes them, in the name of science, to be intolerantly dogmatic concerning them; and that such dogmatism is opposed to the scientific spirit. They are no longer following the scientific method. They are simply misapplying the literary method. The intellectual structure of their theories is of a piece with the construction of a parable or a fable.

On the other hand, scientific habits of thinking cause the sci-

[1] See Faraday on this law in his paper on the "Conservation of Forces." Youmans' ed., pp. 359–383.

[2] With H. M. S. *The Challenger.*

entist to look upon persons and things no longer in their concrete nature, but rather as so many abstractions, or, at most, as concrete specimens of an abstract principle. His very feelings and emotions he learns to classify and, as far as possible, separate from himself. He measures the worth of things accordingly. They possess value in proportion as they explain a difficult problem, or contribute a new truth to the sum of knowledge. It has been well remarked: "Even the feelings of speculative men become speculative. They care about the notions of things and their abstractions, and their relations, far more than about the realities."[1] So that, whilst the scientist may unwittingly bring literary habits to bear upon scientific issues, to the detriment of science, unwittingly also may he bring his scientific habits into affairs of everyday life, and measure persons and things by a false criterion. So, also, may the man of a literary way of thinking use false weights and measures in forming his estimates. "An author's blood will turn to ink. Words enter into him and take possession of him, and nothing can obtain admission except through the passport of words."[2] And, because words do not always represent the full measure of things, or are at times totally inadequate to express them, the mind living in words becomes guilty of blunders no less egregious than the mind living in abstractions. What, then, is the normal state of the mind?

II.

The normal function of the human intellect is to apprehend truth. Its activity feeds upon truth, and by truth is nourished. For truth it was created; by the light and warmth of truth it develops in strength and grasp; without the truth, it gropes in darkness, restless, yearning, in misery, hungering and thirsting for that which alone can satiate its desires. There may be barriers in the way; it may require enduring labor to remove the barriers; opposition only sharpens the eagerness with which the quest is pursued. In this life, subject to the present order of things, with body and sense standing between the soul and the apprehension of all knowledge, it is not easy to determine which is the true and which the false. The gratuitous and unquestioned notions acquired in early training; the habits of thought in which the intellect works; natural likes and dislikes; feeling, sentiment, inclination; prejudices of the age and the race; assumptions and opinions that are the outcome of one's environments,—are all so many hindrances in the way of the clear and simple apprehension of truth. But they are not insuperable barriers. The human intellect, acting in its normal state, and according to the laws of its nature, may with time and patience,

[1] Hare, "Guesses at Truth," p. 495. [2] Ibid.

and without deceiving itself in the process, attain to the knowledge of certain truth. It cannot accept error as error; and if error does, as error will, enter into its calculations, it first assumes the garb of truth, and as such alone is it admitted. Thoughtful study, comparison, careful reasoning upon evident principles, truths and facts, will furnish sufficient light to penetrate the mask and reveal the underlying falsity, if falsity there be.

It is within the province of the human mind not only to apprehend the truth, but also to recognize it as truth. In this recognition consists the mind's certainty. It is with absolute certainty that we know and distinguish that two and two make four, and not five or three. There is nothing relative either in my knowing this truth or in my being certain of it. The Hottentot and the Indian are equally certain. The Agnostic who denies this absolute certainty is also equally certain. It is an ultimate fact of consciousness. If you would inquire how we know that we are certain with an absolute certainty, we can give you no further reason than that, being constructed as we are, we cannot think differently. It is of the very essence of our reason so to think. Nor could it be otherwise. God could not create a reason whose normal condition of thinking would be such as to make two and two equal to any other number than four, without annihilating Himself. Such an act were to destroy the very essence of reason; it would, therefore, be an infinite contradiction of God's Infinite Nature. The one is as unthinkable as the other. We are what we are. We find ourselves to be what we are as thinking beings independently of ourselves. We take ourselves on trust. We take on trust all the faculties of our souls. We use them as we find them. What they report to our consciousness—our inner selves—as true, we accept as true. We cannot do otherwise. The attitude of our mind towards all knowledge is the same to this extent: that in all it seeks to discern the true from the false, to reject the false and to accept the true.

For this reason we cannot agree with Mr. Herbert Spencer when he tells us that "we are not permitted to know—nay, we are not even permitted to conceive—that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance."[1] Why not? Where is the hindrance? Since we recognize this reality, do we not conceive it? It seems to us that the knowing and thinking of Mr. Herbert Spencer is not the knowing and thinking of the normal intellect. If we are not permitted to know or conceive this reality back of appearance, how come we to know that it exists? And yet Mr. Spencer is sure of its existence and recognizes it as essential to our thinking. Recently he has explained himself more fully in these words: "Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; and yet noumenon cannot be

[1] "First Principles, p. 110."

thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once obliged to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can neither bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can bring into any shape its connection with appearance. The forms of our thought, moulded on experiences of phenomena, as well as the connotations of our words formed to express the relations of phenomena, involve us in contradictions when we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena; *and yet the existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary datum alike of our thoughts and our words.*"[1] Underlying this assertion is an important fact, ill-apprehended, we fear, by Mr. Herbert Spencer. It is the fact that thought is always more than its expression. But why quarrel on this account with either thought or expression, so long as each is evolved according to the law of our intelligence? That intelligence is limited in its operations; but it is not we who have defined the limits, or set the boundaries. We find ourselves with those limitations; we cannot change them. Our consciousness reports to us the phenomenon; our reason infers that there is no meaning in phenomenon without noumenon. The one connotes the other in our thinking. What substance is to accident; what the ideal is to the actual; what essence is to existence—the noumenon is to the phenomenon. We perceive the one in the other. We perceive it and we know it. We accept the vouchment of our intellect on the subject. True, we cannot pass beyond this vouchment and give this noumenon a local habitation and a name. What then? At this point we discern the fallacy of Mr. Herbert Spencer's conclusions. He seems to forget that the ultimate analysis of any and every thought brings home to us the fact that the clearly-defined image of the thought does not represent the whole thought; that that image is only a symbol; that the word in which that image is expressed is also a symbol; and that in this manner every expression is only a symbol symbolizing a symbol of the thing expressed. And it may happen, and it does happen, that we think correctly in terms of things of which we know nothing beyond their existence and relations. Such is the case with space and time. The great intellect of an Augustine wrestled with the problems of these two ideas; the more he sought to fathom them, the greater was his awe. And his verdict on the problem of time is that in which all thinkers must rest. "If nobody questions me, I know; if I should attempt an explanation, I know not."[2] In other words, we know these things to use them rightly in our thinking; but we cannot grasp at a sufficiently clear image of them to explain them to others.

[1] "Last Words about Agnosticism." *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1884.

[2] Quid ergo est tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat scio, si quaerenti explicare velim nescio. (*Conf. Lib.* II., cap. xiv.)

Therefore, in opposition to Mr. Spencer, we may lay down the proposition that we not only think the noumenon, but we know it and conceive it back of the phenomenon—not indeed as an image distinct from the phenomenon—but as an element in the existence of the phenomenon without which the phenomenon would be unthinkable. Furthermore, whilst our thinking is circumscribed, words and images are not the measure of its limits.[1]

Nor can we agree with Pascal when he tells us: "It is a natural disease of man to believe that he possesses truth directly; whence it comes that he is always disposed to deny whatever he does not understand; whereas in reality he naturally knows only falsehood, and he should take for true only those things whose opposites seem false."[2] Why call that conviction of direct knowedge of the truth a malady? What would become of reasoning and inferring, of all indirect knowledge, if that which we hold directly is not valid? It is all based upon this very conviction. Man is born for the truth; how comes it that falsehood should be more acceptable? "If our intellect," says Mivart, "is to be trusted at all, it must be trusted in what it declares to be the most certain of all—namely, necessary truths."[3] But our intellect is to be trusted even as we trust the reality of our own existence; and necessary truths do not come to us by a process of indirection, but are directly and immediately self-evident. We have no other vouchment than that we take upon trust our whole nature, and with it the normal workings of our intellect. You may call it an assumption or any other name you choose to give, but it is none the less a fact the most primary of all facts, underlying all action, be it physical, moral, or intellectual. Universal skepticism is an absurdity; the very act of doubting all things is a positive mental act. Therefore the habit of confidingness is the healthier habit of mind. Speaking of these two habits, Cardinal Newman, with that keenness and practical grasp of his subject for which he is pre-eminent, says: "Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything. The former, indeed, seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself; and error having always some portion of truth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect that when there is an honest purpose and fair tal-

[1] Were this the place, it might be shown that this fallacy runs through all of Mr. Spencer's reasoning regarding personality and all the elements of Christian philosophy.

[2] "Pensées," t. i., 1re partie, art. ii., p. 154.

[3] "A Philosophical Catechism for Beginners," p. 25. This is indeed a marvel of clearness and condensation.

ents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it."[1]

When, therefore, we are told that "error is inextricably bound up with the spirit of man," we may interpret it in the sense that it is with difficulty, and after long search, man is enabled to discover truth, and disentangle it from the errors with which it not unfrequently is bound up. But we must keep this fact distinct from the no less palpable fact that in itself and by the light of reason man's intellect recognizes at sight, and accepts with a certainty beyond cavil, all necessary, self-evident truths as truths necessary and self-evident. Be it remembered that it is the truth that is necessary, and not the error. Truth is of things. Truth is reality. Error is only accidental. And when the writer whom we have just quoted, making error necessary, adds the following remarks, we feel bound not only to dissent from him, but to disengage the truth from the sophism in which he has enveloped it. "This necessary error," he tells us, "is the ideal. Man has an innate tendency to form ideals. It would be blocking the way to every deeper insight into things, did we hesitate to consider the first stirrings of religion in man as the first emergence of the ideal."[2] It is to be borne in mind that Herr von Hellwald takes care to tell us that all religion is based upon error and illusion. So he makes the ideal the outcome of necessary error. This is the latest word of the philosophy of negation. Certainly it is a remarkable intellectual feat that bases that which represents whatever is perfect in man's conception, and positive in the order of things—as the outcome of mere negation. Art has its ideal; life has its ideal; religion has its ideal; civilization has its ideal. Are these ideals the outcome of error and illusion? Has it indeed come to this, that men gather grapes of thorns? that the seeds of error grow up and give forth the ripe and luscious fruit of truth? that deception may be sown and confidence reaped? No; error exists but as the excrescence cast off by truth. There could be no wrong if there were not first a right; there could be no error if truth did not have a prior existence; there could be no ideal if there were not a foundation of absolute truth, absolute goodness, and absolute beauty upon which to build it up. Surely literature and art cannot be the outcome of error. Think you the ideals after which Shakespeare and Dante, Beethoven and Haydn, Rafael and Murillo, and Michael Angelo, worked and constructed their masterpieces, are the growth of error? We defy pessimism to come forward and say as much. Error and mistake may enter into every human

[1] "Grammar of Assent," 2d ed., p. 377.

[2] F. von Hellwald, "Culturgeschichte." See *Dublin Review*, art. "The Battle of Theism," by Rev. W. Barry, D.D., Oct. 1884.

expression of the ideal; but the error and the mistake are not of the ideal. It is rather because human hands are unskilled, and human expression is stammering, and human judgment is feeble. Let us dwell a moment on the nature, the origin, and the functions of the ideal, and we will be in better position to understand how it is that genius is not a living in error, nor art a groping after illusions.

III.

A genius conceives and expresses a great thought. The conception so expressed delights. It enters men's souls; it compels their admiration. They applaud and are rejoiced that another masterpiece has been brought into existence to grace the world of art or letters. The genius alone is dissatisfied. Where others see perfection, he perceives something unexpressed beyond the reach of his art. Try as best he may, he cannot attain that indefinable something. Deep in his inner consciousness, he sees a type so grand and perfect that his beautiful production appears to him but a faint and marred copy of that original. That original is the ideal; and the ideal it is that calls forth men's admiration.

An analysis of this admiration will lead us to an understanding of the ideal. It is universal. It is a sense as innate to man as is his sense of taste or touch. Savage and civilized admire whatever appeals to their admiration. Now, not everything does so appeal. The trivial, the contemptible, the weak, the inferior, are all beneath man's sense of admiration. The virtuous, the noble, the heroic; whatever expresses strength or power; whatever is beautiful or sublime; in a word, whatever raises man's thoughts and aspirations to a superior plane—that is for him an object of admiration. Man has within him two opposing elements. One seeks to raise him up into a spiritual and spiritualizing sphere of thought and action; the other tends to drag him down to things earthly and debasing. They are the two steeds that Plato represents the soul as driving, likening it to a charioteer; one steed "leans and presses heavily towards the earth, if he be not well-trained by his charioteer;" the other, "beautiful and noble and of a godlike character."[1] They are the opposing elements—the law in his members fighting against the law of his mind—of which St. Paul speaks in language less allegorical.[2] Now, it is the function of this sense of admiration to raise up and spiritualize the inferior parts of man's nature, so that they grovel not in things earthly, and to strengthen and improve his nobler aspirations. Where man may not imitate, where he may not even love, he can still admire. Wherever an ideal is expressed, there is an object for his admira-

[1] Plato, "Phaedrus," cap. xxv., p. 712, t. i., ed. Hirschigii.

[2] Romans, vii., 23.

tion. We may not explain this mysterious correspondence, but we all have the experience of it. Our souls are so attuned as to give out a music responsive to the chords that are touched. This we know and feel. Let us study the impression.

Take a Rafael or a Murillo. We gaze upon the painted canvas till its beauty has entered our soul. The splendor of that beauty lights up within it depths unrevealed, and far down in our inner consciousness we discover a something that responds to the beauty on which we have been gazing. It is as though a former friend revealed himself to us. There is here a recognition. The more careful has been our sense-culture, the more delicately have our feelings been attuned to respond to a thing of beauty and find in it a joy forever, all the sooner and the more intensely do we experience this recognition. And therewith comes a vague yearning, a longing as for something. What does it all mean? The recognition is of the ideal. "The memory," says Plato, "on beholding the beautiful object, is carried back to the nature of absolute beauty."[1] Thus, there is not only a recognition; there is also a reminiscence of a higher spiritual order of things of which the soul has had occasional glimpses; there is a yearning for the home to which it belongs. Cavil as men may, the artistic ideal is a reality, and speaks to something higher than the material sense. There are moments when, beneath the spell of some great masterpiece, man feels the nearness of the Godhead, and his soul is thrilled with emotions that vibrate beneath the Divine touch. There is no denying it. A year ago, a newly elected member of the French Academy, amid the applause of his fellow-members, quoted these words of Charles Blanc: "The ideal is the primitive divine exemplar of all things; it is, so to speak, a reminiscence of having already witnessed perfection, and the hope of seeing it once again."[2] Charles Blanc was only repeating the magnificent definition of the ideal which has come home to every soul not buried in the inert material, and which has been echoed down the ages ever since Plato gave it expression: "It is," says this wonderful seer, "a recollection of those things our soul formerly beheld when in company with God, despising the things that we now say are, and looking upward towards that which really is."[3] Without admitting the Pythagorean doctrine of a pre-existent state, here implied,[4]

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[1] "Phaedrus," cap. xxxv., p. 718.

[2] M. Edouard Pailleron, "Discours sur Charles Blanc dans l'Académie," *Le Temps*, 18 Janvier, 1884.

[3] "Phaedrus," cap. xxix., p. 714.

[4] In another work of mine may be found additional remarks on this doctrine: "Philosophy of Literature," part ii., chap. i., p. 124.

we may go farther, and say that without the ideal there is no reality.

Nature recognizes the ideal. She has her types, and works by them. Each of her products is a specific realization of a separate type. As genus is a reality, distinct from, and causative of, the species, so is each of nature's types a reality, distinct from the concrete thing fashioned after it and causative thereof. Hence it is that, in the animal and even the vegetable world, we daily witness reversions to older types and the reproduction of ancestral traits of character. Nor is this all. Ascending higher still

> "Upon the great world's altar-stairs
> That slope thro' darkness up to God,"

we come to the prototype of all created types, and find it existing in the Word. Here is the source and fountain-head of the ideal. In the Word—from the beginning—before there was a beginning of time, and the voice of God caused created things to leap forth from nothingness—throughout the cycles of eternity—God contemplated those types. And by the Word were they made real in the order of created things. Were the eternal type not in the Word, the actual existences fashioned after it would not be. And this is why we say that without the ideal there is no reality. We have at last found the origin and source of the ideal. In all earnestness have we sought it; and, hushed in holy awe before the Godhead, in a loving reverence do we contemplate its splendor. The Word is not only the source of all created existences; the Word is also the light that enlightens this world. Its glory is reflected, now dimly, now clearly, in every created thing. As the reason is illuminated with a light above and beyond the sparks that it throws out in its workings, that light giving it all necessary and self-evident truths; as the spiritual sense is nurtured and strengthened by that mysterious energy called grace, so the created ideal in each individual mind is enlightened and vivified by the uncreated ideal dwelling in the Word. This illumination of the ideal is the expression of the beautiful.

We now know whence it comes that a thing of beauty becomes for each of us a joy forever. It is the mission of the artist to rend the veil of accidents and accessories in which the ideal is shrouded and present it to us in all its beauty and loveliness. And the beauty reflected therefrom lights up the folds and inner caverns of our souls, and reveals therein a recognition of this ideal, and reflected from our inmost souls is the image of Him from whom we come, and who is our Home—His image and a pale reflex of the splendor of His glory: on beholding which reflection we are moved; our souls are stirred to their very centre; a yearning takes pos-

session of us—a longing for the home whence we came—a groping after the Invisible Ideal—and we feel our souls vibrate beneath the touch of the Infinite. God is in us and we are in God, and the sense of our nearness to Him grows upon us. This is the experience that passes over us in the presence of the ideal. It is the experience that Plato has grandly recorded in his wonderful allegory.[1]

IV.

We are now in position to understand the importance of an ideal in literary habits of thought. It is essential to them. Literature is the form of art the most varied and complicated. Plato hath well and aptly said of a literary structure: "Every speech ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, so as neither to be without head, nor without hands, nor without feet; but to have both a beginning, a middle and an end, described proportionately to one another and to the whole."[2] So to construct a literary masterpiece that part fits to part and each is subordinate to the whole, requires a central idea. As the parts in the animal organism are determined by the vital principle animating them, in such manner that all unconsciously develop into fitness and harmony, even so is it with the literary production. When the central thought, the animating principle—the ideal—is clearly grasped, it shapes the form in which it would be expressed. This teaching is clear and simple and as ancient as art. It is the teaching on which all the masterpieces throughout the ages have been constructed. You may wonder why we lay stress upon what seems to be an elementary and incontrovertible principle. We will tell you.

It is because Agnostic science rejects this beautiful and ennobling doctrine of the ideal, and regards what we have here advanced as a play of fancy. The Agnostic can neither weigh nor measure this ideal; he therefore relegates it to the regions of the impossible. And yet, even the Agnostic knows and feels, and, so to speak, touches the ideal. By what right does he regard as an illusion a thing so intimate to him? He has no more reason for rejecting the ideal than he has for accepting some of the most positive conclusions of science. In his last analysis he would resolve the whole universe into an ultimate atom. But why should he? He has never seen, nor weighed, nor measured that atom. You say that he infers it. But what right has he to infer anything? Why should he deal in inferences? He does not accept the vouchments of his consciousness, or his reason, or his memory. He does not take himself for granted. The evident brings no evidence

[1] In the "Phaedrus," cap. xxxiii.–xxxviii.

[2] "Phaedrus," cap. xlvii., p. 726.

to him. Vouchers for error are to him equally convincing with vouchers for truth.[1] His knowledge is merely subjective impressions. He is himself but an impression. He recognizes only phenomenon. You will bear witness that we are not inventing; we are simply, almost in the Agnostic's own words, describing the habitual state of mind in which he lives and thinks. Are not the words of Plato as fresh and of as direct application to the Agnostic of to-day as they were to the sophist of his age? "Let us not admit into our souls," he says, "the notion that there appears to be nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to become sound."[2]

Moreover, it never occurs to the Agnostic that, if there is nothing beyond phenomenon and phenomenal impressions, there is no true science; for, in order that a science exist, there must needs be more than the mere cataloguing of facts and observations. But this is all that is warranted, on the assumption that all knowledge is made up of phenomenal impressions. Thus does the Agnostic contradict the primary facts of his nature, and the elementary workings of his intellect. Consider the scientific method. Facts are observed, then classified and methodized; principles are stated; laws are inferred or asserted; a reasoning process based upon known truths and facts is gone through, and leads up to other truths and other laws hitherto unknown. But all this implies an order of things above and beyond mere phenomena. It implies a world of ideas, and therefore the existence of an ideal. And in ignoring this world of ideas and of necessary truths the Agnostic, in all logic, is compelled to abandon science and deny even the existence of the external world. The true scientist admits both the internal and external orders upon the same plane of evidence; and this is the criterion of true science, that it rejects no fact, accepts things as it finds them, and seeks for all an adequate explanation.

Plato, in one of those sublime passages that light up a whole world of thought, thus shows how our knowledge of things is not simply of the transient and the phenomenal, but of essences and eternal principles: "Essence," he says, "which really exists colorless, formless, and intangible"—which, therefore, let me remark, is above the conditions of time and space—"is visible only to intelligence that guides the soul, and around this essence the family of true science take up their abode. And, as the divine Mind is nourished by intelligence and pure science, so the mind of every soul that is about to receive what properly belongs to it, when it sees after a long time that which is, is delighted, and by con-

[1] See Kant's "Paralogisms and Antinomies," "Critique of Pure Reason," bk. ii.

[2] "Phaedo," cap. xi., p. 76.

templating the truth is nourished and thrives. . . . And it beholds justice herself, and temperance, and science, not that to which creation—γενεσις—is annexed, nor that which is different in different things of those we call real,[1] *but that which is science in what really is.*"[2] This is the only science to think in. It is, indeed, the only true science. Agnostic science loses its claim to the title of science by placing itself in a habit of thinking inconsistent with itself and derogatory to the intellect, to thought, and to real knowledge. It is unscientific in another direction. All science worthy of the name confines itself to its subject-matter, and acknowledges itself incompetent to pronounce upon issues outside of its clearly defined limits. This rule Agnosticism does not observe. Pretending to deal exclusively with the visible, the material, the phenomenal, it passes judgment upon the invisible and supersensible, the spiritual and supernatural. Finally, Agnosticism, in regarding the ideal as an illusion and the outcome of error, is thereby, so far as in it lies, the death of the ideal and the bane of all literary excellence,—indeed of all artistic excellence whatever. In what manner and how far it remains for us to note.

V.

The shadow of Agnostic science has crept over the spirit of art and letters. Now, we have seen that there is no real art without the ideal, and that it is the function of art to appeal to our admiration by the presentation of the ideal in all possible beauty and vividness. But, whilst the artist disentangles the ideal from such accidents and accessories as tend to conceal it, he still clothes it in nature. Out of the materials that nature furnishes he fashions for it a body, and breathes into that body the ideal as its living soul, and forthwith the masterpiece stands out a thing of life and beauty and artistic excellence for undying admiration. Defects of detail may enter into its execution; but they are lost, forgotten, absorbed in the general effect produced. It is the *Transfiguration* of Rafael. Who, in presence of that noble scene, would cavil about the posing of limbs or the laws of perspective?[3] It is the *Hamlet* of Shakespeare. Surely, he who overlooks the power, the depth, the philosophy, the dramatic greatness of that tragedy, and quarrels with grammatical structure or obscure expression, has yet to learn the elements of true criticism. Or, it is the *Phaedo* of Plato, whose sublime thoughts so frequently recur throughout

[1] Or as Jowett more strongly translates it, "Not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute, in existence absolute." Jowett's "Plato," vol. ii., p. 581.

[2] "Phaedrus," cap. xxvii., p. 713.

[3] For an instance of such cavilling, see Taine's "Italy," Eng. tr., pp. 142, 143.

the sentences that are repeated here. He who should stop at the hard metaphysic or the apparently pointless questions and obscure answers, and not soar with Socrates in his dying song into the pure regions of truth, proves that he lacks the sympathy and knowledge to appreciate Grecian thought in the days of Plato, and is, therefore, unable to place at its worth one of the sublimest pieces of writing ever penned by human hand.[1] Or, it is the *Divina Commedia.* What boots it that Dante's estimates of men and measures are not those of the historian? It detracts naught from the wonderful poem. Men are lost in admiration when they note the care with which word is built upon word, each having a special significance, and all made into a grand allegory wrought out of the politics and the philosophy, the strife and struggle, the fierce hates and the strong loves, in which the author lived and moved and fought. Or, it is Mozart's *Requiem.* The critic who would quarrel with that grand composition because in its intricate and complicated structure, speaking of a life's hopes and fears, and the more awful hopes and fears beyond the grave, he misses the sweeter strains of other days, would fail to grasp the sublime conception of the piece as a whole. Or, it is the Gothic Cathedral. Who thinks of making faces at gargoyle or statued niche, where all is emblem and significancy, the stone embodiment of a nation's aspirations? We read in it thought, satire, censure, desire, pathos, passion.[2] In all these instances, back of the mechanical structure, looking out upon us, and peering into our souls, is the ideal.

Now, Agnostic science would promulgate theories calculated to paralyze art, and render it incapable of producing such masterpieces as we have instanced. One is the theory that claims that all art has no other aim than to construct the form for the form's sake. Much that is done to-day, whether in words, or on the canvas, or in marble, is done for the simple pleasure of producing. Now, the art that has only itself for its aim may amuse, may please, may even cause admiration on account of the mechanical skill exhibited; but it is not the art that endures for all time. I will grant you that a Shakespeare or a Goethe may sing as the blackbird sings; but I deny that their art is without purpose. Distinguish between the art that is conscious and that which is uncon-

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[1] It is this lack of sympathy that makes the reading of Plato so laborious. Perhaps it is a failing to distinguish between the mental habits of the ancient Athenians and those of modern thinkers that has led Mr. Mahaffy, in his admirable "History of Greek Literature" (vol. ii., p. 173), to make the criticism noticed above as regards part of the dialogue.

[2] This idea has been grandly drawn out by Victor Hugo, in "Notre Dame de Paris," liv. iii., chap. 1.

scious. The Æsopian fable is conscious in purpose; it is written for a definite aim. But, of the great masterpieces that we have been contemplating, can you say that they are purposeless, or that their end is simply this or that? In each of them one may read as many purposes as one takes aspects of them. Their authors may have had no other intention than that of unburthening themselves of the great thought that oppressed their souls, but as surely as their work expresses an ideal, so surely does it embody a purpose. For the ideal, in calling forth our admiration and raising up our thoughts to things higher and beyond the scene of every-day life, or in purifying the incidents of ordinary duties, is educating our better nature; it is working with a purpose. And ideal and purpose combined determine the form. "To act with a purpose," says Lessing, "is what raises man above the brutes; to invent with a purpose, to imitate with a purpose, is that which distinguishes genius from the petty artists who invent to invent, imitate to imitate."[1] Be it remembered that nothing outside of the Godhead exists for its own sake. The art produced in this spirit is sheer pettiness. Nowhere is this more evident than in the world of letters. Just as a word has value only inasmuch as it expresses an idea, so any number of words strung together is meaningless and inane, unless it expresses a thought, not for the expression's sake, but for that of the thought. The sophists of Plato's day attempted to teach expression for the form's sake. He refuses the very name of art to such expression. "She lies," he tells us in his own scathing words, "and is not an art, but an inartistic trick."[2] And, in the domain of fiction, it hath well been said that one can no more conceive a great novel without a purpose than one can conceive an arch without a keystone.[3] All art worthy of the name is imbued with the earnestness of life. Consciously or unconsciously, the artist's is a mission to crystallize in his work the spirit of the age; it is, also, his mission to educate his age, to raise it above itself, and to sustain its aspirations upward and onward—

> "*Artistry being battle with the age*
> *It lives in!* Half life,—silence, while you learn
> What has been done; the other half,—attempt
> At speech, amid world's wail of wonderment—
> 'Here's something done was never done before!'
> *To be the very breath that moves the age,*
> *Means not to have breath drive you bubble-like*
> *Before it—but yourself to blow: that's strain;*
> *Strain's worry through the life-time, till there's peace;*
> We know where peace expects the artist-soul."[4]

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[1] Prose works, Bohn ed., Dramatic Notes, No. 34, p. 327.

[2] καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τεχνη, ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβη. "Phædrus," cap. xliii.

[3] This remark was made to the author by one of the most successful of living American novelists, Mr. W. D. Howells.

[4] Robert Browning: "Red Cotton Night-Cap Country," p. 110.

VI.

Another theory fostered and developed by Agnostic science is the so-called Realism in literature and art. It is the outcome of ignoring the ideal or regarding it as the product of error. If there is no ideal, or if the ideal is only an illusion, then there is nothing beyond the nature we behold and live in; then the supreme effort of all art is to delineate that nature in detail with the greatest fidelity; then the sole rule of art is, "Copy, describe, imitate, express minutely whatever you see or hear: the more accurately you follow your model the greater artist you are." There is in this doctrine a mixture of truth and error. True it is that art cannot ignore nature. The world we live in is the material upon which it works. Therefore the artist observes men and things; he studies the nature without him and the nature within him; he experiments; he compares, judges, discriminates; in this way does he gather up and select the subject-matter upon which he afterwards labors for artistic purposes. But there is in all this more than mere imitation. It is a wholesome realism, and does not exclude the ideal. It is the realism that Millet paints and Ruskin commends. The art that merely imitates can only produce a corpse; it lacks the vital spark, the soul, which is the ideal, and which is necessary in order to create a living organic reality that will quicken genius and arouse enthusiasm throughout the ages. Let us make the distinction; it is a vital one: Art is not imitation; art is interpretation.

This distinction the realistic school in art and letters loses sight of. Accordingly, it abandons all attempt at an ideal; it makes no effort to read the lessons of nature; it sees nothing in nature to read beyond the cold, hard lines that it traces. Here Agnostic science steps in, and directs this school in the ways it must walk. It teaches that as the only knowledge is the knowledge of observation and experiment, upon these two lines must art work. And, as the novel is the most potent literary influence of the day, it would especially make the novel a mere study in nature and character, in which naught is to be set down save what has fallen under the eye or has been experienced in actual life. On the face of it, this theory is sound enough. By all means, let us have observation and experiment. But distinguish between the observation that takes in all the elements of nature and the observation that regards only its material side. The latter alone falls under the scope of the realistic school. It has no other field for development. In consequence, it deals only with man living and acting out his brute nature in all its cunning and sensuality. The writers of this school give us observations indeed; but they are of the street

and the tavern. They picture human nature; but it is diseased human nature. They paint us life episodes; but what lives! Now it is the drunkard's; now it is that of the fallen woman; now it is that of actors and authors of bohemian ways; again it is that of notorious criminals; invariably it is passion wallowing in the mire of depravity. This is no freak. It is a systematic procedure, and the logical outcome of the realistic school as inspired by Agnostic science. Believing only in the animal man, naught else remains for the members of this school to depict. Not saintliness of life; for saintliness of life means to them only hypocrisy, or, at most, warped character. Not nobility of thought or word; for weak, erring, human nature is the only nature that the Agnostic recognizes. In his last word he is a pessimist. The conclusions of Schopenhauer on the misery of life, its worthlessness, its crime, its helplessness in the great machine of the universe, are those to which every logical Agnostic must come.[1] The only poetry he can weave is that which, with Ackerman, cries out in an agony of despair and rebellion worthy of Satan.[2]

But this is not the world in which we live and move. This is not the human nature that we are cognizant of. The circle of our acquaintance includes—we know intimately—men and women of a far different stamp; men and women who are true and faithful in their love and friendship; grand and generous souls, who are self-sacrificing whenever good is to be accomplished or duty to be fulfilled; who think and say the sweetest and sublimest thoughts; whose lives are pure and disinterested; whose intentions and aspirations are elevated and ennobling; who, in the daily round of their beautiful lives, shed around them loveliness and peace and joy and gladness of heart. These are the men and women that surround us, and beneath whose influence for good our own hearts and souls strive to rise in the scale of perfection. Here is the reality that we know. Here is the reality that even the Agnostic knows. It is only in his library that humanity is to him such a monster. The lowliest life has its sublime passages. It has wherewith to inspire the poet, for it has its ideal. In this thought we place our consolation and our hope for the future of art and letters. "Realism," said an eloquent French preacher, "is a chronic disease; it is the leprosy of art; it is the epidemic of literature in the nineteenth century."[3] This is the proper diagnosis of the case. Let it be treated as a leprosy or an epidemic.

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[1] See Schopenhauer's "Essay on the Misery of Life."

[2] "Poésies Philosophiques," par L. Ackerman, Paris, 1877.

[3] R. Père Felix, Conferences, 1867, Conf. v., p. 251.

If realistic works are left untouched and the home atmosphere is kept purified, both leprosy and epidemic will soon die out.[1]

VII.

Such are the relations that exist between the literary and the scientific spirit. Each has a distinct sphere. Each may aid the other. But when one assumes the functions of the other or attempts to dictate to the other, collision and confusion are the result. We have noticed an interlacing and overlapping of literary and scientific habits of thought greatly to the detriment of both literature and science. We may trace this cause to the present intellectual state of our own day. Every age may, in a sense, be said to be in a state of transition, for all time is a becoming. But there are influences hovering over epochs and peoples that give them a characteristic coloring, and place upon them a distinctive impress. Our age is pre-eminently a transition period. New discoveries, new industries and new sciences are calling for new terms, new habits of thought, and new methods of work. And yet, much of our thinking runs in old grooves. We are groping in mist and darkness, with new and complex problems pressing upon us harder and faster than we can solve them. Each decade brings its riddle. The conjectures of one decade become the conclusions of the next, and are made the elementary truths of the third. Hence it is that the books of the day are so many fleeting records of impressions as fleeting. Hence the mental entanglements and inconsistencies that beset men's thoughts and actions; their reasoning and their sentiments; their formal expressions and their inner convictions.

Now every age and every people whose spirit became crystallized in a literature that may be called classic, was possessed of a central thought, an all-absorbing idea—in a word, an ideal—

[1] There is an awakening to the danger all along the line. In Denmark, the poet Drachman, to the surprise of many, in his last volume of poems—"Deep Chords"—has entered protest against the realistic spirit, and proclaimed himself the poet of "heart and home." (Viggo Petersen in *Athenæum*, No. 2983, Dec. 27, 1884.) Speaking of this school in Italy, Signor Bonghi writes in the same number of this journal: "But while in the past years there was a great array of poets following this path, and one saw lying about in every bookseller's shop their elegant volumes of every kind of shape and type, but especially the Elzevir, *this year there is not one to be seen*, and their principal publisher, Zanichelli of Bologna, *tells me he no longer publishes any on his own account*." The fact is significant. M. de Pressensé writes words no less encouraging from the parent-soil of this school. "If it is true that in literature, as in everything else, the demand in the long run regulates the supply, it is indubitable—and this is a consoling prospect of which we have need—that a reaction will, before long, set in throughout France, and that our country will not endure to all eternity the debasement of the level of the imagination and the corruption of art." (*Athenæum*, Ibid., p. 833.)

that fired genius and laid its impress upon the form of expression. Thus, the Hindu literature teems throughout with the illusory and passing nature of all things earthly; the inmost feeling that this life is only a preparation for another form of existence, pervades its poetry and philosophy and in a great measure moulds the Hindu life. So with the literature and art of ancient Greece. The one absorbing idea that became a passion for her, was beauty of form and corresponding harmony of expression and action—a beauty and harmony everywhere reflected from her sculpture, her architecture, her poetry and her life. So it was with ancient Rome. All Rome's greatness, all her conquests, all her jurisprudence, her public and domestic life, her art, her worships, her literature, were centred in, and became the outcome of, the one idea of Rome. To be a Roman citizen was the supreme badge of honor; to live for Rome was the sole aim of life; to die for Rome was the most heroic of deaths; to sing Rome's glories, to record her deeds, or to perpetuate the names of her heroes, was the highest ambition of her greatest poets and historians. The literature of Mediæval days has also its distinct mark. It reflects throughout the spirit of chivalry and feudalism. This is the one idea into which all thought is translated. Even the popular religious writings of the day represent the soul as standing towards its Maker in the relation of serf or yeoman to his baronial lord, and as going through life in a spiritual combat with the powers of darkness.

But the idea of chivalry and feudalism is for us a matter of history; it no longer comes home to us as a living reality; we are outgrowing the forms of thought into which it so largely entered. Our modern life has little or nothing in common with those days of adventure-seeking and wonderful feat-performing. Commerce and the industries and sciences are the absorbing occupations of the present. But we lack, or we fail to see, a distinctive centralizing thought predominating over our lives and moulding action and expression into a harmonious whole. Our business affairs are one thing; our literature and its topics are another thing. Agnosticism is making strenuous efforts to impress its spirit upon life and thought. It has enlisted under its banner genius, culture, learning and passion. But the underlying principle of Agnosticism is negation and a reversion to what is brutal and debasing in the pagan ideal; and the age is not prepared to accept such a principle. The leaven of Christianity permeates too intimately the world's thinking.[1] There is profound truth in the sublime expres-

[1] I am glad to present this corroboration from one whom all will regard as a not over-partial witness: "To deny that Christianity in its various forms has been, and still is, one of the greatest powers in the world, or to deny that its leading doctrines have, in fact, been associated in many ways with all that we commonly recognize as

sion of Tertullian, that the human soul is naturally Christian. It loves positive, wholesome truth; it pines in bondage till it possesses truth; but holding the truth, the truth shall make it free. Too long has it fed upon the nourishing meats of Christian truth to be content with the winnowed husks of negation that Agnosticism would impart. Through long and dreary ages, the world fed upon all that Agnosticism has to offer it, and souls became starved, and civilizations went down and were buried in the grave of materialism. Agnosticism cannot harmonize the clashing elements of the age.

In the meantime it is the life-work of each of us to harmonize, in his own nature, all the elements that go to make it up. Socrates, on that memorable day when he drank the hemlock cup, told the faithful followers who were gathered around him, how at different times a dream visited him in diverse forms, exhorting him to apply himself to the cultivation of music.[1] By music Socrates meant not simply that combination of sounds that catches up a few fragments of this world's harmonies, and with them moves our souls. There is another and a higher music. It is the music of a soul in which dwell order and method; which co-ordinates all knowledge; which recognizes the ideal; in which the good, the true, and the beautiful are cultivated, each according to its own nature, and by its own method. It is the rhythm of a thoroughly-disciplined intellect and a well-regulated life. That dream comes to us all. In its fulfilment will we find the reconciliation of literary with scientific habits of thought.

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virtue, is like denying the agency of the sun in the physical world." (James Fitzjames Stephen in the *Nineteenth Century* for June, 1884). The admission is a remarkable one, coming from Mr. Stephen.

[1] "Phaedo," cap. iv., ed. Hirschigii, t. i., p. 46.

THE TREATY OF PARIS, 1763, AND THE CATHOLICS IN AMERICAN COLONIES.

I.

ON the 10th of February, 1763, there was signed at Paris the definitive Treaty, of Peace between France, Spain, and England. This treaty besides terminating the Seven Years' War, contains an adjustment of the North American possessions of these three nations. Prior to this, the English ruled over the Atlantic seaboard provinces—Acadia, afterwards divided so as to comprise New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and the territory lying to the south of it, running westward from the Atlantic Ocean, north of Florida, to Louisiana and the Mississippi River. The French possessions were Canada, along the banks of the River St. Lawrence (except the Gulf Islands) and the country north of the Great Lakes and westward, including part of the present State of Michigan, to the wilderness beyond. Northward they held sway to the limits of the Hudson Bay Territory. Besides these northern possessions, named New France, the French held a chain of forts running south from Canada to New Orleans; and whether or not these corresponded to the Mississippi, they claimed to own all westward—all to the rear—of the English colonies. They owned the substantial province of Louisiana, extending east to Georgia and Florida, and northward about a third or more of the distance between the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes of Canada.

Florida under this treaty was given up to England by the Spaniards, and Canada by the French, leaving the western territory and its forts undetermined; subsequently the French reasserted their claim to these; but, by the Peace of Versailles, 1783, the French and English, as is well known, lost the entire territory south of Canada.

The fall of Quebec, the stronghold of the French, was in the year 1759, and in the following year the capitulation at Montreal surrendered the whole of Canada to the English. It is true that the effort of Pontiac was made subsequently (but before the Treaty), yet the cession was complete in 1760 as a military, though not as a diplomatic, fact. A rupture having occurred between England and Spain, a period of over three years passed before all parties agreed to settle their then impending difficulties. Canada, in the meantime, lived under a military rule—the "reign of the soldiery;" and the law, if any, in all matters, was to be found in the terms of

capitulation between General Amherst and Vaudreuil made at Montreal, in 1760.

The terms of capitulation at Quebec and at Montreal are not now of any real value, except in so far as they throw light upon a similar question in the Treaty of Paris. It is much to the credit of the French in Canada, and correspondingly uncomplimentary to their enemy, the English, that in every treaty between these two powers in this country, the French stipulated for the free exercise of their own—the Roman Catholic religion. About 130 years before the date we are now considering, the French surrendered Canada to Sir David Kirk, the English commander, and stipulated for these terms. The same was done, in Quebec, between De Ramezay and the English commanders, and in Montreal the matter was gone into more fully. The contracting or negotiating parties were not on very good terms, and the French commander complained bitterly of the want of courtesy shown him and his troops by his opponents. The demands and replies have been used a good deal by those who wish to minimize the power of the Church in Canada, yet it could not be argued but that these terms became *merged*, as the lawyers say, in the subsequent treaty.

The following articles and the replies thereto are useful on other than historical grounds:

Article 27. "The free exercise of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion shall subsist entire, in such manner that all the States and people of the towns and country places and distant posts, shall continue to assemble in the churches, and to frequent the sacraments as heretofore, without being molested in any manner, directly or indirectly. These people shall be obliged, by the English Government, to pay to the priests the tithes, and all the taxes they were used to pay, under the Government of His Most Christian Majesty.

Answer. "*Granted*, as to the free exercise of their religion. The obligation of paying the tithes to the priests will depend on the King's pleasure.

Article 28. "The chapter, priests, cures, and missionaries shall continue, with an entire liberty, the exercise and functions in the parishes of the towns and country.

Answer. "Granted.

Article 29. "The grand vicars named by the chapter to administer the diocese during the vacancy of the episcopal see shall have liberty to dwell in the towns or country parishes, as they shall think proper. They shall at all times be free to visit in different parishes of the diocese, with the ordinary ceremonies, and exercise all the jurisdiction they exercised under the French dominion. They shall enjoy the same rights in case of death of the future bishop, of which mention will be made in the following article.

Answer. "Granted, except what regards the following article.

Article 30. "If, by the treaty of peace, Canada should remain in the power of His Britannic Majesty, His Most Christian Majesty shall continue to name the bishop of the colony, who shall always be of the Roman communion, and under whose authority the people shall exercise the Roman religion.

Answer. "Refused.

Article 32. "The communities of nuns shall be preserved in their constitution and privileges. They shall continue to observe their rules. They shall be exempted from lodging any military, and it shall be forbid to trouble them in their religious exercises,

or to enter their monasteries; safeguards shall even be given them if they desire them.

Answer. "Granted.

Article 34. "All the communities, and all the priests, shall preserve their movables, the property and revenues of the seignories, and other estates which they possess in the colony, of what nature soever they may be. And the same estates shall be preserved in their privileges, rights, honors, and exemptions.

Answer. "Granted."

After the capitulation at Montreal, the English ruled New France for the next three years under a martial system. In Quebec, at all events, the decencies were observed towards Bishop Pontbriant and the clergy. No one expected the then state of things to continue, and perhaps, under all the circumstances, the rule might have been less objectionable. The people looked forward to the treaty, and faith was expected to be kept under the provisions of the capitulation. These are not within our present purpose to consider, but the reader will bear in mind that under the French régime the Catholic Church was part of the law of the land—the established Church of Canada—or New France, as it was called. No one was ignorant of the absence of toleration in the British laws towards that Church, so that both parties knew what their position was, and what each wanted to secure.

II.

The negotiations for the treaty begun in 1761 were mainly intrusted to two representatives from France and England who exchanged protocols, etc., as is the custom in such formal proceedings. Mr. Pitt represented the English nation—the French side was intrusted to the Duke de Choiseul.

Mr. Garneau, in his History of Canada, states that the Clergy of Quebec drew up two memorials on ecclesiastical affairs in Canada, one for the Duke de Nivernois, the other to the Duke of Bedford—these nobles being the two chief diplomatists employed in settling terms of pacification between France and Great Britain. He refers also to one of the Canadian agents, Etienne Charrest, who was charged to negotiate in the article of religion as expressed in the treaty of Paris, and who wrote several times on that subject to Lord Halifax, Secretary of State.

It cannot be supposed, therefore, that each party did not minutely understand the business in hand, or what was meant by the free exercise of religion; nor was any one ignorant of the fact that the laws of Great Britain—the penal laws—were aimed directly at the Roman Catholic religion, and in fact that there was no toleration of it in England at the time. The first memorial from the English contained no reference to this question of religion. Subsequently

a French memorial of Propositions was submitted of which the second clause is as follows:

"The King, in making over his full right of sovereignty over Canada to the King of England, annexes four conditions to the cession.

"1st. That the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion shall be maintained there, and that the King of England will give the most precise and effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may as heretofore make public profession of their religion according to the rites of the Roman Church."[1]

To this, so far as religion is concerned, Mr. Pitt made no objection, and in the ultimatum of France in reply to England, 5th August, 1761, it is reasserted that his majesty "will not recede from the conditions he has annexed to the same memorial relative to the Catholic religion."

An answer to this ultimatum came on the 16th August. *Inter alia* it says: "As to what concerns the public profession and exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in Canada, the new subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall be maintained in that privilege without interruption or molestation."

The rupture with Spain, and some differences in other articles of the treaty, delayed its conclusion during the following year.

In November, 1762, the preliminary articles of peace were signed at Fontainebleau between Great Britain, France and Spain, and in the 2d article "his Britannic Majesty on his side agrees to grant to the inhabitants of Canada the liberty of the Catholic religion. He will in consequence give the most exact and effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the Roman Church as far as the laws of Great Britain permit."

The same words in Article XIX. are used for the cession of the Spanish possessions.

Mr. Fox rose in the House and moved the adoption of an address recommending the treaty.

Mr. Pitt violently opposed almost every part, but made no reference to the change of the words added after he himself had ceased negotiations respecting it some months before. That would not have been a popular argument. The House accepted the address, 319 being for and 65 against it.

The words of the treaty, as finally agreed upon, do not differ from the foregoing, except that the word "precise" is used for "exact." in the official reports.

The last article, XXVI., reads:

"Their Sacred Britannic, Most Christian and Catholic, and Most Faithful Majesties promise to observe sincerely and *bona fide* all the articles contained and settled in the

[1] The other conditions have no reference to the subject here discussed.

present treaty; and they will not suffer the same to be infringed directly or indirectly by their respective subjects; and the same High Contracting parties generally and reciprocally guarantee to each other all the stipulations of the present treaty."

Attorney-General Maseres, writing about ten years after the treaty, says:

"Two senses may be put upon these words, 'as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.' They may either be supposed to mean that the Canadians shall be at liberty to profess the worship of the Roman Catholic religion as far as the laws of Great Britain permit that worship to be professed in England itself, or that they shall be at liberty to profess that worship as far as the laws of England permit it to be professed in the outlying Dominions of the Crown of Great Britain that are not parcel of the realm, such as Minorca, Senegal, the West India Islands, and the colonies of North America. The former of these senses I acknowledge to be too narrow to be put upon these words, because it would in a great measure destroy the grant of the liberty of professing the worship of the Romish religion which these words were only intended to qualify and restrain; because in England itself the laws do not permit the worship of the Romish religion to be professed in any degree.

"We must therefore have recourse to the latter sense above mentioned and suppose these words to mean that the Canadians should have the liberty of professing the worship of their religion as far as the laws of England permit it to be professed in the outlying dominions of the crown that lie without the realm. . . .

"Now, upon making this enquiry we shall find that though most of the penal and disqualifying statutes passed against the professors of the Romish religion relate only to England and Wales, yet the Act of the first of Queen Elizabeth, cap. i., which is entitled '*An Act to restore to the Crown the ancient jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical and spiritual and abolishing all foreign powers repugnant to the same*,' which is commonly called the Act of Supremacy, does expressly relate to all the Queen's dominions as well as to the realm of England, and is even extended by positive words to such countries and places as should at any future time become subject to the crown of England."

He then sets out the effect of this statute of Elizabeth, and adds in conclusion that "the British Nation is bound by that article to grant to the Canadians the liberty of professing the worship of the Roman Catholic religion only so far as is consistent with that statute."

The statute, however, imposes no insuperable difficulty; it requires all priests and other ecclesiastical persons to take the oath of supremacy, but, in the event of their refusing, it annexes no penalty beyond the deprivation of their benefices or other spiritual promotions. The question therefore would not arise until the state held the property of the Church, and in Lower Canada, at all events, this question did not arise. The Quebec Act, as will be seen presently, provided an oath in lieu of the one in the Act of Elizabeth,[1] and though many difficulties arose under the Quebec Act, they terminated in favor of the Church.

Besides the construction put upon the words of the treaty by

[1] By an act passed in the first year of the reign of William and Mary, the *Bill of Rights*, the oath of supremacy as provided in the Act of Elizabeth was taken away and another of a milder character substituted. It is, however, much more objectionable than the one in the Quebec Act, which is indeed no more than an oath of allegiance.

the English Parliament, which is substantially that of Mr. Maseres, eminent lawyers in England have given opinions thereon.

In reference to it Attorney-General Wedderburne, afterwards a Lord Chancellor of England, says: "True policy dictates, then, that the inhabitants of Canada should be permitted freely to profess the worship of their religion; and it follows of course that the ministers of that worship should be protected, and a maintenance secured for them."

And Attorney-General, afterwards Lord, Thurlow says: "The free exercise of their religion by the laity and of their function by their clergy was also reserved."

As a matter of fact it would be of little account, after the Quebec Act was passed, what any legal opinion might have been as to the meaning of these words—the Act thenceforth was the guide. The Act, it is true, could not abridge the effect of the treaty so far as the new British subjects were concerned—the subjects who were the subject of the treaty; but the act could, and probably did, enlarge the meaning of the words for the benefit of these subjects. For instance, it might have been a condition that each of the three religious orders then in Canada should receive one thousand acres of land. No act could be passed, without setting at naught the law of nations, giving them only five hundred acres, but an act giving them two thousand would be valid. And so the Quebec Act took the sting out of the objectionable words in the treaty and apparently established in Canada the Roman Catholic Church. It gives probably the most favorable construction that could be put on the treaty, and indeed a much less equitable interpretation would have suited the English party in Canada and in some of the other American provinces.

III.

Thus stands the treaty, and in the fall of the same year, 1763, a proclamation was issued by George III. referring to the valuable possessions secured by this treaty, and under it were erected four governments under the names of Quebec, East and West Florida, and Grenada. The governments of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia were also referred to, and a general promise given that the colonists could confide in the royal protection for the enjoyment and benefit of the laws of England, until assemblies of the people could be summoned.

There were at this period about seventy thousand inhabitants in Canada, and less than five hundred of these were English and Protestant. The remainder were French and Roman Catholic. The Catholic religion had been the law of the land, and in Quebec at least the British soldiers were ordered to be respectful to the

clergy and to the religious processions in the streets. It will be remembered that after Cardinal Richelieu founded the royal government in New France, the governor, the bishop, and the royal intendant practically ruled the province. It is, therefore, to be expected that the Church and its ministers in their time would be respected. Under the comparatively mild rule of Sir Guy Carleton the Catholics had little to complain of on this score.

The people complained somewhat that the terms of the capitulation were not observed, the French as to innovations, the English that everything was not expressly made to suit their wants. However, the ministers in England urged that their case would be considered as soon as the war—the Seven Years' War—would be at an end, and it came to an end by the treaty which we are now discussing.

Before the treaty, the military rule depended much on the temper of the governor, who, all things considered, was better vastly than those of his countrymen who formed his staff.

The question of the status of the Roman Catholic Church in Canada arose at once as to a successor to Bishop Pontbriant. In 1763 the governor sent M. Cramahé to London to sustain an application in this matter. In 1765 the attorney and solicitor general, Norton and Grey, expressed their opinion regarding the Church of Canada, that the Catholics of that (now British) colony were not liable to the operation of the disabilities imposed by statutory law on their co-religionists in Great Britain. In 1768 the king issued three mandates to the governor for the appointment of a rector for each of the towns of Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal. Governor Carleton directed Mr. Maseres, the attorney-general, to prepare a draft commission, which that zealous official did with all promptitude. On consideration of "the peculiar and delicate situation of the province with respect to the article of religion," as Mr. Maseres put it, "his excellency did not think it expedient to grant these gentlemen commissions of this form under the seal of the province, but in lieu thereof gave them licenses to preach and perform divine service according to the ceremonies of the Church of England in the respective parishes of Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal, under his hand and private seal." The draft was never availed of, and Mr. Maseres in about a year afterwards calls attention to this in certain other papers preserved at the time.

The Proclamation of 1763 promised the people that as soon as it was convenient an assembly would be given the Canadians—the new subjects—and that in the meantime they could rely on the regard of the sovereign for the solution of any difficulties that might arise. This *meantime* lasted for ten years, greatly to the annoyance of the old subjects, who regarded the colony as a place

to make money in and regain their shattered fortunes while their past history in England might be forgotten. There is little room for doubt as to the character generally of these noble five hundred; but it is not with them we are concerned, though they made themselves heard more clamorously than the whole French population.

In this interval a chief justice, an attorney-general and some other officials were sent out from England. The attorney-general, Francis Maseres, lived in Quebec for about three years, up to 1769, and retired apparently in disgust to England, where he was appointed to an inferior judgeship. He is the author of certain papers—and violent papers they are—regarding the colony and its laws. These are called the "Maseres papers," and from them a good deal of inspiration can always be drawn against the French people and their religion.

He and Sir Guy were not of one mind as to the manner of ruling the new possession, but the governor had not only the more sensible plan, but also the one that recommended itself to the home government. Maseres became the spokesman for the English in Canada—he represented their grievances and formulated reports. He even drafted a bill for the better government of Quebec. Under this model document the five hundred colonists referred to were to have full control of Canada, to the exclusion of every Frenchman and Catholic.

In the "draught of an act . . . ." for the good government of Quebec, prepared by Mr. Maseres, the members of the assembly would be required to take an obnoxious oath passed in the reign of George II:

"And likewise to make and subscribe the declaration against the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation mentioned in an act of Parliament made in the twenty-fifth year of the reign of King Charles II. entitled '*An Act for preventing dangers which may happen from Popish recusants*,' before they are permitted to sit in said assemblies."

Another recital, in the spirit of this one, stated:

"That hitherto it was not practicable, by reason of the general prevalence of the Romish superstition among his Majesty's 'new' Canadian subjects, to summon and call a general assembly."

The draught goes on to enact that in view of these and other things an assembly be called, each member of which should take the oath referred to, and so exclude any Roman Catholics.

"If it should be approved and carried into execution," wrote Mr. Maseres, "I confess I should think the inhabitants of the province would be likely to be governed more happily under it for seven or eight years to come, than under the influence of an assembly into which the Papists should be admitted. As to an assembly of Protestants only, I see no objection to the establishment of one, but the danger of disobliging the Catholics of the province, who are so much superior in number."

Mr. Maseres's plan of a legislative council was so good as to

merit the approval of "Mr. Thomas Walker, of Montreal, and Mr. John Paterson, of Quebec, English merchants of eminence settled in those towns," but it did not commend itself to the governor nor to the British ministers. The council was to consist of thirty-one members, all Protestants and thirty years old:

"Because if Roman Catholics are admitted into the council, there is no good pretence for not having an assembly agreeably to the King's proclamation and commissions to General Murray and General Carleton."

The council afterwards established, it may be remarked, was comprised of seventeen members, seven of whom were Catholics.

The ordinance appointing them is as follows:

"To consist either of seventeen members or of twenty-three members, or of any intermediate number of members at the King's pleasure. And they may be all papists or even popish priests if the King shall so please, and of any age the King shall please above twenty-one years."

Mr. Maseres might be pardoned for writing, as he did, a "remark" of ten pages upon this.

The petitions of the London Board of Trade and of the English at Quebec were entrusted to him, and in 1773, after a ponderous mass of materials from French and English petitioners were in the hands of the home ministry, the government set to work to frame an act for their new and old subjects of Canada.

IV.

The Earl of Dartmouth introduced the bill into the Lords, and Lord North assumed the task of defending it in the Commons. It may save some speculation here if we anticipate and say that in almost every particular, and certainly in every important one, the British Ministry disregarded the clamor of the now Baron Maseres and his requisitionists, and passed an act much more in the spirit of justice to the French than might have been expected. There were reasons for this outside of pleasing the French, as the coming events of 1775 were shadowing the whole continent.

Indeed, the cause of the difficulties at Boston, in 1773, was an error admitted in English councils. Whatever may have been the motive, the English government certainly desired to deal fairly with the French.

The English emigrants, once in America, were intolerant and revolutionary to a great degree, and in Canada they were, at the time about which we are writing, and later, in 1791, the most troublesome and unreasonable of subjects.

The Quebec Act of 1774 was an important measure, and so much so that although anything approaching a Hansard or parliamentary

reporter was then in its infancy, we have, thanks to the industry of the then member from Lostwithiel, a very full report of the whole measure—the debates, the evidence taken, and the reports before the committee. These form a volume of 300 pages and are called Sir Henry Cavendish's reports. The fact that such a thing was done is good reason for believing how great an interest was taken in the act itself. Sir Guy Carleton was examined, Chief Justice Hey, a touchy and bigoted Doctor of Laws named Mariott, and many others of less note. Edmund Burke made several good speeches, and we can read the names of Attorney-General Thurlow, Colonel Barré, Mr. Wedderburne, Charles Fox, and others.

The bill defined the boundaries of the new British province which was thereafter to be known as "Quebec," containing:

"All the territories, islands, and countries in North America, belonging to the crown of Great Britain, bounded on the south by a line from the bay of Chaleurs, along the high lands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, to a point in forty-five degrees of northern latitude, on the eastern bank of the river Connecticut, keeping the same latitude directly west, through the lake Champlain, until, in the same latitude, it meets the river St. Lawrence; from thence up the eastern bank of the said river to the lake Ontario; thence through the lake Ontario, and the river commonly called Niagara; and thence along by the eastern and southeastern bank of lake Erie, following the said bank, until the same shall be intersected by the northern boundary, granted by the charter of the province of Pennsylvania, in case the same shall be so intersected; and from thence along the said northern and western boundaries of the said province, until the said western boundary strike the Ohio; but in case the said bank of the said lake shall not be found to be so intersected, then following the said bank until it shall arrive at that point of the said bank which shall be nearest to the northwestern angle of the said province of Pennsylvania, and thence, by a right line, to the said northwestern angle of the said province; and thence along the western boundary of the said province, until it strike the river Ohio; and along the bank of the said river westward, to the banks of the Mississippi, and northward to the southern boundary of the territory granted to the merchants-adventurers of England, trading to Hudson's Bay; and also all such territories, islands, and countries, which have, since the 10th of February, 1763, been made part of the government of Newfoundland, be, and they are hereby, during his majesty's pleasure, annexed to, and made part and parcel of the province of Quebec, as created and established by the said royal proclamation of the 7th of October, 1763."

This boundary has been given in full because it will be seen to what extent the Quebec Act stretched across the continent the protection of the law in regard to the Roman Catholics. Part of this old province is now in the United States, part in several provinces of the Dominion of Canada other than the present province of Quebec, which, after an interval of 93 years, resumed its old name. It would, therefore, include Ontario, Manitoba in part at least, and part of the Northeast and Northwest Territories. But it might not include Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, as these became British provinces by the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and were then undivided and known by the name of Acadia. The English owned Prince Edward Island since 1758. Although the treaty con-

firmed these provinces to Great Britain, it could scarcely be said that the inhabitants were "new" subjects. But this and the matters adverted to at the end of this article may be referred to on another occasion. However, any one with a map before him can see the extent of the old Province of Quebec; and this much is certain, that for so much of that as had been wrested from the French by the capitulation of 1760, its inhabitants came within the relief given by the Quebec Act.

Attention will now be called to the clause as to religion, which is as follows:

"And for the more perfect security and ease of the minds of the inhabitants of the said province, it is hereby declared that his majesty's subjects, professing the religion of the Church of Rome of and in the said province of Quebec, may have, hold, and enjoy the free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the King's supremacy, declared and established by an act, made in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, over all the dominions and countries which then did, or thereafter should belong to the imperial crown of this realm; and that the clergy of the said church may hold, receive, and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights, with respect to such persons only as shall profess the said religion.

"Provided, nevertheless, that it shall be lawful for his majesty, his heirs or successors, to make such provision out of the rest of the said accustomed dues and rights, for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, and for the maintenance and support of a Protestant clergy within the said province, as he or they shall, from time to time, think necessary and expedient.

"Provided always, and be it enacted, that no person, professing the religion of the Church of Rome, and residing in the said province, shall be obliged to take the oath required by the said statute passed in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, or any other oaths substituted by any other act in the place thereof; but that every such person, who, by the said statute is required to take the oath therein mentioned, shall be obliged, and is hereby required, to take and subscribe the following oath before the governor or such other person in such court of record as his majesty shall appoint, who are hereby authorized to administer the same; *videlicet.*

"I, A. B., do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful, and bear true allegiance to his majesty King *George*, and him will defend to the utmost of my power, against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his person, crown, and dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavor to disclose and make known to his majesty, his heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies and attempts, which I shall know to be against him, or any of them, and all this I do swear without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation, and renouncing all pardons and dispensations from any power or person whomsoever to the contrary.

So Help Me God."[1]

[1] When this clause was open for debate Mr. William Burke, a kinsman of Edmund Burke, said, "I do not remember that I ever saw the House of Commons in so sick a situation as it is at present (cry of order! order! order!). I say Sir, that the parliament of Great Britain is in an unfortunate situation. This is the worst bill that ever engaged the attention of the British Council. It is a bill to establish the Popish religion—to establish despotism. There have been instances in human affairs in which for purposes of commerce we have established freedom as far as we could in a certain locality; but to establish Popery—to establish despotism in a conquered province is what we have never done before. . . . . The gentlemen who opposed the bill, knowing it was impossible to defeat it, have almost worked themselves to death to make it, as

V.

This bill created a great sensation in England, and the debates are instructive and interesting. As the reports are very scarce, the important references are given here.

"The Solicitor-General (afterwards Lord Chancellor Loughborough) said: 'I will state in a few words the intention of the proviso, with respect to the establishment of a provision for the clergy in Canada. First, I agree that the Roman Catholic religion ought to be the established religion of that country in its present state; the clergymen of which are paid by the landed revenue of that country. I do not mean to assert that this should be perpetually the state of Canada, or that we are by law to enact that the people are not to be converted, or that the tithe shall remain in the Popish clergy, or that the tithe shall sink. I would not hold out the temptation that if you are a convert you shall not pay tithe. If the majority of a parish are Popish, there ought to be a Popish clergy in that parish; that Popish clergy ought to be maintained by such as are Papists; but the money of the Protestants ought to be applied for the encouragement of Protestants, and for the maintenance of Protestant clergy. In proportion as the scale, with regard to numbers, shall turn to the Protestant side, the clergymen ought to be Protestant. The amendment points rather more definitely to this object than the clause. There is no harm in leaving the discretion open. I would leave it so large that if they were to be converted to the Protestant religion, I should hold it to be absolutely necessary to adopt the mode of Protestant worship; and then all tithes should be paid by Popish inhabitants and others to the Protestant clergy. The bill waits events.'

"Mr. Charles Fox.—'I perfectly agree that no Protestant ought to pay tithe to the Romish clergy. That is provided for in the clause. It could not be better stated for that purpose. But the learned gentleman has not absolutely said how far this proviso goes. The noble lord's amendment points to a more definite purpose. Am I to understand the tithe to be absolute so that you are not to alter it, and that it is contemplated to give to his Majesty the power of applying that tithe to the support of which clergy he pleases?'

"The Solicitor-General.—'Though I wish to tolerate the Popish religion, I do not wish to encourage it. When we tell the Roman Catholics of Canada that we will not oppress them, we, at the same time, tell the followers of the Church of England that whenever their faith shall prevail, it will have a right to its establishment. As soon as the majority of a parish shall be Protestant inhabitants, then I think the ministers of the Crown are bound to make the minister of that parish a Protestant clergyman; then, I think, it could not be felt by any man an act of injustice to say that the whole revenue of that parish shall be paid to the Protestant clergyman.'

"Lord North.—'Sir, as you have pointed to me, I presume to offer my sentiments, to explain the views I had when I made this amendment. I was in hopes of meeting the objections which had been made against the bill as it stood before. Those objections are two: one, that no care was taken of the Protestant clergy; that no establishment had been thought of for them; that, in the course of this bill, we had not only tolerated, but established the Roman Catholic religion, and that nothing had been thought of for the Protestant clergy. I am persuaded, in the present state of that country, the Protestant religion does not call much for support; but the hope of greater encouragement should be held out to it. A small establishment, however, will be sufficient at present. The question then is asked, what is to become of the tithe which will be paid to the Protestant clergy at a future period? Are the people in the meantime to pay no tithe? And do you hold out to persons that they may, for the sake of

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far as they could, consonant to English liberty and the principles of the English Constitution." After much more in the same strain the clause was carried, no other member speaking on it.

saving the tithe, disclaim the Roman Catholic religion and not embrace any other? I thought, by the alteration of this clause, that both those questions would be answered, and I proposed it, by way of pointing out the method in which the tithe which would otherwise be paid by the Protestants to the Popish clergy, should be applied by the king to the Protestant clergy. The words I offered would, I thought, have answered that purpose. If gentlemen do not approve of them—I proposed them to remove particular objections,—but if they encounter greater objections I shall withdraw them. I will read my amendment:

"'The king will not be able to raise any tithe not now payable; but may dispose of that which is payable. There will be an extent of power given to the king in that circumstance.'

"MR. DUNNING.—'My opinion of religious toleration goes to all who stand in need of it, in all parts of the globe. It is a natural right of mankind that men should judge for themselves, and offer up to the Creator that worship which they conceive likely to be most acceptable to Him. It is neither competent, wise, nor just for society to restrain them further than is necessary. I should think the Roman Catholics would consider themselves well treated if they were put in the same situation the Protestant subjects are put in by this bill; at least, the preference ought not to be given against them. I am anxious to know from the learned gentleman what the extent is understood to be of those laws which we are going, by this bill, to give to the Catholic Church. Will they include all ranks now in that province? Will it include the bishop? I should be glad to know how he came there; what power he has there; from whom he derives that power, whether by Papal authority or whether by royal authority? In my apprehension, these questions deserve a serious answer. The dues and tithes, whatever they are, which may belong to this bishop and which he has thought fit to appropriate to himself by his own authority, will go to his successor to the end of time without any interposition of royal authority. Whether the bishop has exercised the power of nomination I do not know. Upon that fact I wish to be informed. Is it the intention of ministers that he shall, for the future, name to vacant churches, or that the king shall so name? If they think that the king only should name thereto, they will take care not blindly to give the power to the bishop; nor will they give him the power of suspension, if they are, as they ought to be, ministers of peace, anxious to promote good will and good fellowship among men. To establish, in the judgment of the learned gentlemen, is not to encourage; in my judgment it is to encourage; and especially if this is to be the predominant religion. I do not like domineering in religion. I do not think the religion of the many ought to be the religion of the few. According to my apprehension those few have as good a right to judge for themselves as those many. Every man has a right to pursue his own opinion; no man ought to be permitted to control that of another.'

"MR. STANLEY.—'There is no inconvenience in supposing two religions established in the same country. For example, the establishment of the Roman Catholic religion has by no means excluded the Protestant.'

"MR. THOMAS TOWNSEND, JR.—'I want to see some specific provision immediately made in Canada for the Protestant religion. I was concerned to hear that nine or ten years ago there was not a single place of worship for the Protestant, which I consider to have been a great disgrace to the English governor. I was surprised at an expression dropped by the noble lord, 'that the Protestant religion in Canada at present was hardly an object worthy of consideration.' During the whole of these discussions, pains have been taken by the Prime Minister of this country, and Chancellor of the University of Oxford, to rank the Protestants in Canada as low as possible in number, consequence and character.'

"LORD NORTH.—'The honorable gentleman is word-catching. I certainly did say that the Protestant inhabitants were so few that they were hardly worthy of attention; but I explained it at the time. What I meant was that they were not sufficiently numerous at present to make it necessary for the legislature to provide establishments and a revenue for them. With regard to the bishop, it is my opinion—an opinion founded in law—that if a Roman Catholic bishop is professedly subject to the king's

supremacy, under the act of Queen Elizabeth, none of those powers can be exercised from which dangers are to be apprehended'

"MR. EDMUND BURKE.—'The noble lord says he makes the proposition contained in the amendment in order to make the clause palatable; but if not liked, he has no objection to withdraw that amendment. Are they then mere nugatory words, since they are drawn with such extreme levity? Then I promise mine as a better candidate for the consideration of the committee. But before I proceed, allow me to state, in a few words, my opinion with regard to the principle of toleration. There is but one healing Catholic principle of toleration which ought to find favor in this House. It is wanted, not only in our colonies, but here. The thirsty earth of our own country is gasping and gaping, and crying out for that healing shower from heaven. The noble lord has told you of the right of those people by the treaty; but I consider the right of conquest so little, and the right of human nature so much, that the former has very little consideration with me. I look upon the people of Canada as coming, by the dispensation of God, under the British government. I would have us govern it in the same manner as the all-wise disposition of Providence would govern it. We know He suffers the sun to shine upon the righteous and unrighteous; and we ought to suffer all classes, without distinction, to enjoy equally the right of worshipping God according to the light He has been pleased to give them. The word "established" has been made use of; it is not only a crime, but something unnatural to establish a religion, the tenets of which you do not believe. Applying it to the ancient inhabitants of Canada, how does the question stand? It stands thus: You have got a people professing the Roman Catholic religion, and in possession of a maintenance, legally appropriated to its clergy. Will you deprive them of that? Now that is not a question of "establishment"; the establishment was not made by you; it existed before the treaty; it took nothing from the treaty; no legislature has a right to take it away; no governor has a right to suspend it. This principle is confirmed by the usage of every civilized nation of Europe. In all our conquered colonies, the established religion was confirmed to them; by which I understand that religion should receive the protection of the state in those colonies; and I should not consider that it had received such protection, if their clergy were not protected. I do say that a Protestant clergyman going into that country does not receive the protection of the laws, if he is not allowed to worship God according to his own creed. Is this removing the sacred landmark? What I desire is that every one should contribute towards the maintenance of the religion he professes; and if this is proper to be done, why not do it immediately? . . . .'

"THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.—'The present question turns upon the merits of two propositions. The one moved by the noble lord stands in a very small compass—"let those inhabitants who profess the Popish religion continue under the obligation of paying tithes for the maintenance of the Popish clergy." But as there are a certain number of persons in the province who do not profess the Popish religion, some regulation ought to be entered into with regard to their tithe. The noble lord proposes a clause referring it to the king, to appoint the payment of their tithe, in such course and order as his Majesty's wisdom shall suggest, for the support of the Protestant clergy. Another plan which has been proposed is that instead of the tithes of the Protestants being paid as circumstances may require, they shall all be paid to the receiver-general. They are not even then to be disposed of, even by his Majesty, as the exigency requires, but to be paid to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in foreign parts; so that, instead of the disposal of the tithe being committed to the king, we are called upon to declare by our vote, that it is a fitter thing to place greater confidence in the wisdom and discretion of a religious corporation. I should never have thought of referring this to the opinion of the House. I have no difficulty in saying that the first proposition is infinitely the better of the two.'"

This is substantially all there is preserved of the debates on the clause as to religion, though there was considerable discussion on the second reading of the bill, when its principle was discussed.

The clause was carried by a very large majority, and in a few days afterwards the bill passed into the act of Parliament.

VI.

Whatever success the French regarded as falling to their side, the English—the old subjects—were sorely disappointed. They were defeated and they knew it. The act, besides what we have referred to, established the French municipal law in Canada as it was formerly—at least for all civil cases. The criminal law of England was in use since the capitulation and was only formally introduced. The bill produced something like a panic at Quebec among the English colonists. All his Majesty's ancient subjects settled in the province of Quebec petitioned against it, and in the following year Lord Camden endeavored to get the act repealed, but the motion was defeated. Mr. Maseres finally gave expression to his feelings by declaring that in his opinion "it had not only offended the inhabitants of the province itself in a degree that could hardly be conceived, but had alarmed all the English provinces in America and contributed more, perhaps, than any other means whatsoever to drive them into rebellion against their Sovereign."

For the next fifteen years, of course, the influx of English speaking citizens was very great, not only by the natural emigration from the British soil, but also by the hegira of those superior souls, the United Empire Loyalists. These came chiefly to the western part of the province of Quebec—what was later called Upper or Western Canada and now the Province of Ontario. In 1790 a dead set was made by all those on the Quebec Act, and a worthy man from Montreal went to England on a like mission as was previously intrusted to Baron Maseres.

This was Mr. Lymburger, who made a long speech in the Commons against the proposed constitutional act brought in by Mr. Pitt. Mr. Fox thundered against the new bill and its provisions, but all chiefly because it did not repeal the old act—the Quebec Act. Mr. Lymburger and his friends met with no better reception than the agents of the British colonists did in 1774. They wanted the province to remain as one province—the English laws to be the law in all cases, and the obnoxious act repealed.

The Pitt ministry divided Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada —they did not touch the Quebec Act except in so far as the new act expressly altered it, and the only concession was a clause for the Protestant clergy. This gave rise to what was called the Clergy Reserve, which, after disturbing the country for over fifty years, was finally wiped out of the statute book.

The Quebec Act has, since the constitutional act of 1791, been

recognized in a score of statutes by the provincial and imperial authorities.

As late as the year 1880 a leading judge in Quebec, in giving judgment in a case involving what elsewhere would be a conflict of municipal and ecclesiastical law, says :

"Inutile d'établir ici que la religion catholique romaine et son plein, entier et libre exercice ont été reconnus dans ce pays et garantis par la foi des traités confirmés par l'acte imperial de 1774 si souvent cité devant nos tribunaux sous le nom 'd'Acte de Québec.' La plus forte partie de notre législation civile se rattache à ce fait et en est la conséquence nécessaire."

The writer of this paper has no intention of discussing *coram non judicibus* nice points of law. The exact *status* of the Church may be referred to hereafter. Enough has been given to form an estimate of what at all events was intended by the Treaty of Cession and by the subsequent legislation down to the division of Quebec into two provinces. Authoritative opinions and the weight of interpretation of the English parliaments and its legal lights, have been referred to in discussing the position of the Church generally. The opinion of eminent judges of the Privy Council of England at the present day could be given to show that no subsequent legislation has effected the general *status* referred to. In a court of law several other circumstances would have to be considered—what was the exact *status* of the Church in Canada before the cession, under the French king? Was the law of the Church modified, and to what extent, by "*les libertés de l'Eglise Gallicane*"? What relations have actually subsisted between the Church and state in Canada since the treaty? Was the Roman Catholic Church established by law by the act of 1774 subject to whatever may be meant by the supremacy of the Sovereign of Great Britain? Did the sovereign of Great Britain succeed to all the rights of the French king in his relations to the Church in France or in Canada?

Exactly one hundred years after the Quebec Act was passed the Privy Council of England heard and decided a celebrated case from Montreal known as the Guibord case.

It may be said to have decided no point of importance, and it appears to have been argued in a remarkable way—those upholding the *Fabrique* at Montreal and the action of the *Curé* in refusing ecclesiastical burial to the member of a condemned *Institut*, arguing that the Church in Canada was not established by law, and their opponents asserting that it was an established Church. Their Lordships decided on a narrow ground—(the extent of an *et cetera* in an ordinance as construed *ejusdem generis* with other terms)—and avoided every important point, conceding, however, the difficulty and importance of the questions raised in the argument.

WHAT IS THE MOTIVE POWER OF MAN?

The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D., London, Physician to the West London Hospital, Honorary Member of the Medico-Psychological Society of Paris, formerly Resident Physician of the Manchester Royal Lunatic Hospital, etc. New York. D. Appleton & Co., 1871.

The Brain and its Functions. By J. Luys, Physician to the Hospice de la Salpétrière. With illustrations. London. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., No. 1 Paternoster Square, 1881. International Scientific Series, vol. xxxvii.

Body and Will; being an Essay concerning Will in its Metaphysical, Physiological, and Pathological aspects. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. London. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., No. 1 Paternoster Square, 1883.

THE fundamental idea in modern philosophical discussion lies in the question, whether the human intellect is a manifestation of physical force on matter, or the brain the instrument of a something superphysical, called mind.

That man is largely automatic in his brain processes and in his bodily actions is amply demonstrated by the facts which are here set forth and generally known. Let us frankly concede that man is largely automatic. Let us, at the same time, however, try to see if his automatism may not hold the secondary place in his being; whether that is not the fairest induction from all we know. The things—the mysteries—that surround him interest him deeply, because, ulteriorly, they are related to his being. This has always been so, and it is doubly so now, because, whereas only a few years ago, comparatively, nothing had been effectively done, impugning the spirituality of man, now a powerful, materialistic school, armed with the latest results of science, has arisen, ready to do battle against all comers. It contends that there is naught in man, non-physical, non-dynamical, ethical, spiritual; nothing that can justify the ascription to him of that which is termed soul. It contends that man is of the earth, earthy, an evolution of matter directed in certain grooves of action by physical forces. It finds itself as unable to conceive of a psychic force—soul, emanating from a supreme psychic force—God, as to conceive of a cloud-compelling Jove.

Let us first proceed to the consideration of automatic man, to that in him which has been demonstrated by physiology to be automatic, and then, proceeding beyond, see if we do not find a resi-

duum for which the theory of his essential automatism in everything is utterly unable to account.

It is a part of popular misconception regarding man, that his every act is the result of an exercise of will, and this in face of daily evidence to the contrary. A man has, let us say, the habit of winding his watch as he takes it from his pocket on retiring for the night. Many times he withdraws it, winds, and lays it in a safe place, without any conscious perception or will whatever having been concerned. Or he has, we will say, lived for many years in a certain house, and moves away from it to one a few doors off. Shortly afterwards he passes his own door unknowingly, his steps not arrested until he finds himself in front of his former residence, when he is aroused suddenly to his mistake. Will certainly does not enter into these acts. Whence are they then derived? They are clearly ideo-motor, as contradistinguished from volitional acts. They are as somnambulistic acts, compared with ordinary waking acts. Just as, waking, it is possible to see without perceiving, so it is possible to act without willing.

Man's few first simple movements as an infant are either inherited or automatic. Thenceforward, as the adjustment of his life with reference to his environment proceeds through the nervous centres and the machinery which they actuate, which gradually learn the lesson of greater or less adaptation to his needs, he becomes endowed with manifold secondary automatic movements, which serve in the commonplace actions of life, that call for no exercise of the powers vested in the supremacy of the brain. The brain, it would seem, like a chief of state, can withdraw itself into the seclusion of the closet, having relegated to well-instructed ministers the petty details to which it is below its dignity to attend.

That it is not the brain only which, so to speak, possesses memory and will and executive powers is readily perceived upon slight consideration of some facts open to daily observation. Recollect how slowly and laboriously many movements are acquired, and it will be seen how little conception and will are competent in these to insure success. Recollect, further, how easily, from want of practice, a movement which has reached perfection is imperfectly executed or lost entirely, without any diminution of the appropriate conception or of the will to execute. With regard to some movements, it is only in the general immaturity of youth, at a time when, of course, the brain also is immature, that certain movements can be thoroughly acquired, and this apart from any question of flexibility of muscles and joints. The difficulty of acquiring the manual of arms, dancing (in the rhythmical, not in the agile sense), instrumental music, and the succeeding diminu-

tion in facility in proportion to want of practice, are examples of the slowly acquired action, and the gradually lost action of co-ördinative nervous centres possessing capacity independent of conception and so-called memory and will. The brain's mandate may or may not issue for a particular action. Its sway, in proportion to the individual's elevation in the scale of being, and the consequent training which it has imparted to his life-work, is not exercised save in a supervisory capacity, which generally takes in the whole situation represented by the actions to be performed, and the greater or less degree of excellence with which they are performed.

Having now considered in this cursory, but sufficient, manner, the automatism of man in his waking life, let us consider it in the other aspect of his existence, the sleeping life. In sleep the response of simple reflex action and of sensori-motor reaction to external stimulus is plainly to be observed. The tickling of a sensitive part of the body, as of the nostril, with a feather, or the application of cold or heat, will bring about the same reactions that would be produced by the same causes during waking. Everyone knows that, in sleep, sound is readily taken up and appropriated by the dreamer, and assimilated with the subject of his dream, or may initiate a dream; that it may give a new direction to a dream, or a modification to a theme proceeding quietly to its *dénoûement;* or that, reaching the climax of an explosion or a roar, it may cause a sudden awakening. This last effect is produced by sensori-motor reaction. On the other hand, a noise may not cause awakening, even when violent. It may not cause an expenditure of outward energy. It may, even although violent, be accommodated by the dream; so that a violent concussion shall appear, in a dream of battle, the report of a cannon, the springing of a mine, or a signal-gun from a rocky coast. Or, so accommodating are dreams, a battle, or something else where noise would be a concomitant, lends itself at once to the imagination of the dreamer, solely for the purpose of accounting rationally for the noise. A dream, to a sound sleeper, can accommodate much, for all things that the sleeper has experienced are, fundamentally at least, memories recombined, lending themselves in profusion to his phantasy. Why should a sound, or a touch, or a smell, refuse to assimilate itself with the manifestations of a life in which the laws are but amplifications of the laws among which, awake, he has lived and moved and had his being? Amid dream-perceptions, whether derived from inward or outward impulse, or from them combined, the sleeper is thinking, under the limitations of dream-life.

Having thus afforded a rapid but well-balanced survey of the

two lives of man, the waking life and the dream-life, turn we for a moment away from both (to recur later to some of their phenomena in detail), in order that, upon the basis of what has been already said as to automatic man, whether awake or asleep, we can proceed with discussion from this point, beyond which he, as he seems to us, whether awake or asleep, ceases, at least mainly, to be automatic. The exception to which we refer in saying "mainly" is that relating to "unconscious cerebration," the very terms of which, admitted, concede automatism in action. We admit formally, however, that there is no question in our mind, that "unconscious cerebration" exists, and is, moreover, as active in waking as in sleeping moments. In the first, it is coupled with other cerebration; in the second, it is almost alone.

When we consider, from the psychological point of view, the processes constituting the law of thought, we find that related sequence is the first in importance. A man cannot have a single thought. One thought engenders another—not another entirely diverse, for if it were, there would be no related sequence, but another which in turn transmits its ancestral attributes, and bears the same relation to it as parent to child, however at the first glance seemingly dissimilar. If this be not so, it is impossible to conceive of individuality, or of variety in individuality. Individuality consists far less in features, form, and other bodily attributes (these change greatly merely from the advance of age) than in character, of which we possess no other manifestation besides expressed thoughts and acts, which, through all disguises, in the long run always correspond; and character, which is only another term for individuality, is regarded by modern science as being as persistent as anything in nature. It certainly would not be regarded as persistent, if thought in the individual were not so related to thought as to cause him to be best known through his mind. If we experience a difference in a friend's expressed ideas, we say with surprise that he is changed. If his ideas, although coherent, are utterly different from those with which we are familiar as emanating from him, we are alarmed lest he may be verging on insanity. So strongly as this do we confess our faith in the persistence of individuality. At the same time, however, that the law of related thought, through heredity, is not to be disputed, it is only a general law of sequence, conservative of individuality, and is immeasurably far from involving the narrow limitations enunciated by Lord Kames in his *Elements of Criticism*, who makes thoughts, through generations of thought from the cradle to the grave of every man, one long line of generations, each linked indissolubly to its predecessor, of necessity its progenitor. To hold this is certainly to admit that man has no con-

trol over his action, is to make of man the merest automaton passing over the stage of life.

From outward experience, and from self consciousness, one must concede the existence of the law of related sequence in ideas, but consideration of the evidence deducible from both proves that the law is no more than general in its binding force. It is true that we should refute ourselves if, by way of showing that an existing thought is not the parent of the succeeding one, we were to say, "we shall prove our position by conceiving here and now a thought that shall be utterly unlike what the succeeding thought would, without the intervention of our act of will, have been," and were then, in pursuance of our intention, to leap instantaneously in mind from this essay to some idea foreign to all our surroundings, as, for instance, to the conception of the frosty Caucasus, or to the perforation in manufacture of the eye of the needle. For these conceptions are merely drawn from the storehouse of memory, and the thought, of which they are the form, was born of the thought of avoidance of parentage, and therefore is the veritable child of the first thought.

But no regular sequence can be proved of many evolutions in the mind, especially in the mind actively and multifariously engaged. There are to be discerned other laws, by virtue of which the memory and the will, sometimes in conjunction, sometimes separately, assert their claims. It is a matter of daily observation to the man earnestly employed, that he has other things to attend to, besides those represented by the thoughts which are for the moment in a determinate direction passing through his brain. He is often, without individualizing one of them, conscious that many things are awaiting his attention. Some one or more of these may obtrude themselves upon him, but many more may still await in the antechamber of his mind the pleasure of his memory to introduce them, or of his will to summon the memory to introduce them to his presence. What is of commoner occurrence than that, when his preoccupation slackens, he invites them one by one to appear before him? Was his last thought, in the previous absorption of his mind, in any wise the parent of the next thought, directed to an entirely different quarter? Assuredly not—he merely became at leisure to entertain thoughts which, previously, he had not had leisure to entertain. If his preoccupation continues inordinately long, we find him often losing all hold upon the circumstance that something had required his attention; he has forgotten something, often to the point of never knowing of it, except, perhaps, through "mechanical memory," over which he can, of course, exercise no control.

Notwithstanding this, M. Luys, the French physiologist, says:

"I imagine that I think of an object by a spontaneous effort of my mind; it is an illusion—it is because the cell-territory where that object resides has been previously set vibrating in my brain. I obey when I think I am commanding, merely turning in a direction towards which I am unconsciously drawn. A phenomenon quite analogous to the conjuring trick of forcing a card takes place in this instance; the conjurer forcing us unconsciously to take a card, while letting us imagine we have liberty of choice."[1]

Can this be the process always, seeing that memory sometimes calls a man's attention to a subject dormant in his mind, in regard to which consciousness admits the importance (presumably associated with energetic cell-activity)? and that, although he strives to convert the warning as to the existence of a something important, to be attended to, into a recollection of the subject-matter, he may or may not succeed; for he sometimes does and sometimes does not? If he does, can the rescued idea possibly be physically represented by a previous specific cell-vibration? Is it also, of necessity, the lineal descendant of the last one of his preoccupation, or of an intermediate phase of thought? If it had been, it would not have required to be dragged forth into the light. If he does not succeed in rescuing it from oblivion, its lineage is, of course, disproved by the fact of its eluding observation. In point of fact, not only are volition and memory capable of instituting as well as breaking trains of thought, but circumstances in the outward world are continually engaged in instituting and breaking them. On the one hand, an episode of any sort, great or small, may institute a new train, and on the other, the thought that would have been born, but for the interposition of an exterior force, in the voice of a friend or an enemy, in a sudden accident or a catastrophe, may never come into being.

The truth is, that when the power, called will, enters, the automatic man does not end, but the higher man begins. Certain of man's brain-processes do not cease to be automatic then; they continue to act for themselves, but they then begin to act also under the mandate of the higher man. "Unconscious cerebration" will often have taken place on a theme in which there has been conscious interest, but no intention of proceeding with reason to the ultimate point; but again, the higher man may consciously think upon a subject which he wishes to elucidate, and may also, at the same time, commit to "unconscious cerebration" the task of doing its part towards placing him in the mental frame in which he can best devote himself to the subject, when his will decides to

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[1] J. Luys, "The Brain and its Functions." "The International Series"—translation. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., London, p. 254.

attack it with his whole vigor. The higher man, in a word, can utilize the automatism of his being, as a machine, to grind out a portion of his work. But it does not follow that the higher man (and higher he is, in the supreme function assumed, without our begging the question by that term) is therefore no more than the machine. On the contrary, if he can use the machine, he must be a something separate and apart from it. Every man, who, from the beginning of the world, has thought or said, "I will take some time to think over this question," has to some degree, whether he knew it or not, committed his subject to his "unconscious cerebration," as well as to prospective, conscious thought. He has, whether knowingly or unknowingly, used the automatism of his being as a machine which he knew would yield him product which he could further shape through intending will.

Dr. Maudsley, in his *Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, contends that character is not determined in the particular act by the will, but determines the will. That is true if sufficiently qualified. Unqualified, it will not stand the test of experience. Dr. Maudsley himself expressly says in the same treatise, "The way in which the will does operate upon the character, or affect the *ego*, is indirectly, by determining the circumstances which subsequently gradually modify it." These two propositions are irreconcilable. If character must always determine the will in the particular act, it must also determine the circumstances in accordance with its own bent. It is impossible to conceive of its determining an act in one direction and circumstances (which are to control acts) in the opposite direction. And yet, it is just these two propositions that Dr. Maudsley calls upon us to accept. The idea, that the process of which he speaks shall be gradual, is misleading; it could never be initiated. The propositions amount to saying, in sum, that it is in man, through character, to determine to act in a particular direction, and at the same time, or later, to act otherwise in future. The terms "circumstances" and "acts" are, in this connection, equivalent. The character (upon the assumption) must needs determine circumstances for the future, that would result in acts precisely like those which it, in the present, decrees. The well-known effect, too, of taking a direction is to strengthen a tendency. That fact also is irreconcilable with the statement that the same character can determine circumstances—virtually acts—conflicting with its acts. The whole difficulty is resolved, if we regard will as capable of determining against desire, and therefore, against character at a given point of time.

This is the true theory. We cannot accept Dr. Maudsley's theory that, in the individual act, one must, for "will," read "character." His answer would perhaps be, that we know what the

will is by knowing what the act is, but that we do not know what the character is, for that is not directly knowable; that, in a word, this unknown character determines, in strict accordance with itself, the known act. But we must assume that we can know character. All discussion of the question must cease if we cannot make that assumption. Dr. Maudsley's own conclusions are based upon that assumption. We therefore say emphatically, that we find in experience the individual act often in opposition to the character.

It is only upon the theory of the reciprocal action and reaction of will and character, that improvement or degradation in the individual is comprehensible. It is only upon this, the true theory, that Dr. Maudsley's own description of the efficacy of the will can be justified, and never has it been more brilliantly described. He says, "Without doubt the will is the highest force in nature, the last consummate blossom of all her marvellous efforts. . . . By the power of a well-fashioned will man re-acts with intelligent success upon the external world, brings himself into a complete harmony with his surroundings, assimilates and incorporates nature, and thus carries forward its organic evolution. The highest action of will is therefore truly *creative*."

Even in dreams, to which we will now revert, to show that even in that life where the mental powers are most in abeyance, the intelligence and the will of the individual man still bear witness by their persistence to the identity and the will of the man.

Problems that have eluded the thinker in his waking hours have sometimes been solved by him during sleep; perhaps because the synthetical process is then less embarrassed by the commonplace surroundings of the waking life. Sometimes, as though by intuition, is grasped by the sleeper what had been denied him when awake. As if by intuition it must be, for deliberation is impossible to the dreamer. But what, after all, is intuition at any time, awake, but the synthetical faculty unconscious of acting? It, like the best brain product of other kinds, is from the mind at the time unconscious of its processes, working with the maximum of power, because with the minimum of friction. In the case described, the ideation may be held to be automatic just because of its rapidity. We have a right to reply that that adverse criticism is not applied to rapid waking thought.

Considering that Newton struggled to bring to the surface a thought which seemed to him great, and succeeding, found it unutterable nonsense, it may be inferred by some persons, unaware of very different cases, that dreams must always be of such stuff, for what could be expected of lesser men? But appeal to some experience of every one, and principally to that of certain great men who have told of their dreams—Condorcet, Franklin, and

others,—proves that true thought is sometimes evolved in dreams. Even Sir Humphry Davy's experience when experimenting with nitrous-oxide gas, and under its influence conceiving that the universe resolves itself into thought, cannot be held nonsensical. His thought was a beautiful abstraction, but another form of the conception that Goethe makes the Earth-Spirit utter, when he says:

> "'Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I ply
> And weave for God the Garment thou seest Him by."

How defenceless the sleeper lies, open to all potentialities! Well may Shakespeare speak of dreams abusing the curtained sleeper! His brain, with all its accumulated treasure of ideas, is ready to respond to an impulse from within itself, ready to respond to an impulse initiated in the sensory system, or to one due to that system's communicating with the outer world. Ideas, abstract and concrete, roll onward, directing and directed by ceaseless phantasmagoria—the sensible images that people this special world invisible to all but himself, visible to him as if he saw them with his bodily eyes. Probably the molecular changes in the sensory ganglia, which would accompany actual sight, are the same in kind as they would be if the images were received upon the retina, and thus excited vision. Sight, which, as Dr. Johnson says, can, of all the senses, occupy itself longest without satiety, asserts its predominance over the other senses in our sleeping as well as in our waking moments. These phenomena are, of course, for the most part automatic, but much thought is mingled with them, however evanescent, and it is not always evanescent.

Dreams are as various in character as the men who dream them; but one essential quality underlies them all—that they are, as one ought to know they must be, wrought out of the nature of the individual sleeper. There are men and women who lead humdrum lives within the same lights and shadows from the cradle to the grave; and they, perhaps, as the father of Robinson Crusoe said to him of the middle estate, are the happiest of mortals. Others there are who have lived lives within lives, which, viewed from their present standpoint, seem eras distantly related. To the people and places associated with these, the dream-visits from the last period have often more than the ordinary reality of dreams, and present truthful scenes more vividly than their counterpart real prototypes appear in waking hours. The dreamer bears with him, as the ordinary traveller does, the thoughts and feelings of his present home, and sits in melancholy musing near the ashes of his former hearths. He even sees people, not as they were when he lived among them, but as they ought to look from the actual lapse of time, regarding which he is often wonderfully accurate.

One man, as intimated, does not dream as another dreams. A man is no other than himself when he dreams; he never loses his identity. The dreams of each person are the resolution of the whole person, plus or minus something—a variable quantity for each person, when asleep, as compared with awake, but a different and constant quantity in comparing one person with another. It is as the *ego*, not the *eidolon*, that one threads the labyrinth of dreams. High or low as he may rise or sink in fortune, as he occupies the stage of his fancy's creation, where he has furnished every actor's part and the whole *mise en scène*, he never loses his identity. If he should be then asked his name, he may not know it, but he is in some subtle sense himself, and knows that.

It will be apparent to any one who may choose to investigate the subject, that, although man shows much automatism in sleep, yet the higher man, the intellectual, ratiocinative man, capable not only of reasoning, but of what is called intuition, is not always absent in sleep. It remains to consider whether the highest part in man—the will (without which the whole man is neutralized) is absent in sleep. We think that to a certain degree the will is not absent, Miss Frances Power Cobbe to the contrary notwithstanding. Released as all mankind are by the fact of sleep from moral obligation, the will, nevertheless, asserts and effects in sleep a certain restraining influence.

The most marked characteristic of dreaming, however, is the weakening of morality in the dreamer. The consciousness which accompanies the *ego* of the dreamer is the same consciousness in kind, but not in degree, as that which accompanies him as a man awake. He commits or allows certain actions impossible for him to commit or allow if he were awake. And yet, if he be at all a moral man, there are bounds beyond which his weakness never passes, by which his individuality is still preserved. If, awake, he be a man incapable of fraud, he cannot, asleep, conceive himself guilty of fraud. If, awake, he cannot lie, neither can he when asleep. With self-consciousness, which we have said exists in the dreamer, must be associated conscience. In a superficial sort of way the terms consciousness and unconsciousness serve to distinguish between the states of waking and sleeping; but not otherwise. Self-consciousness—the presence of the *ego*—belongs to both waking and sleeping thought, and the most essential difference between waking and sleeping thought is in the diminution of the power of will. Physiologically speaking, a man's mental and moral condition in sleep is owing to loss of coördination of the nervous centres; psychologically speaking, that involves the diminution of reflection and will. Asleep, a man's intellect for single, isolated ideas is often as brilliant as in his waking moments. Tested by comparison,

under the different conditions of sleeping and waking, as the Persians, according to Herodotus, and the ancient Germans, according to Tacitus, tested an important question, drunk and sober, they often stand the ordeal. They sometimes add a happy conception which had failed to offer itself under the noonday sun. The memory is not dulled; it unlocks its treasures and pours them forth in reckless profusion, but so blended and transfused that the owner cannot always recognize them as his own. The imagination does not lack wings, and the mind is seldom unequal to accepting its flights as realities. We say "seldom," advisedly, because there are cases where the mind refuses its assent. But memory in profusion, without order, imagination almost without bounds, affords no resting place for any but the most transient reflection—deliberation in the true sense is impossible, so that real thought in dreaming comes in flashes, and the moral force and will-function suffer from the absence of deliberation. The sleeping adult becomes in a measure like the child, which possesses but little of either reflection or will.

The true test to apply, after all, to the solution of the problem that has been set before us is to try to ascertain whether or not the manifestation of thought—mind—is not in some particulars, and indeed the chief, so unlike, as far as we know them, other manifestations of force upon matter, as to lead to a definite conclusion, either that they are like or unlike. We think that it will be found that the manifestations are so little alike as not to be analogous. Mingled with and dominating the physical aspect of the case is a superphysical one, just as plainly as the other, by painstaking observation, to be perceived. Granting all that has preceded regarding the automatism of man, we may still dissent from the view that his brain-product is mere manifestation of physical force in matter.

What right is there to infer, when we consider that discrete intelligence acts upon discrete intelligence, that the physical force and matter which, associated, seem to make man, represent in sum his intelligence? We find intelligence present even when the body is being renovated through the process of sleep. We find in that state the individual man duly represented in the character of his mind, even to its most distinctive trait—his will. Is it not rationally deducible from all we know, that the brain is the instrument of the mind?—the machine for all directive life purposes,—and that its synchronous response to the mind depends upon whether or not the master is at the keys? In the opposite view, it would seem that the fallacy of the *post hoc, propter hoc* argument is apparent. It seems to us as irrational to hold that mere numerals and algebraic signs, which are but the symbols of computation, contain in themselves all the possibilities of mathematics, as to hold that it is

through a synthesis from the revelations of the senses, that we reach abstract ideas. All that is included in man—body, sensorial apparatus and brain proper, however they may have acted in the beginning of life, when they were informing and educating each other; later, when the education is completed to the possible extent in the individual, are dominated by the brain, for which term read *mind*. This to some physiologists would seem hyperbole, rather than a scientific conception; but ought not, consistently, to one who, like Dr. Maudsley, can say, as already quoted, "Without doubt the will is the highest force in nature" and that its highest action is "truly creative." Unless it be creative, it is not the highest force in nature, but is merely on a par with other forces; and if it be not creative, it has not, as Dr. Maudsley also says, power to affect the *ego* indirectly, "by determining the circumstances which subsequently gradually modify it."[1]

If it be true that the mind is exercised upon the basis of life experience, internal and external; that it makes laws of conduct, subject to its own revision, amendment and abrogation, it is evident that, trammelled though it be by its corporeal entanglement and its environment, it is the most independent of all agents in nature, enjoying legislative, executive, and judicial functions. In an analogous manner to that in which a man's conduct is modified by his environment in the world, by what is imposed upon him, so the brain, as the organ of the mind, entangled with internal forces, has its product modified by them. Although this is inseparable from the constitution of man, yet, in sanity and health, his mind is master of all else in his composition, originating and developing thoughts never received, excepting in the form of signs and symbols with which, according to greater or less capacity, to work out the problem of life.

Yet there are those, as intimated, who would have us believe, from analogy and experiment, that, whether waking or sleeping, mental phenomena are merely modes of motion; who seem to forget that the integrated entity which we call mind communicates with exterior force and matter by the determination of what kind, of what complexity, and of what amount the communicated energy shall be. The modes of motion belonging to the brain end there, unless man chooses to let them proceed beyond. There, in the brain—in the mind—they, unlike other modes of motion, reach conclusions, which may or may not, in accordance with, and in proportion to, the individual man's knowledge and will, affect external force and matter.

If it be affirmed, as is true and conceded, that in following their

[1] Dr. Maudsley has recently published a volume entitled "Body and Will," in which his views are even more explicitly adverse to those herein set forth than they are in his "Physiology and Pathology of the Mind."

transitions, the modes of motion whose existence and action have been demonstrated, and that matter also, implicitly obey their own laws, unless when sometimes interfered with and utilized by man, how can it possibly be held that in creating, say, a great poem, the steamship, the telephone, exterior force and matter are directly acted upon only through physical forces by which he is himself actuated? Unless that view be held, the notion of his mental manifestations being merely modes of motion is inconsistent with our knowledge of the correlation and conservation of force, the theory of which is that the chain is unbroken. There can be no correlation and conservation of physical forces involved in the transmutation of the idea of the poem, the steamship, the telephone, into the concrete creation of these and a thousand other things. If the truth of this be granted, it follows, of course, that what we call mind acts upon internal and external physical force and matter through something superphysical, is, in a word, superphysical.

Nature, however we may choose to formulate our idea of her, is certainly intelligent. So far as experience goes, she does not palter with the truth, but is, so to speak, brutally straightforward, even to the point, to our limited vision, of cruelty. She does not divulge, nay even, to appearance, sometimes jealously guards her secrets; while at other times it seems marvelous, when one is discovered, that we have not seen what she was clearly pointing out. We may or may not understand the lines which she puts before us to read, but in them is never found, if at last interpreted, any evidence of deceit or subterfuge. The great majority of men cannot believe, with M. Luys, in her juggling with the consciousness of her highest type. Beginning with the *Cogito, ergo sum*, there are other axiomatic postulates of life, rendering inconceivable to most men the proposition that freedom of action within the limits defined (limitation encompassing all nature) can be a visionary concept.

Some forty years ago we had not reached further than knowledge of the indestructibility of matter. Since then, Helmholtz, Mayer, Grove, and others, have demonstrated the indestructibility of force. May we not rationally conclude, although unable to demonstrate it, that, as we know force, and what we call mind, only through matter, and both force and matter (through ever extending bounds) as directed and ruled by mind, that it too is indestructible? The vast majority of men have held, and will continue to hold, if for no other reason than that man is creative, that a scintillation of a Great Intelligence shines on earth. If, as Mr. Herbert Spencer says, "Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a certain conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause," must not what we call mind, with its limited creative power and dominion over both force and matter, be regarded as a conditioned effect, but none the less as a conditioned cause, and, like force and matter, indestructible?

THE FIRST CENTURY OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN IRELAND.

THE history of nations, like the history of individuals, is made up of trials and of triumphs. As the centuries of the world's life roll on, one race after another rises to prominence and power only to fall again, so that the successes of one age are balanced by the disasters of another. In its day of power each thinks itself all but eternal, unmindful of the fate of its predecessors, and regards its national policy as the supreme effort of human wisdom. The courtly poet of Rome could find no more fitting expression of endless fame than "while Pontiff and Vestal should ascend the Capitol" of the Emperors. To Dante the fate of the world was forever bound in the fortunes of the German Empire; and the Spanish conquerors of America in their time held that the occupation of a New World was the seal of the lasting supremacy of Spain. We need only open a newspaper to-day to see how complacently similar ideas are held as self-evident truths. Bismarck's victory over France is accepted readily as proof of the innate superiority of the race which he rules, as if there had never been a Thirty Years' War, a Louis the Fourteenth, or a Jena. Gladstone sees in the growth of English wealth convincing proof that the power of England must still increase through unknown ages. The decay of the once powerful Spanish empire is constantly taken as a proof of her ignorance of the true principles of government, as if the building up of that empire had not in its day commanded the same admiration that is now given to the work of Bismarck or of England. So wide-spread is the worship of present success that ages of past misfortune are looked on as fully compensated for by a few years of prosperity, when that prosperity happens in the present century. Leading writers to-day, men like Green and Freeman, speak of the long centuries of devastation which England underwent at the hands of Saxon and Dane, through Norman conquest and civil war, as absolute blessings to humanity, because from them has resulted two generations of prosperous Englishmen in the nineteenth century, to be succeeded, it well may be, by other unprosperous generations in the coming years. In the eyes of Carlyle and his school, the miseries inflicted on Germany by the so-called Reformation and the century of wars that followed are more than compensated for by the fact that a hundred years later the Prussian Frederick had the best drilled army in Europe. That indeed

was a compensation to humanity compared with which three or four generations filled with the ravages of war and famine, the uprooting of the most cherished beliefs, and the wreck of old popular liberties, were as nothing.

To such a view of history we cannot assent. The prosperity of one generation cannot really compensate for the sufferings of another in this world. It would have afforded no relief to the Saxon serfs in the days of the Norman Conqueror to learn that their life-long slavery was necessary if England was to control the commerce of Europe six centuries later. In point of fact every generation has its appointed work, and the individuals that make it up receive their rewards as that work is done, apart from the fate of future times. The work may be different in different cases. A people may be called to make right prevail by victory, or to spread civilization by its intellect, or it may be its allotted task to maintain the eternal principles of truth and justice by patient resistance to superior brute force and heroic self-sacrifice. Even humanly considered, the last is as noble a work as the former, if not nobler. Thermopylæ is a more glorious page in history than Salamis. Washington was as great amid the hardships of the Valley Forge winter as when triumphant at Yorktown.

The full value to human nature of suffering for justice' sake is nowhere so fully brought out as in the history of the Catholic Church. During the first three centuries of its existence the power of the Roman Empire was arrayed against it, and all through succeeding ages it never has lacked occasions of holding its faith against hostile force. The persecutions of Pagan Rome had hardly ceased when the Arian war on Catholic faith began; and scarcely had Arianism passed away, when the sword of Mohammed raised up an anti-Christian empire mightier than that of Rome itself. The Saracen invasion had been but just checked by the sword of Charles Martel in the centre of France, when the pagan Vikings of Scandinavia began their raids on Western Europe. Christianity was almost destroyed in the north of England and in Ireland. France and Flanders during a century and a half had to bear the almost constant attacks of the pirates whose hatred to the "White Christ" was scarcely less violent than their love of plunder. In the end the Church prevailed, the Norsemen became Christians, and with the general adoption of Christianity the piracy of Scandinavia disappeared. But almost simultaneously with the conversion of the Norsemen, a new anti-Christian invasion poured in from Asia. The Mongols overran Russia and Poland, and penetrated to the heart of Germany, in the days of St. Louis, and they did not relax their hold on Russia till the middle of the sixteenth century. The kindred tribe of the Ottomans commenced its career of conquest in

the thirteenth century, and never halted until its banners waved supreme from the Indian Ocean to the Danube, and from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. We often hear of the time when the Church was supreme in Europe, as if she had exercised undisputed sway over its destinies during many centuries. As a matter of fact, however, there has never been a time since the fall of the Roman Empire when large Catholic populations were not forced to hold their faith at the cost of the dearest temporal interests. "No cross, no crown," is the law of human nature within the Church as well as in other spheres.

The history of Ireland, since the so-called Reformation, is a striking instance of the vitality of the Catholic Church under persecution. From the days of Elizabeth to the close of the last century all the power of English Government was steadily bent to the task of uprooting the Catholic religion in Ireland. The deprivation of civil rights, the all but total confiscation of their property, the suppression of their schools, the proscription of their clergy, the breaking-up of families, and at times the exile or enslavement of thousands of Catholics, were the means employed during over two centuries to stamp out Catholicity among the Irish people. How utterly they have failed, the state of the Church in the English speaking lands to-day attests. "Where the Parliament of England has power, the Mass shall never be allowed of," wrote Cromwell, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when Ireland lay crushed under his armies; and for more than a hundred years Parliament rigidly adhered to the same policy. In 1660 a single Bishop, worn down by age and infirmities and hidden away from sight among the poorest peasants of Ireland, was the only representative of the Catholic hierarchy within the British dominions. To-day more than fifty Bishops find ample work among the Catholics of Ireland and Great Britain alone, apart from the still larger churches of the United States, Australia and New Zealand which are mainly sprung from the descendants of the few hundred thousand Irish Catholics of the seventeenth century. No victorious revolution, no foreign invasion, has come to bring about the result. It is simply the supernatural power of divine Faith which has overcome the efforts of man. The way in which the contest was carried on can best be gathered from the records of Catholic life in Ireland under the Penal Laws.

It is not a part of our task to speak of the rise of the "Reformed" doctrines in Europe. The Irish people took no part in them, and it was only when Henry VIII. had established himself as Head of the English Church that any religious question arose in Ireland. In England, the worldliness of the episcopacy and the lately acquired power of the throne enabled him to accomplish his purpose

changing the outward organization of the Church without much difficulty. It was confidently expected that even less would be found in Ireland, whose people were far more remote from the centre of Catholic unity, and were besides almost destitute of any general national organization. Henry assumed the title of King of Ireland, which had never before been borne by the English sovereigns, and in virtue of this title he further had himself proclaimed head of the Church. The assumption of royal authority was not especially unpopular in Ireland. The Norman nobles of the Pale had been daunted by the wholesale execution of the Kildare Geraldines, long the chief family of the Anglo-Norman colony. The Celtic chieftains through the rest of the island had small scruple about accepting a nominal kingship, when coupled with the full recognition of their local independence and laws. The headship of the Church claimed by Henry seems to have been scarcely distinguished from the right of presentation to the bishoprics long enjoyed by the crown in the English Pale. The monasteries, indeed, were partially suppressed, and a royal commission was appointed to plunder the churches of their "superfluous" plate and ornaments; but the people in general could hardly distinguish such action from the ordinary policy of the government whenever it found itself strong enough to make English law "respected" in Ireland. Henry's religious policy in fact seems to have been regarded merely as a new act of legal robbery, and not as a new form of Christian faith.

The fate of the monastic establishments in Ireland under the new regime, is a striking illustration of the attitude of the people towards the new doctrines. Henry had secured supporters in England to his religious changes by lavish gifts of the property of the suppressed monasteries. The politicians of his court for the most part were as ready to change their creed for a share in the stolen property of the monasteries as a modern adventurer is to sell his reputation for a share in the profits of a swindling speculation. On the proclamation of Henry as King of Ireland, the same policy was tried to bring the Irish people over to the royal modification of Christianity. The abbeys and benefices of Thomond, or North Munster, were granted as a free gift to O'Brien, the newly-made Earl of Thomond, those of Clanrickard in Connaught to McWilliam Burke, the monasteries of Aghadoe and Aghmacart to Fitzpatrick of Ossory, and various similar donations made to the different other nobles and to the corporations of the towns of the Pale. Through a large part of the country those "gifts" were accepted, but the grantees made no use of the privilege to plunder. The corporation of Clonmel continued the Franciscans in the possession of their church and convent, which had been formally sup-

pressed and handed over to the town by law. The convents of the same order continued to exist in a similar manner in Drogheda and Galway, in spite of their legal suppression. The convent of Multifernan, in Westmeath, remained in possession of its occupants under the protection of the Barons of Delvin, those of Kilcrea and Timoleague under that of the McCarthys of Muskerry. Muckross, in Killarney, continued to shelter Franciscans under the ownership of the O'Sullivans, as did Moyne and Kilconnell, in Connaught, under that of the Burkes and O'Kellys. In Ulster, the royal decrees remained in complete abeyance, and even the bishops continued to be nominated by the Pope directly all through Henry's reign. In other dioceses the priests nominated by the crown often remained Catholics and applied to Rome for confirmation, like the Primate Dowdall. At the close of Henry's reign, only seven bishops were even claimed as adherents to the royal supremacy, and five of these were Englishmen sent over specially to occupy Irish sees. One of the other two resigned in the early part of Edward VI.'s reign, and the other, Bishop Tirrey of Cork, appears as a Catholic in the following reign. Altogether it was pretty clear that the change in the faith proposed by Henry met no approval among any class of the Irish people.

The adventurers who controlled the English government during the reign of Henry's son speedily pushed the work of changing the national religion to a point which left no doubt of its true nature. The sacrifice of the mass was forbidden, and a new form of service, devised by Cranmer and his confederates, ordered to be substituted for it in all the churches of Ireland. To carry out this sweeping change, the Deputy called a convocation of the bishops and clergy in Dublin in 1551, and communicated to them the royal orders. Five of Henry's episcopal nominees, of whom only one, Coyne of Limerick, was an Irishman, accepted the new rule of faith; all the others refused, and the struggle was thus formally opened between Catholicity and Protestantism in Ireland three hundred and thirty years ago. The rulers of the land had decided that their belief should be regulated by their temporal interest (Northumberland himself, the Regent, it will be remembered, professed Catholicity at his execution after persecuting its professors during his power); the people of Ireland refused to do likewise. Their constancy had to be soon and terribly tested.

The government of Edward VI. had freely employed German and Swiss mercenaries to force their new doctrines on the English people, who showed no inclination to receive them. The same policy was adopted in Ireland. Sir Edward Bellingham brought over a large body of disciplined troops, such as in the sixteenth century were taking the place of the old militia in war everywhere

through Europe, and the work of "converting" the Irish was vigorously commenced. The hitherto almost independent Celtic chieftains of Leinster were attacked and reduced to subjection, and the famed monastic university of Clonmacnoise, on the Shannon, which had survived the changes of nine centuries, was mercilessly sacked and burned by the garrison of Athlone. In the north, however, the invaders were repulsed by Shane O'Neill, and in Kilkenny the citizens put a summary stop by force to the Protestant Bishop Bayle's attempt to destroy their altars. In spite of the "hobillers and mounted bowmen," the "Reformation" made scanty progress in Ireland during the reign of Edward; and with the accession of Mary its missioners either fled the country or, like the deputy St. Leger, again professed themselves Catholics, like the majority of their colleagues in England.

The accession of Elizabeth soon renewed the briefly interrupted struggle. The Queen and her counselors after some hesitation decided to separate from the Church, whose faith they had so solemnly professed belief in during the last few years. The chief inducement was the increase of the royal power, expected from the supreme control of religious worship among the Queen's subjects. However, Burghley and Elizabeth, on mature reflection, concluded to go further than Henry, and prepare a new form of belief, suited to the politics of the time, for the use of all the Queen's subjects. How that creed was established in England is foreign to our subject. It is enough to say that it was ratified by Parliament as the only one which it was lawful for Englishmen to hold. Lord Sussex was sent over to Ireland as Lord Deputy, with orders to settle the religion of the people there on the same footing as in England. A Parliament was called for that purpose in the second year of Elizabeth. The system of representation in the Anglo-Irish government was of a peculiar character, and its complexion depended mainly on the will of the deputy. Deputies were only invited from ten counties, less than a third of the island, and by a liberal construction of the forms of Parliament members were freely returned for villages without the formalities of previous residence, election, or even the existence of electors. In this manner a considerable number of English officers and adventurers found place among the representatives of Ireland, and by some dexterous management, such as holding a session on a holyday in the absence of the Catholic natives, the Act of Uniformity was passed. The Church in Ireland was ordered to conform to the creed of Elizabeth, all public officers were ordered to swear to their belief in it; the sacrifice of the Mass was forbidden, all Catholic priests ordered to conform or leave the country, and the laity in general directed to attend the churches at the new worship, when-

ever her majesty could provide ministers to teach in them, under penalty of fines for every absence. The churches were pretty generally seized at once, but the other penalties were suffered to lie dormant for a time. A system somewhat like that of the Culturkampf recently tried in Germany was inaugurated. The bishops and priests were to be driven off in detail, official favor was to be extended exclusively to the professors of the new doctrine, and the Catholics of note were to be made to feel the power of the government whose religion they dared to reject. Meanwhile the Penal Laws remained in force, and any part of them might be executed at the will of the deputy or even his subordinate officers in remote districts. Such was the nature of the pressure applied to separate the Irish people from the Catholic Church, more than three centuries ago, and which has resulted as the world knows. "Unstable as water," regretfully writes Mr. Froude, the Irish temperament lacked cohesiveness to receive permanent impressions. The impression of the Catholic faith on the heart and mind of the Irish people is the same to-day as it was when Elizabeth knelt at mass in the royal chapel.

The English officials made no secret of the want of success which attended their attempt to force a new creed on the Catholic people. "I assure your Lordship," wrote Loftus, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, to Burghley, in 1589, nearly thirty years after the Act of Uniformity had been made the law of the land,

"That unless they (the people of this realm) be forced, they will not ever come to hear the Word preached, as by experience we observed at the time appointed by the Lord Deputy for a general assembly of all the noblemen and gentlemen of every county, after her majesty's good success against the Spaniard to give God thanks for the same, at which time, though the sheriffs did their duties with all diligence, yet very few, or none almost, resorted thereto; but in Dublin itself the *lawyers in term time* took occasion to leave the town, on purpose to absent themselves from that goodly exercise."

In the other towns the same story was told. In 1585 the Protestant Primate was informed by an English schoolmaster, who had been established in Waterford under government protection to instruct the children of the citizens,

"That it was not for any man that feareth God (after the Queen's fashion) to dwell among them; for although they cannot martyr his body, yet will they trouble his mind. First, there is not one couple among twenty married according to her majesty's injunctions, but hand-fasted only, *or else* married at home, with a mass; then they never christen their children, but in their houses, either with a mass priest, or for want of him the women themselves christen. Their dead they bury not (*i. e.*, not in legal fashion), but tumble them into the graves like swine, without any service (Protestant), or any minister; and as for the Word, altogether, they either abuse the Word or absent themselves from the church, or when they come they walk round about, like mill horses, chopping and changing and making merchandise; and these be not small fools, but even the chief of the city. The ministers cry out that they are abused,

deceived, despised, and almost discomfited, and *for this especially*, that they being constrained to send up a true certificate (for legal punishment) of such as frequented not the church nor received the communion; this certificate was presently shown to their enemies and such comfortable and friendly speeches given to them that they returned home again with open mouths and foaming jaws, and reviled the ministers with such opprobrious terms that they, poor shepherds, for fear of those brutish and savage lions are almost afeard to come near the sheepfold."

The strong family resemblance of this last document to recent letters of English special correspondents from Ireland makes it all the more valuable evidence of the reception given to the new doctrines in the teeth of the English power in Ireland.

It is not to be thought that the authorities contented themselves with the mere seizure of the churches and levying fines, in their policy of uprooting Catholicity. The clergy had to keep carefully out of the way of the royal troops, and where occasion offered there was no lack of executions. Bishop O'Haly, of Mayo, and a friar named O'Rorke had landed at Dingle, in 1579, and were arrested by Sir William Drury, who, on discovering their character, had them put on the rack, sharp needles thrust under their finger nails, their legs and hands broken with hammers, and finally hanged outside Limerick and their bodies used as targets. Archbishop O'Hurley, who fell into the hands of Loftus, was detained nearly a year in prison, and had his feet toasted at the fire before he was hanged at the gates of Dublin. The Bishop of Kilmore was three times arrested and escaped twice by his friends bribing the guards, and on the third time, in 1602, as he was unable to walk, he was stripped and thrown into a brake of thorns and left for dead. The Primate Creagh died in prison in London for his faith, and these are only a few examples of the fate of Catholic bishops in Elizabeth's reign. The priests, and especially the regulars, were equally at the mercy of ill-disposed officials. It was not very often, perhaps, that like Father Stephens, they were hanged by plain sentence for having celebrated mass; but they were practically outlaws, whose lives might be, and on favorable occasions were, taken with impunity by officious judges or a ferocious soldiery. The friars still clung around many of their suppressed convents under protection of the public feeling, and a favorite display of "vigor" on the part of the government was to dispatch parties to raid such settlements. Multifernan, Kilcrea, Timoleague, Moyne, Donegal, and numerous other convents were thus sacked at various times, and such of the inmates as fell into the hands of the soldiers were murdered, carried off prisoners, or released according to the whim of the commanding officers. Still the friars refused to abandon their old homes, and the courage with which they returned again and again to their abodes is astonishing. Multifernan was burned to the

ground and its prior carried off in 1601. Yet a community was there again, to be again dispersed, in 1602, and again in 1607. Timoleague and Donegal have similar histories, and around some of the old monasteries communities continued to dwell all through the next two centuries.

But it was not on the clergy alone that the hand of the government fell. A third refusal to take the oath of supremacy was treason in a layman, and thus the lives of the population lay virtually at the mercy of the deputy. In the corporate towns the municipal privileges, indeed, gave protection in general against the enforcement of this law; but the lives of the country people were absolutely at the mercy of the judges. Thirty-six were hanged in one session at Kilkenny, in 1578, by the same Drury who tortured and executed the Bishop of Mayo, and twenty-two more at Limerick. "Down they go on every side," wrote the Deputy, Sir Henry Sidney, describing his progress through the country (not then in war, be it remembered), "and down they shall go." When it is remembered that the ill-will of a judge could thus at any time send a score of Irish peasants to their death on any charge, or none, and that the power was freely used, we can appreciate what the holding of the faith meant to the Irish people in the sixteenth century.

A still more terrible proof, however, of what resistance to the will of the "authorities" meant was to be given to the recusant Catholics. Among the nobles of Norman descent, the Geraldines of Desmond were conspicuous for their attachment to the ancient creed. The Earls of Kildare and Ormond, the other two heads of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy, had bowed to the Queen's will, and accepted the decree of Parliament as the revelation of the Almighty. The Earl of Desmond, whose authority extended all through the south of Munster, steadily refused apostasy. In the first parliament he had stoutly opposed the proposed change of religion, and shortly afterwards he had given shelter to the Bishop of Kildare, Leverous, when driven from his diocese by the government. Sir Henry Sidney bided his time, and suddenly descended on Kilmallock, where Desmond resided, and carried him off a prisoner of state, or, as in modern English usage in Ireland it would be called, a suspect, on no special charge. The earl and his brother, who had been invited to Dublin and similarly arrested, were transferred from Dublin to the Tower of London, and again returned to Dublin in custody. Their relatives and clansmen rose in arms under Sir James Fitzmaurice, and, after a couple of vigorous campaigns, Desmond himself escaped from Dublin, and Fitzmaurice submitted. Four years passed in apparent peace, until an English army was available, and then the attack on the devoted

Geraldine was renewed. Driven to desperation, he took the field in 1580, and the raw levies of his clansmen, as might have been expected, were overpowered by the disciplined troops of the crown. For three years the horrors of war, such as no pirate raid had ever inflicted in civilized history, were let loose on the Catholic "rebels" of Desmond. Edmund Spenser, the poet, who himself was an eye-witness, and whose zeal for the new-made religion of the Queen urged the application of similar treatment to the other Irish Papists, tells us how the growing crops and cattle were destroyed, and the hapless peasants driven to the woods by the scattered parties of soldiers, "so that in all that war there perished not many by the sword but all by extremity of famine." Old men, women, and children were driven in crowds into their dwellings, and burned with them, and women were found hanging on trees, with their infants strangled in their mothers' hair. The poet himself tells how, through the once fertile fields, a few wretched fugitives might be seen "crawling forth like anatomies on hands and knees" for utter weakness to walk; how they "did eat the carrion if they found it," and that, if by any chance a plot of water-cress or of sorrel was found, "thither they flocked as to a feast." Finally, even the "anatomies" disappeared, and "a most populous and plentiful country was suddenly left void of man and beast," so that, as Holinshed, another English authority, tells, "the very wolves and foxes, many of them, lay dead, being famished." For sixscore miles, from Limerick to Cashel, no human being was left to question the queen's supremacy through all the open country of Munster. The land was partitioned out among English undertakers on the condition that none of the native Irish should be admitted. Spenser himself received a grant of three thousand acres in Cork, where he wrote the *Faërie Queen*, in glorification of Elizabeth, and warmly urged on Government the wisdom of applying the system of famine, which had worked so thoroughly in Munster, to the rest of Catholic Ireland.

The advice was not neglected. Twenty years later, when the struggle of Ulster for liberty had been broken down by the power of England, Mountjoy repeated in Tyrone and Donegal the horrors which had been already experienced in Munster. "No spectacle," says Moryson, "was more frequent in the ditches of towns than to see multitudes of the poor people dead, with their mouths all colored green by eating nettles, docks, and all things they could rend up above ground." Ghastly trial was this, surely, of a people's faith, yet neither in Desmond nor in Ulster would the remnant that had escaped the sword and famine accept the new religion so sternly urged on them. Fifteen years after the desolation of Desmond, when O'Neill was threatening the English power, the

son of the last earl, who had been kept a prisoner in England and brought up a Protestant, was sent back to his country. The awful miseries of the war were forgotten in the enthusiasm of his still-devoted people on his arrival in Kilmallock, so that a military guard had to open a way for him through the crowd. The next day, however, the young lord attended the Protestant church, and immediately he was deserted by the whole population. The sword of Drury and Mally might make the land a desert, but it could not force the Irish people to accept the will of queen and parliament as the truth of God. Nearly three hundred years have since come and gone, but still the Catholic Church holds its sway unchanged over the hearts and minds of the Irish people, even as it did in the days of Elizabeth.

The story of Hugh O'Neill's family is a stranger tale than novelist could invent of fortune's changes and unconquerable tenacity. When O'Neill took up arms against the Government of Elizabeth in 1594, he demanded liberty of conscience through Ireland, and five years later, in a stirring address to the Anglo-Irish towns, he declared: "I have already protested, and do now protest, that, if I had to be King of Ireland, without having the Catholic religion, I would not the same accept." The English officials were unable to comprehend such language in any other sense than a partisan cry. They had adopted the new religion, and were ready to forswear it if Parliament should so decide, and it was beyond their ken why an Irish chief should risk a principality for his faith. "You talk of religion," said the Earl of Essex to O'Neill at a conference between them; "why, you have no more religion than your horse." English historians have since repeated the charge on the word of Essex, whose authority as a moralist they accept unquestioned in this instance. The Prince of Ulster was still, however, obstinate in refusing to abandon his faith. The war went on, the battle of Kinsale was lost, and O'Neill with a few hundred men still held out, while thousands of corpses lay unburied in the track of his victorious foes. Nor did he submit until Mountjoy had promised that his religion should not be interfered with. The same promise was renewed by James I., when O'Neill was received at his court and confirmed in his possession of Tyrone and Londonderry as an Anglo-Irish earl. A few years later the promise was broken, and the earl was told he must conform. Had he been as careless of his belief as Essex thought, it would have been easy for him to have become the most powerful man in Ireland. The earls of Ormond, Kildare and Inchiquin had conformed and were high in favor and power. The man who "had no more religion than his horse" abandoned the widest estates in Ireland and his native land, when nearing his seventieth

year, rather than betray his conscience. The English Court seized his lands, and parcelled them out among Scotch adventurers. His sons won distinction in the Spanish service, but still cherished hopes of returning to Ireland. Thirty years after the great O'Neill had gone to his rest, a grandson of his returned to serve in the war between Charles I. and the Puritans. He won high honors on various fields of battle, and was created a baronet for distinguished services during the struggle. Following the fortunes of Charles I., he returned to Ireland after the downfall of the Protectorate, and recovered some part of his family's property under the act of settlement. But the baronet held his faith as his grandfather had done, and he transmitted it to his successors. William and his foreign soldiery once more conquered Ireland, and the Protestant Parliaments were determined to pauperize, if they could not pervert, the Catholics of Ireland. Sir Bryan O'Neill's family were gradually stripped of all, and the fourth baronet was reduced to support himself by keeping a little meal-store in a country village. The title was abandoned, but still the Catholic faith was held, and little more than twenty years ago the lineal heir died in a back street of Dublin, so poor that a subscription had to be raised to defray his burial. He had served in the army as a sergeant, and afterwards had earned his living as a cabinet-maker in one of the poorest quarters of Dublin; but the pressure of hard times had reduced him to absolute want. If we think for a moment on what is involved in the slow, grinding reduction of a family from wealth to the hardest poverty, with the means of arresting that reduction within easy reach by the sacrifice of conscience, and bear in mind that the temptation was steadily withstood through private misery and national calamity for nine successive generations, we will more fully appreciate the quiet heroism of the resistance to persecution which has left Ireland to-day essentially a Catholic nation.

The story of Spenser's career and family was widely different. As we have seen, he had recommended starvation as the surest means for bringing the Irish into due subjection and establishing the new-made "divine faith" according to the English politicians of the day among them. As secretary of Lord Grey, he was rewarded with three thousand acres of Munster lands, whose inhabitants had been, in his own language, "forced to devour one another" by the means which he afterwards recommended should be used towards the rest of their countrymen. The latter resisted the process, and under Hugh O'Neill they not only swept back the invaders from Ulster, but descended in triumph on the southern provinces. Spenser and his fellow "undertakers" who had been settled on the confiscated lands were driven from their stolen property, and the poet himself fled to England. His friends had

scanty sympathy for a ruined man, and in the heart of London the lot which he had himself recommended for the Irish Catholics fell on the courtly poet. Ben Johnson wrote to Drummond of Hawthornden that the author of the *Faërie Queen* died for "lack of bread" in the English capital. His son afterwards returned to Ireland, and seems to have obtained some share in the lands before granted to his father. Sixty years later, the grandson of the poet appears again in history as an Irish Papist, whose lands had been seized by the Cromwellian soldiers, but who was ready to abjure his religion for their restoration. Cromwell himself, then Lord Protector, in a letter dated 27th March, 1657, wrote in his behalf to the Commissioners for Affairs in Ireland, urging the restoratian of his estate, on the grounds of his professed apostasy, and his grandfather's "eminent deserts and services to the Commonwealth." But even Cromwell's recommendation failed of effect, and the lands passed away forever from the family of the poet, whose grandson had so strangely been found among the ranks of the Irish Catholics, though lacking the courage to hold his faith as they did, when his interests were involved in abandoning it.

The long, and for some years successful, struggle of the Northern Irish, under Hugh O'Neill, against Elizabeth's government brought about some relaxation of the government's war on the Church. The penalties prescribed by law for rejecting the State worship were not enforced in the southern part of the island, though the laws themselves were left unrepealed. After a seven years' war O'Neill's resistance was finally broken down, but the government was so exhausted in the effort that he was willingly received into submission. His lands were all confirmed to him and his allies in Ulster, and James I. promised personally that the Catholic religion should be tolerated in Ireland. The corporate towns of the south restored the open practice of the Catholic worship on the death of Elizabeth, and though the Deputy Lord Mountjoy, at the head of an army, speedily forbade such proceedings, he granted for a while permission for the private exercise of religion. Vice-regal or even royal promises were, however, a short-lived security. James decided, after a short delay, that the religion invented by Elizabeth's council was the best adapted to maintain royal power, and he abandoned the Presbyterian creed, in which he had been reared, for it in consequence. That subjects should be more tender of their beliefs than their monarch appeared absurd to his majesty, and accordingly, in 1605, the old decrees against Catholicity were renewed by public proclamation of the viceroy, Sir Arthur Chichester. The Catholic bishops and regulars were ordered to leave the country at once, under penalty of being arrested wherever found. All celebration of Catholic worship was

strictly forbidden, and every one was ordered to attend the Protestant churches on Sundays under pain of a fine for each absence. Heavier penalties were proclaimed against all parents who should neglect to present their children for baptism in the State churches, and against persons who should marry without the presence of a Protestant minister. The proclamation in which these measures were announced concluded by informing his majesty's Irish subjects that he never would grant toleration in any shape to any form of divine worship except that established by the law of England.

The conditions of the struggle between the Irish people and their rulers were very different from what they had been in the former reigns. The local independence of the Celtic chieftains had been finally broken down by the defeat of Hugh O'Neill, and for the first time in history the law of the English monarch was supreme in every part of Ireland. The whole country was mapped out into counties, and the law administered by English judges and enforced by English sheriffs, supported at need by the whole military force at the disposal of the crown. The surviving monasteries were successively raided by armed bodies of men, and their inmates seized or scattered. The homes of prominent Catholics were suddenly searched for priests, and amongst others those of O'Neill, in Dungannon, in spite of the royal promise of toleration given to him on his surrender. The aldermen and mayors of the towns were successively summoned before the judges and required to abjure the Catholic faith on oath. Almost to a man they refused, and in consequence they were subjected to heavy fines and sometimes to imprisonment in a body. In some cases, as in Waterford, the charter of the town was suspended in consequence of the refusal of the corporation to conform their belief to that of the king. By the peculiar system of administration in Ireland, the viceroy and judges appointed by the court had absolute power over the lives and liberty of the people. The Catholic members of Parliament were as liable to the penalties of treason for refusing to accept the State religion as the rest of the population, and from time to time they received significant proofs of the fact. A still more formidable engine of persecution was devised for punishing the Catholics who possessed any property, by means of blackmail titles. A class of discoverers, needy lawyers, and adventurers were employed to hunt up flaws in the titles of the Catholic proprietors of lands, and technicalities of the flimsiest character were held by the English judges a sufficient warrant for stripping them of their property. The flight of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell from Ireland was thus held sufficient ground for confiscating the greater part of Ulster, and similar measures, on a smaller scale, were carried out in the other prov-

inces. The lands thus seized were granted to English and Scotch adventurers on the condition of planting them exclusively with Protestants. The system of eviction, with all its horrors, was introduced as a legal consequence of the refusal of the people to accept the religion of the king. Chichester swept Innishowen, in Donegal, of six thousand of its inhabitants in this way, and sent the able-bodied men to serve in the armies of the Protestant kings of Sweden and Denmark. Where the means to collect the fines for non-attendance at church were available, they were unsparingly levied on the Catholic farmers. Thus, in one year, eight thousand pounds, probably equivalent to nearly four hundred thousand dollars in our days, was thus levied off the small county of Cavan alone. The capriciousness of these enforcements of the "law" made them even more terrible. The arrival of each new viceroy or judge might be the signal for a fresh outburst of persecution. Year after year the Catholic proprietors saw themselves stripped of their lands; the cultivators of the soil found themselves liable to fresh exactions, and the merchants of the towns had to meet new and indefinite fines, at the discretion of the legal officials. For each class the remedy for this state of things was an easy one. To accept the State religion and abjure the Catholic faith was a ready road to relief. But no body of the Irish people was found to sacrifice their consciences to their interests; and after three generations had passed away, and when four-fifths of the land of Ireland had been torn away from its native owners, a free-thinking writer, Sir William Petty, thus summed up the religious elements of Ireland: "The Scotch settlers are Presbyterians, the English half Protestants (Episcopalians) half Anabaptists and other sects, the Irish *all Catholics*."

One class was specially marked out for punishment by the goverment. Whatever hesitation there might be in applying the rigors of the law to an entire population, there was none with regard to the clergy. We have seen that the Catholic Episcopacy and the regulars, Jesuits, Franciscans, and Dominicans, had been ordered to leave the country by royal proclamation, and the arrest of any of them was a gainful object to the minor officials. In spite of this fact, both bishops and regulars continued to discharge their duties in Ireland. The friars often clung around their suppressed monasteries, and in some cases even continued to inhabit them under the protection of a few Catholic nobles, whose influence was capable of keeping off in general the official priest-hunters. Multifernan in Westmeath thus continued to shelter a little community all through the reigns of James and Charles; the old convents of Rosserilly and Clare Galway, in Connaught, held together under the protection of the powerful Earl of Clanrickard; and in Clonmel

the municipality, in spite of pains and penalties, still allowed the Franciscans to possess the ancient church of their monastery. In other places, as at Moyne and Crevelea, in Leitrim, the Protestant settlers themselves allowed the friars to use their ancient churches for rent, and, stranger still, in Galway a wealthy apostate protected their convent as his private property while allowing the friars to occupy it unmolested. Elsewhere, the proscribed Franciscans and Dominicans lived in cabins near their former convents, and continued their work among the people. The government, from time to time, renewed its edicts against their presence in the country, and sheriff's posses or military detachments swooped down on their abodes; but the vigilance of the people usually gave the intended victims warning, and it was found almost impossible to seize them unless by accident.

At Drogheda, in 1616, a raid was made on the house occupied by the Franciscans, and a priest, Father Holan, was seized at the foot of the altar; but the women of the town assailed his captors so vigorously that they were forced to take refuge in a neighboring house. Multifernan was raided in 1607, and again in 1608 and 1614, in spite of the powerful protection of the Nugents, and on each occasion several of the friars were carried off to prison. Such captives often had to spend months in jail, as the authorities cared little for bringing them to trial, and bribes were usually efficacious in obtaining their ultimate release. The law which identified Catholicity with treason left the viceroy and the English officials virtual masters of the lives and liberties of individual Catholics, and they usually employed their power like Turkish pashas in squeezing as much as possible out of the Catholic population. A letter of the viceroy to some of his friends engaged on a tour of official inspection of the churches of Ireland gives a ludicrous specimen of these petty vexations in the advice to "cess themselves on the Papists for chickens and bacon." But the administrators of the law were not without giving more significant proofs of their hatred to Catholicity and their power over its professors. Lord Falkland, in 1627, had organized a state emigration scheme to remove some thousand Ulster Catholics from their country as soldiers for the Kings of Sweden and Denmark. The project was unpopular, and as the best he could think for its encouragement the viceroy wrote to the English Privy Council for permission "to rack one Glassney O'Cullenan, a priest," who dissuaded the idle swordsmen of Ulster from joining the mercenaries of Gustavus Adolphus. The answer of the Council was prompt. "You ought to rack and hang the priest if you find reason for doing so, for such is the opinion of the Council and his Majesty's pleasure." Whatever toleration was

allowed to the Irish Catholics was thus dependent on the humor of their rulers, and liable to suspension at any moment.

The execution of Bishop O'Devany, of Down and Connor, in 1611, under the administration of Chichester, was a still more striking proof of what punishments awaited obnoxious Catholics. The bishops in general were too well watched by their people to be easily taken. "We are full," wrote the viceroy in 1613 (speaking of his want of success in catching a certain Father Meagh just returned from Rome), "of priests of this man's condition, practicers of sedition and insurrection, of which there is not a greater worker than Owen MacMahon, the titular Archbishop of Dublin. Albeit I cannot get any draught, though I have offered largely for it." The year after Archbishop MacMahon's arrival, however, chance threw Bishop O'Devany into his hands as he was administering confirmation in his diocese. The captive was eighty years of age, and high in the esteem of the people for his courageous labors during the former reign. Him accordingly Chichester resolved to make an example of. He and his chaplain were charged with high treason on general principles, and a packed jury at once found them guilty. It may be necessary to explain to those unfamiliar with the course of English law in Ireland that there was at the time no resistance anywhere in Ireland to the royal authority, nor was it assumed that the octogenarian bishop was about to take up arms. The charge of treason was simply a general formula for sending an obnoxious individual to death, and as soon as the conviction was obtained from the jury, eleven of whom were English or Scotch settlers, the viceroy offered to release the prisoner if he would take the oath of supremacy, in other words, declare himself a Protestant. The Bishop, of course, refused, and on the following Saturday he and his chaplain were publicly executed with all the horrors of the English law of treason. The executioner had run away, and an English volunteer had to be obtained for the purpose. The hanging and cutting down before life was extinct, in order that the sufferer might be disembowelled while still living, the beheading of the body and hacking it into quarters, were all performed on the old Bishop and his chaplain in the sight of nearly the whole Catholic population of Dublin, who, in the words of an English eye-witness, Rich, "made such a dole and lamentation after him as the heavens themselves resounded the echoes of their outcries." The same writer adds the strange information that the following night a crowd surrounded the gallows, and after midnight, "having their priests in readiness, they had Mass after Mass till daylight." It is pretty evident that the butchery of O'Devany had utterly failed in striking terror into either the laity or the priests of Ireland.

One of the most striking points about the Irish resistance to the religion which it was sought for over two hundred years to force on them is the manner in which the hierarchy and priesthood was kept up. In the ordinary affairs of the world, it would be absurd to expect that any number of men should freely choose a life such as that led by the Irish clergy in the seventeenth century, except in the excitement of some thrilling and doubtful struggle. To live apart from all public assemblies of men, and debarred even of the solemn celebration of their religious functions, to be constantly on the watch for prowling enemies armed with the full powers of the law against Popish priests, to have to fly again and again to the woods and caves for shelter, and it might well be to spend occasionally months in the loathsome jails of the period (no improved modern penitentiaries, be it borne in mind, but ill-lighted fireless dungeons); such was the ordinary career of the Irish Catholic priest at the time we are speaking of. To celebrate Mass in private houses or often in the shade of woods and mountains, to instruct a flock, to whom it was forbidden to assemble in any numbers, or to open schools for them, to avoid, as far as might be, giving any umbrage to the local magnates whose acceptance of the state religion made them masters to a certain extent of their Catholic neighbors, to subsist on the alms of an impoverished people, was the course of the priest's or bishop's life in more than usually favorable times. Yet all through the long years from Elizabeth to George the Fourth, the persecuted clergy continued to recruit its ranks in Ireland. In some shape or other schools were maintained, now in one place, now in another, where young Catholics managed to acquire education. Colleges were established abroad in Rome, Spain, Flanders and France for the education of Irish ecclesiastics who bound themselves to return to the dangerous mission of their native land when qualified for it by due training. In the reign of Elizabeth, Spenser had marvelled how the Catholic priests "spared not to come from Rome and Rheims and other places with long toyles and travails for no reward of richesse," to uphold the Catholic doctrines in Ireland. For more than two centuries the same spectacle continued to bewilder the minds of the foreign rulers of Ireland.

The accession of Charles Stuart made little difference in the condition of the Catholics of Ireland. The raids on "Mass houses" were still made from time to time, and the young heirs of Catholic families were carried off in large numbers to be educated by the Court of Wards in England as Protestants. Still the marriage of Charles to a Catholic princess was supposed to show that he was less bigoted than the former sovereigns, and through Parliament, which was still nearly half composed of Catholics, an appeal was

made for the full freedom of worship and the cessation of the legal confiscations which were constantly being made under pretext of flaws in titles. A large subsidy was offered to the king as the price of those concessions which were promised, and the money paid. We have not room here to tell how the royal promise was broken, and how Lord Strafford attempted to seize the whole of Connaught, and generally ruled as absolute monarch in Ireland. In justice, however, it must be said that although he refused to grant legal toleration to the Catholics, Strafford refrained from persecuting them himself. Catholic chapels and schools were allowed even in Dublin. In other respects the condition of the people, however, was so nearly intolerable that a crisis was evidently at hand. It was not slow in arriving, and with it a fiercer storm of persecution than had yet been experienced in Ireland.

Elizabeth and her ministers had, as we have seen, formed a religion of their own, which they and their successors had been in vain trying to force on the Irish. The opposition to it, as might be expected, had been strong in England, but it had been put down remorselessly, and during the following reigns an ultra Protestant party, the Puritans, had grown into a power. Charles was what would be called to-day a High-Church Episcopalian. As king, he claimed the headship of the three churches of England, Ireland and Scotland, and in each he was confronted by a separate political and religious hostility. The Scotch Calvinists had very reluctantly accepted bishops into their church organization, under James, and the majority of the nation, with the Parliament of Scotland, rose in arms for the overthrow of Episcopacy, and the English Parliament, in which the Puritans had a majority, openly sympathized. The Puritan faction in England had a grievance of their own. They held that the Catholic Church was not being persecuted enough, and they charged the king with being a secret favorer of the Catholics. The matter was a little complicated by the fact that it was the refusal to accept the king's own creed that legally made Catholicity a crime, as the king was officially regarded as the infallible head of the Protestant Church. The Puritans, however, were not the men to stand on trifles in such points. Their Protestantism had grown into fanaticism, and its distinctive form was clear on one point, and one only,—hatred to the Catholic Church and its children. Puritanism under its first form was Episcopalian, of the Low Church type, and such was the creed of Hampden and the earlier leaders of the great rebellion. Presbyterianism appeared to be the prevalent creed during the triumph of the Parliament properly so-called. The army, in the hands of Cromwell, adopted Congregationalism, and ejected Parliament and Presbyterianism from State and Church, and finally the socialists of the day were busily preparing

for a new upheaval at the close of Cromwell's reign, when Monk suddenly recalled Charles II., and the whole English nation went wild with delight over the event. The Puritan fanaticism was "like light straw on flame," "a fierce but fading fire," but for its time it had to burn fiercely in the already sorely-tried Ireland.

On the downfall and execution of Strafford, Charles appeared to yield to the demands of his Puritan Parliament. No Lord Lieutenant was appointed for a time, but two Puritans, Borlase and Parsons, were appointed Lords Justices, with virtual control of the country. The newcomers loudly denounced the toleration granted by their predecessor, and made no secret of the intention of their friends in the English Parliament to utterly crush out Catholicity. The same body was evidently on the eve of a death struggle with the king, and the leaders of the Irish Catholics decided to seize the opportunity of securing civil and religious freedom for their own country. The Catholic members of Parliament, both Lords and Commons, withdrew from Dublin, and established a national government at Kilkenny, which for several years virtually controlled the greater part of the country. It would far exceed our limits to go into the details of the succeeding wars, nor is it essential to our object, which is to point out the conditions under which the Catholic faith was preserved in Ireland, in despite of the attempts made so persistently by the rulers to suppress it. It is enough to state that, in 1652, the last stronghold of Irish freedom—Galway—was forced to surrender to the forces of the English Parliament after a resistance of nine months, more than double that of the boasted siege of Derry, nearly forty years afterwards. The English Puritans, who had already executed Charles, and reduced the hitherto independent kingdom of Scotland, were now, by force of arms, absolute masters in Ireland.

The conquerors resolved to use their power without mercy. The population was probably about a million at this period, and, as a first step, between thirty and forty thousand of the able-bodied men who had borne arms during the war were transported to the European continent to serve as soldiers in the armies of the various powers at peace with the new government of England. Pestilence and famine had already fearfully decimated the Irish population during the two preceding years. In Dublin alone thirty thousand persons had been swept away by plague in 1650 and 1651, and the garrison of Waterford had been reduced by the same cause from twelve to four hundred men in a few months. The Parliamentary troops, during the same time, had regularly followed the traditional English plan of cutting down the growing crops and destroying the cattle wherever their forces extended, so that their parties often travelled thirty miles through lately popu'ous districts,

without meeting a living creature. Dean Bernard tells how, around Newry and Dundalk, the dogs of the exterminated peasantry had grown as ferocious as tigers from feeding on the unburied bodies left by the English soldiers. The wolves increased so fast that hunts were organized for their destruction around the suburbs of Dublin, and state leases were made of lands for keeping up packs of wolf-hounds. It is only when we read such things as these that we can appreciate the resistance of the Irish people to the foreign conquest, and how utterly powerless they must have been when the thirty-four thousand "swordsmen" had been swept off to fill the ranks of any power in Europe.

For the rest of the Catholic population it was ordered by the Parliament that all proprietors and all who had served in the war against their forces should remove by a fixed day beyond the Shannon. The province of Connaught, the wildest and most barren, as well as the smallest, of the four divisions of Ireland, was assigned as the abode for the entire nation, except whatever laborers might be needed for the service of the new English settlers. Even those laborers were not allowed to remain in the cities, from which all Catholics had to remove under pain of death. The whole Catholic population of Dublin was ordered to present themselves in the Puritan Churches on the day after Christmas in 1651, or leave the city. Similar decrees were published in Cork, Galway, and Waterford. In the capital, by the statement of the Puritan authorities, only a few hundred were found to accept apostasy even on such conditions, and a still smaller number in the other cities. In 1655 Sir Charles Coote received the thanks of the English Government for having cleared Galway of all its Catholic inhabitants except the sick and bed-ridden, whom he was requested to remove, too, as soon as the weather would permit. In Wexford, after its capture, Cromwell informed the Parliament that not one in twenty of its former population remained, and in 1654 it was stated by the clerk of the Council, Herbert, that in a whole barony of Tipperary no inhabitant of Irish race remained, so that a few families had to be brought back to inform the government surveyors of the boundaries of the confiscated estates.

The land thus swept of its Irish owners was divided among the soldiers of Cromwell and English adventurers who had taken shares in the expenses of the war. The national hatred of the English Puritans might have been supposed satisfied by so wholesale a despoiling of the Irish race; but, so long as the latter retained their religion, the conquest seemed incomplete. Henry Cromwell, the son of the Protector, in 1655, urged on Secretary Thurloe the policy of sending a couple of thousand Irish boys, from twelve to fourteen, as slaves to Jamaica, on the ground that "we

could well spare them, and it might be the means of making them Englishmen, I mean Christians." Pym had declared in Parliament that they would not leave a priest in Ireland, and Cromwell himself had declared that "where the English Parliament had power no Popish Mass would be endured." It had now full power, and the Protector set himself in earnest to make good his words. The Catholic clergy were hunted down by armed parties. During the continuance of hostilities the priests who fell into the hands of the soldiers were, for the most part, at once executed, and even after the submission of the country the same practice was occasionally followed. Three bishops, O'Brien of Emly, MacMahon of Clogher, and MacEgan of Elphin, with about three hundred priests, were thus put to death by the Parliamentary soldiery, and all the remaining bishops save one, the aged and nearly helpless Bishop of Kilmore, were driven from the country. The remaining priests were keenly pursued everywhere.

"We have in Ireland three beasts to destroy that lay burden on us," said Major Morgan, the member for Wicklow in Cromwell's Parliament at Westminster, in 1657. "The first is the wolf, on whose head we lay five pounds a head if a dog, and ten if a bitch. The second beast is a priest, on whose head we lay ten pounds, and if eminent, more. The third beast is a Tory (rapparee), on whose head, if he be a public Tory, we lay twenty pounds, and forty shillings if a private Tory." With garrisons in every town, with the old landmarks of Irish owners broken down and a population guarded within the limits of a small province like prisoners at large, it may be realized how hard it was for the Catholic priests to escape capture. At times the jails were full of them. In 1656 orders were given to transmit all captive priests to Carrickfergus, thence to be shipped by the first ship to Barbadoes. It was, however, directed that any who would renounce the Pope's supremacy, and frequent the Protestant meetings, and no others, should be allowed to remain. Scarcely any could be found to accept such terms, and the majority had to find their graves in the slave quarters of the West Indian plantations. In spite of all, however, over three hundred continued to elude capture, and maintain the Catholic faith in Ireland all through the reign of the Protector, whose boast, that "the Popish mass should not be endured," was thus baffled by the constancy of its undaunted ministers.

The laity were not allowed to profess their faith without further trials. With the cant which was so characteristic of the Puritan declarations, Cromwell, at the same time that he declared the mass should not be endured, said, "he meddled not with the internal conscience of any man." To show what value was to be attached to these words, an oath was drawn up, in which the leading Catholic

doctrines were declared to be false and damnable, and all Catholics were required by law to solemnly invoke the name of the Divinity to a denial of their internal faith. The oath might be tendered by any magistrate, and the penalty was the forfeiture of one-third of all property for a first refusal to take it, and of life imprisonment for a third. The Catholics who had received lands in Connaught, or still retained some movables, were summoned frequently to take this oath; but we are told it was almost generally refused. For the laborers and others who could not be fined, for the simple reason that they had nothing, another means of punishment was invented. Contracts were made with the Bristol merchants for the supply of Irish slaves for the West Indies, and the military governors of various posts, as Carlow, Kilkenny, Clonmel, Ross, and Waterford, got orders in 1654 to arrest "all such Irish within their precincts as could not prove they had a settled course of industry enough to maintain them," and deliver them and all children in hospitals and work-houses to Captain Morgan, Mr. North, and John Johnson, English merchants, who were empowered to transport them as slaves to the West Indies. Six thousand four hundred were thus carried into slavery before May, 1655, when the orders were repealed, because the slave hunters were found to be carrying off English children as well as Irish when occasion offered. The difficulty which has so constantly beset the English administration of Ireland, namely, how to have robbery and rapine honestly carried into execution, thus put a stop to the Cromwellian slave trade in Irish Catholics.

Nine years had passed since Cromwell had emphasized his declaration that "the Mass should not be endured," by the massacre of Drogheda, and still there was no sign of Catholicity dying out in Ireland. Confiscation, slavery, and wholesale slaughter had all been tried, and tried in vain. The Puritan fanaticism had well-nigh burned itself out in England, and on the death of Cromwell the popular feeling there turned irresistibly against its professors. Charles II. was recalled to the throne amid a delirium of public rejoicing. The body of the late ruler was dragged from its grave and shamefully hung up to public insult by the very people who had a few years before raised him to supreme power. The creed which he had established was swept away. The Irish Puritans, who had been so loud in their outcry against Popery and prelacy while seizing the lands of Ireland, were among the first to pay homage to the new monarch, on whose head a price had been set by their party a few years before. Henry Cromwell himself was among the foremost of the new loyalists, and while his father's dishonored corpse was still rotting at Tyburn, the late Lord Lieutenant was humbly begging the favor of Lord Ormond

to enable him to retain Lord Clanrickarde's estate of Portumna, which had been granted him by that father's government as a reward for his services. Coote and Broghill, the executioners respectively of Bishops MacMahon and MacEgan, and the merciless leaders of the Parliamentarians against the Irish royalists, were prompt to follow Henry Cromwell. As Lords Justice, they presided at the formal restoration of the royal authority, and in the words of their address quoted by their apologist, Froude, they could not "conceal the unspeakable joy" with which they welcomed the revival of "the true worship of God" among them and pronounced the Protectorate which had enriched them with Irish spoil "a wicked, traitorous and abominable usurpation."

The body of Cromwellian settlers, in the words of the same author, "so long as they lived retained their own beliefs, but deprived as they were of school or chapel, they were unable to perpetuate them, and thus their children were swept into the Irish stream and became Catholics." A hundred years had passed since school and chapel were taken from the Irish Catholics, as far as the power of English law could take them; yet after that hundred years, with its sad story of war, famine, confiscation and executions, the old Irish Nation was Catholic still. The contrast speaks for itself.

FREEDOM OF WORSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES.

WHEN, on September 25th, 1789, the first amendments to the Constitution of the United States were proposed by Congress, and afterwards ratified by eleven of the thirteen original States, the Catholics thanked God, because, by the first article of these amendments, it was enacted that "Congress should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, and prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The third section of the first article of the Constitution of New York reads as follows: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State to all mankind."

The influence of the wiser and more farseeing statesmen of that day tended towards an almost universal repeal of all the disabilities under which the Catholics had groaned in the previous colonial days. The States that refused to sign this treaty of religious peace were sure soon to follow an example which the spirit of the age rendered, as it were, necessary in the new republic.

But the prejudices existing still in the great mass of the nation against "papal power" could not be instantly removed, and in many public institutions of the new States the superintendents thought themselves authorized to exclude from the premises any Catholic clergyman who had been called by a sick person living at the time in the house. We remember that in 1847 no priest could enter the poor-house of Westchester county, at the gates of New York city, and the faculty of St. John's College, Fordham, obtained that permission only after a discussion before the Board of Supervisors of the county.

A happy change has taken place since then. In the charitable and reformatory establishments founded by the municipal government of New York, and situated in the beautiful islands of the East River, there is now, and there has been for a number of years, a perfect freedom of action for the ministers of the Catholic faith. They are allowed to perform their duties whenever they are called, night and day, to the bed of the sick, or for the consolation of the afflicted. All citizens, whatever may be their creed, concur in saying that the former disabilities were the deplorable remains of a brutality, yea, a savageness, whose past records, chiefly in England, strike the reader with amazement and horror.

Still this country is not yet entirely free from those excesses of

bigotry. The doctrine of perfect equality of all religions before the law, though it has been now accepted or enacted by all the States, remains, as it were, an affair of theory rather than of universal practice. We meet occasionally with facts which can scarcely tally with the renowned principles of civil toleration prevalent at this day in all free States. The abnormal exceptions introduced by European agnosticism on the other side of the Atlantic, which bring back again despotism under the garb of liberty, are, it is true, scarcely perceptible in this happy country; still there are yet some symptoms of it, and the sooner they disappear the better it will be for us.

The spirit of the new political institutions created in this country at the period of the Revolution was that of civil and religious liberty, but in many of the colonies the penal laws of England against Catholics had been copied in their legislation, and prejudice and suspicion against them had been fostered by the enactments of assemblies and the prevailing tone of the pulpits.

The prejudices, pervading as they did the mass of the nation against "papal power," could not be instantly removed, and it required time to carry out in fact the beneficent and reasonable provisions of the National and State constitutions. People who had been brought up to regard adherents of the primitive Christian Church as entitled to no civil rights, but as beings who could claim only such rights as any man in position might for the moment see fit to grant them, could scarcely be expected to give a generous and hearty interpretation to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Nursed in ideas of intolerance many were, unconsciously to themselves, grossly intolerant and acted accordingly. The mass of the American people ultimately entered heartily into the spirit and practice of religious liberty, accepting as a fundamental principle that every man in the land should be free to attend the worship of the denomination to which he belonged, and that no man could be compelled to attend, or be bound directly or indirectly to support any other.

As Catholics increase in numbers Catholic inmates of prisons, reformatories, and asylums for the homeless and unfortunate increase. That these people have a right to attend the worship of their own church, and ought not to be compelled to attend the service of another faith, all would admit as an abstract proposition; but it unfortuately has happened that in isolated cases and institutions a few set themselves against the sound American principle of religious freedom and equal rights, and seize any opportunity afforded by the absence of express laws to prevent Catholics from being allowed to hear mass on Sunday, and to force them to attend some Protestant form of service, either that of some denomination,

or one framed for the institution, which thus has a religion of its own.

The ingenuity of perverted reason is shown in the fertility of arguments put forward to defend this course and make the unreflecting think that they are advocating American and liberal principles against a grasping ecclesiastical body. Whenever they are called to account for their illiberal and oppressive course they make the discipline of the house a pretext, as though the assembling of Catholics for half-an-hour apart, to attend services by a clergyman of their own faith, could endanger discipline. That it is a mere pretext, and a shallow one, is clear from the experience of the English government, which ever since 1862, now nearly a quarter of a century, has carried out this separate worship in all institutions on the British Isles, and in this period of twenty-three years has found it an aid, and not an obstacle to discipline.

Another pretext is that the service enforced suits all; that it is not that of any particular denomination, and is unobjectionable. It is essentially Protestant, however, and even if it were acceptable to all Protestants, which can seldom be shown to be the case, it cannot be made by the State compulsory on any one, Protestant or Catholic. The State cannot by law institute a form of worship and compel any class of citizens to attend it, and the State cannot delegate a greater power than it possesses.

Every sophistry and trick of false reasoning is resorted to when the question arises of depriving officials of the un-American power they assume of violating the rights of conscience. Catholics are accused of claiming special privileges; of attempting to interfere with Protestants and to deprive them of their religious rights; of seeking to proselytize. Yet, with singular inconsistency, they will maintain that their so-called non-sectarian service suits everybody, and in the next breath say that if every denomination is allowed to come in it will lead to general confusion. If all Protestants accept the non-sectarian form they will not seek to introduce anything else. If they do seek this it is clear that the non-sectarian form does not suit them. As to the other charge, that allowing Catholics to hear mass will interfere with Protestant inmates and deprive them of rights, it is merely absurd, as the priest will officiate only for those of his own faith, and not come in contact with others at all.

Catholics never have sought in any country to force Protestants to attend mass, and certainly do not ask it in any institution in this country. The mass, in the Catholic Church is the essential act of worship, in which every member of the Church is required to join on Sunday, and it is the great act of sanctifying that day. It is not an optional service with him. It binds him in conscience, and

if he is free he must hear mass. If he is confined the privation is to him the greatest of evils. The Protestant system has nothing analogous. No service of his appeals to a Protestant conscience as one that he must attend under pain of sin. As the mass has this claim on the Catholic conscience, the denial of it has a character of especial cruelty, and wantonly to deprive a Catholic of the privilege shows a heart insensible to every fine feeling of love for our neighbor which should ever mark a true Christian character.

That we in no degree exaggerate this will be clear to every one living out of cities who wishes to secure Catholics as servants or for farm work. If Catholics thus employed cannot get to mass on Sundays, they give up situations where the recompense and the treatment are all they can desire, because all these weigh as nothing compared to the loss of the great sacrifice of their religion. In numerous places aid is given to the erection of Catholic churches by residents who wish in this way to put the minds of those whom they employ at rest on this to them important and essential point.

It would be impossible to enumerate and discuss the pretexts raised by the few institutions which array themselves against true American liberal feelings. They pretend that those in eleemosynary and reformatory institutions are criminals, and that criminals have no rights, reviving in their worst features the old laws of attainder, and setting up the most dangerous theories, making poverty itself a crime, in defiance of all the teachings of our Lord. They claim to be private institutions while asking for public money; they declare that they belong to some particular denomination at the very time that they earnestly aver themselves to be non-sectarian and open to all; they retain Catholic children and force them to attend Protestant service, and complain that the State unjustly compels them to receive Catholic children. No good or sound cause can possibly require in this free country such absurdly inconsistent defences.

The necessity for legislative action is not general. In many States the institutions, on a fair presentation of the case, have freely adopted the English rule, and recording the religion of each inmate on entering, enabled him to receive the ministrations of a duly appointed clergyman of that creed in the full extent.

In Ohio, Kentucky, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, it has been necessary for Catholics to ask specific laws in order to prevent officials from infringing a clear provision of the Constitutions of those several States. In Ohio, a law was passed, but, before its salutary provisions could be tested and their advantage shown by experience, it was repealed in deference to the outcry

of a few fanatical opponents of religious liberty. In Kentucky, the struggle was a long one, before even in that State the inalienable rights of men were secured. In New Jersey, under the impulse given by the present liberal governor of that State, Catholics in reformatories are able to attend the Catholic service, the mass, as Protestants are to attend their own services. Yet, the New Jersey Methodist Conference, in March, 1885, protested against this act of justice, as giving "pre-eminent and peculiar privileges to a particular denomination," insisting that Catholics must be prevented from hearing mass. In Pennsylvania, application has frequently been made to the Board of Managers of the House of Correction at Philadelphia, and, though the grand jury has recommended it, liberty is constantly refused to Catholics to have mass said for them. The Board say: "The Board has no doubt that the good order, discipline of the house, and cleanliness of the inmates are greatly promoted by these general services at fixed times at which all the inmates are obliged to attend." They admit and defend "a compulsory attendance" on services held by a Methodist minister and Protestant in character. In the words of the managers, the usual shallow pretexts for a great wrong are put forward, perhaps in their most ridiculous form. How order, cleanliness and discipline could suffer by allowing a Catholic priest, either before or after the Protestant service, to offer mass for the Catholic inmates, the only service which for Catholics constitutes divine worship, no man in his sound reason could explain. The long experience under the English law shows that men are more disposed to reform and to respect the law when it acknowledges their religious rights, than when they have to brood over a great and shameful wrong done them by the strong arm of the State.

In New York there is at least one example of this anomaly in one of the "beautiful islands of the East River," where everybody can contemplate an establishment supported in great part by the public money of the city, in which it must be said that "the free exercise of the Catholic religion is prohibited." This is the House of Refuge, so called, in Randall's Island, which this year has called up long debates in the Legislature, and unless redress is granted, will make the subject one of the State issues for a long time.

During more than ten years the Catholics have meekly taken all the legitimate means of coming back into possession of their rights. These rights have been several times acknowledged by the Legislature of the State. Large majorities in both the Senate and the House of Assembly have enacted laws for this purpose; but delays due to some proposed amendments to those bills were followed by the blunt veto of a Governor of the State, Mr. Cornell.

The reasons he gave for his action appeared so unsatisfactory to the legislative body that the following year the same bill in a stronger form was presented. The new Governor, Mr. Cleveland, counselled a private settlement of the matter between the Church authorities and the managers of the House of Refuge, and an informal understanding was reached. But the faithless directors at Randall's Island refuse to fulfil their promise, and come again before the public with their arbitrary conditions, which would render the ministry of a priest absolutely futile and of no effect. It is time to speak plainly, so as to open the eyes of all, Protestants as well as Catholics. It must be made clear to all Christians of any denomination whatever, that the system followed in this and similar cases is the most anti-Christian and sectarian that can well be imagined.

The bill having been lately introduced again at Albany, the managers of the House of Refuge have given a new form to their pretensions, and at this moment they publish in the most extensively spread papers of the State the long list of their reasons for setting aside those of the Catholics; though they take good care not to allude to the best and most peremptory of those reasons, the one derived from the Constitution of the United States incorporated into that of New York. Of this anon.

Anti-sectarianism is the fortress behind which they have intrenched themselves. In a series of resolutions passed among them on April 5th, 1883, and reproduced in the New York *Tribune* of January 26th, 1885, they declare:

"That the House of Refuge is, in every sense of the word, an unsectarian institution;

"That all the inmates have entire freedom of conscience, and from all religious restraint;

"That no sacrament of any particular church or creed is used or allowed in the institution;

"That services of a purely non-sectarian character are held in the chapel on Sundays as part of the discipline of the house;

"That clergymen of all denominations can hold service according to the rule of non-sectarianism," etc.

This is sufficient for their absolute condemnation; and it is proper to consider first the meaning of the words *sect* and *Church*. The word sectarianism comes from *sect*, and the Church is not a sect, no more than a sect can be the Church. A word on the foundation of Christianity is absolutely necessary here. Our Lord Jesus Christ was the Founder, and is forever the Head of the Church. He knew what He meant when He commissioned His apostles to preach; when He told them, as recorded by St. Matthew (xxviii., 18, etc.): "All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Going,

therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." This is the solid foundation of Christianity.

The Saviour himself has described His Church as an institution coextensive with the world *in space*, and destined to subsist until the end of the world *in time*. The world, therefore, must allow people to receive from the apostles and their successors—*usque ad consummationem sæculi*—all the doctrine He had during His public career communicated to them; with the express promise, besides, that He would remain invisibly with them, to guide them in their decisions, and support them in their trials.

That the apostles felt the full weight of responsibility imposed upon them by these words, and the high dignity to which they had thus been raised, is proved by the meeting they held, as a body, at Jerusalem, to decide on the first question proposed to them by Jewish proselytes, who wanted to impose on Gentile converts the prescriptions of the Jewish law. After a proper discussion, in which Peter spoke first, the apostles issued together their decree in the following terms (Acts xv., 28): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no farther burden upon you (Gentiles) than these necessary things," etc. Their decision, they knew from Christ, was that of the Holy Ghost Himself. Many Jewish proselytes preferred their personal opinion to that of the apostles, and thus they formed the first *sect*—the Ebionites. For, owing to the constitution of the human mind, it was *necessary* there should be heresies and schisms, as St. Paul declared (1 Cor. xi., 19). Those who cut themselves off from the Church are properly called a sect; but it would be absurd to call the Church a sect when she is in fact the main stem of the Christian tree.

The reader, whatever may be his belief, is no doubt aware that this is not a mere conjecture derived from a doubtful text. It is simply history, attested not only by the New Testament, but also by the subsequent events of the Jewish race in Palestine. For the Ebionites had their own short-lived existence, ending at the destruction of Jerusalem. Every author who has spoken of them avoids confounding them with the Church, but has given them the character of a true sect separated from the main body.

This main body meanwhile had its organs, which have continued to speak until our own day. The voice of pontiff and of councils has constantly been heard during nearly nineteen hundred years, since the first council at Jerusalem, holding forth the doctrine communicated by the God-man to the primitive apostles, and speaking at this day with the same authority and the same assurance. The

advocates of the Protestant ascendency which hypocritically hides its schemes under the pretext of non-sectarianism ought to be afraid of making themselves ridiculous by calling sectarian such a body as the Catholic Church, which has good reasons to claim an antiquity coeval with Christ, and to promise to itself a continuance of life until the day of judgment. It shall be seen anon on which side the true sectarians are likely to be found.

But the pretensions of these men go straight to the ruin of Christianity itself, and it is important to bring this immediately forward. Christianity is eminently a positive religion. Its dogmas are all highly supernatural, and its moral precepts always perspicuous and forcible. There is nothing shadowy in its history, nothing hesitating in its commands. From the time it was first preached man found at last he could rely on his conscience, because it was not the voice of reason alone, but above all the voice of God speaking to the reason of man; Christianity is nothing if it is not supernatural. It comes from God, and cannot be a shadow.

On this account chiefly heresies and schisms have abounded, because the pride of many could not brook a *superior* control, namely, that of God himself. But at the same time heresies and schisms have universally been called sects; being evidently cut off from the main stem, and unable to claim a higher origin than private reason. To apply the epithet sectarian to the stem itself is thus to set aside all ecclesiastical history.

There are, however, various degrees in the system of sects; and it will not be difficult to prove that the worst of all is precisely that which a certain class in institutions, legislatures, and the press hold up as eminently non-sectarian. Their attempt consists in suppressing altogether the supernatural, and consequently Christianity; they forbid Christian ministers to preach positive Christian doctrine to their spiritual children, and they call this practice unsectarian.

To deny or wilfully ignore *a single* dogma is heresy, and is sufficient to constitute a sect, by denying a supernatural fact or doctrine pertaining to the deposit of faith as handed down from the time of the apostles to our own. To reject, or refuse to admit, *several* articles of the creed, is a concentration of sects in a single religious body. Consequently the act of expunging the whole creed at once cannot but be the supreme degree of sectarianism; and it is exactly what those gentlemen boast of securing under the pretext of non-sectarianism. What becomes of the religion of Christ in such a system as this? In the absence of all dogmas there cannot be but skepticism in the mind; in the absence of a divine sanction given to moral precepts, a sickly sentimentality is the only guide of the human conscience. Can, then, the voice of

duty be heard, and temptation be warded off? It is puerile to speak of "the broad principles of Christianity being composed of what all sects teach together." Since all Christian truths have been denied or doubted by some sect or other, there is no *common ground* among them to stand upon. In any institution based on these theories, do they teach "on Sundays in their chapel" the belief in the Holy Trinity? They cannot according to their principles, since the Unitarians deny it. Do they teach the necessity of baptism, which was formerly the common rite of all Christians? I am sure they would rather discourage it, as a matter controverted in our days. What do they, what can they teach of the Christian religion to the unfortunate children confided to their care?

It is, indeed, painful to see, in this age and country, many men animated with the best intentions, listening with a sort of approbation to such paltry sophisms and plausible nonsense as are contained in the "resolutions" quoted above. Still, it is a consoling fact that few of those men who feel inclined to apply the word sectarian to the Catholic Church, have ever gone so far as to discard altogether the doctrines of Christianity. They would feel insulted if they were openly accused of it. Some raving maniac may occasionally bring many to hear his denunciations of the belief in Christ, and even of God; but among his listeners a great number, I hope, would reject with scorn the imputation of not being Christians.

Let, however, people understand that it is not only those who blaspheme God, and throw their venom on the pages of Holy Writ who can be said to have abjured their religion. Those also who refuse to the ministers of God the faculty of addressing children in public institutions, and telling them that there is in heaven one God in Three Persons; that the Son became incarnate in the bosom of the Virgin Mary, in order to atone for our sins on the cross; that the Holy Ghost speaks both to the individual human heart who invokes Him with sincerity, and also to the whole Church through its pastors, in order to establish the kingdom of God on earth; that, finally, the soul is immortal and there shall be a day of judgment, etc., etc.; yea, those who insist on preventing all positive Christian doctrine from reaching the mind and heart of children, are as dangerous adversaries of truth as Tom Paine was in his day and Ingersoll is in ours.

In case this much-vaunted non-sectarianism were finally considered a condition to be enforced in all our houses of education, public and private, what would become of religion in this country? It has been attempted twice in France, with the most appalling results—we can conjecture how it would turn out among us. The public worship of the Christian to his God would gradually

disappear, and in its place would be substituted a senseless performance without substance or form. Nevertheless, public worship is necessary in a nation unless godlessness can be the foundation of society; and in all ages this has been denied by all profound thinkers. What is the use of citizens meeting together in a public edifice on some appointed day of the week, unless they have some common and positive doctrine relating to the attributes of the Deity, and to what God may have revealed to mankind? If either the Deity is not known in its attributes, or no revelation has come from that heavenly source, religion is a mockery; and the most solemn act of human life—the worship of God—turns out to be the most flippant and meaningless. Look around you and examine whether this has not been so far the clear expression of our ancestors' wisdom. Can you see in this country, where sects are so numerous, a single temple or church in which there is not some profession of positive faith publicly avowed by the worshippers? I know there are men who pretend that henceforth creeds must disappear, and a broad Christianity without dogmas and rites is the only thing acceptable to human reason. But did they ever dare to reduce to practice their bold assertion? Can any one point out in the vast extent of this continent a single meeting-house devoted to non-sectarianism in the sense of our adversaries? It has not been attempted, because all are aware that the project would soon end in the establishment of practical atheism. Not one of those who advocate non-sectarianism in public institutions belongs to a non-sectarian church, for no such thing can exist, for as soon as it became a church, it became a new sect; that is, must be sectarian. And this is true of the religious position of the institutions in question. Where there is a set of moral and religious doctrines, a form of worship and a ministry, it belongs to some old sect, or is a new sect.

The greatest error, perhaps, of non-sectarians consists in believing that by the adoption of their system there will be unity among Christians; and Jesus Christ certainly prayed that His disciples should be *one*, as He Himself was one with His Father (John xvii., 21). The Church has always insisted on this great prerogative of the Christian religion—unity—which is the first mark—*nota*—of true religion. It has just been seen that by rejecting all creeds and all visible authority in point of morals, the non-sectarians are reduced to fall upon "the common *feelings* of our Christianity," as if this could form a bond between brethren, and unite them together in the worship of the same God. We said that a *positive* creed was required to form this bond, and that the moral precepts required also a *positive* sanction; otherwise they cannot be taught, but only proposed as probable suggestions. This point we feel it

necessary to examine more at length, and state clearly and explicitly, because the greatest error of non-sectarianism—that of claiming unity—must be thoroughly confuted, and the mock dress of Christianity, they assume, must be stripped from their shoulders.

All Christians must admit that the relation of man toward God—religion—affects him both in the order of nature and in the order of grace. This second one supposes the first; but the first does not suppose the second. And as the order of grace is in general little understood by the men of the present age, this must be more fully explained. All know, however, that man, created at first in holiness and in the image of God, fell from his high estate by the disobedience of Adam and lost all claim to heaven and union with God. This was restored by the Author of grace—the Son of God made man, who redeemed us by dying for us on the cross. This new dispensation must be as far above the first as grace is above nature. Hence the supernatural destiny of man was far better expressed by the doctrine of redemption than by the religion of the patriarchs who expected a redeemer, but knew that He had not come and would delay His coming. As soon as He appeared, all the circumstances of His advent proclaimed a new kingdom of God of a totally supernatural character. He was eternal, yet appeared in time. He had an All-powerful Father in heaven, and chose for His human mother a Virgin of the race of Eve. Angels sang at his birth, and kings adored him. It is not necessary here to follow in detail His public career when He revealed us His origin, and His intention of making us His brethren and His co-heirs in eternity. His power over nature, His superhuman wisdom, His very sufferings and death proclaimed that He was truly the Son of God. The religion He founded was destined to unite intimately the order of nature and that of grace. Nature was not totally depraved by Adam's fall, but it is to be raised by redemption to a higher plane by its union with the divine. Hence natural elements must be used in the highest mysteries of grace, and bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ. All sacraments—and there are seven—partake of this union between earth and heaven; and—as it was meet it should be—man becomes a different being from what he was; and he is raised far above even the high state which Adam and Eve enjoyed in Eden.

Unless this statement is admitted as the true one, nobody can know what Christianity is. From one of the "resolutions" quoted above as a condition for entering the House of Refuge, a type of these pretendedly non-sectarian systems, no one can administer any sacrament, nor enforce any creed when allowed to deal with the children of the establishment. The necessary consequence of this declaration is that the order of grace is totally

denied by these gentlemen, and nothing but pure philosophy can be inculcated within the precincts of the house. This was already seen in what was said previously; but it is much more clear at this moment by their very words that Christianity is excluded from their pretended unsectarian system. If no minister of religion can teach any "creed," any summary of truth, necessary to salvation, he cannot preach Christianity; if he cannot administer any sacrament, he cannot obey the express commands of Christ to the body of teachers instituted by Him. Such a regulation literally forbids Christianity. If these gentlemen were more familiar than they are with the classics of Greece and Rome, they might propose to burn incense before the statues of Pythagoras, Socrates, Aristotle, and even Cicero in some of his pious moods. For by these great men the highest philosophy was taught. But as probably their culture is not so far advanced as this would suppose, we must consider a moment the philosophy they themselves teach, since they cannot teach Christianity, of which they repudiate all possible notion. It will thence become evident that there can be no unity in their system, and the prayer of Christ for His disciples that "they should be one as He is one with the Father," is everlastingly for them of no effect. Since among them the order of nature is not ennobled by that of grace, their teaching must be confined to the averments of human reason. But it would be preposterous to imagine that their lessons are in any way systematic, and that they can enter into the discussion of the various philosophical systems. Should they do so, the poor boys and girls whom they teach would find themselves in a Babel of the most contradictory problems. Has there ever been any unity among the followers of pure reason? Have the philosophers of even our age settled the innumerable questions they have always been discussing? But this consideration does not deserve to be insisted upon, as there can be no question of such philosophy among them. In what does their teaching really consist? When the inmates of such an institution come out of their prison, after seven or eight years of a strict confinement, the best among them may remember having heard their masters speak sternly against lying, gambling, drinking, etc. Had the same poor boys and girls remained rambling in the streets, instead of being sent to the institution, they would have known as much; for we speak here *of the best among them*, and the inward light which all men receive at their birth is at least as good a monitor for the well-disposed as the utterances of a superintendent.

As to the multitude of those boys and girls who naturally during their imprisonment rebelled against their confinement, the first thought of all of them, on coming out, must be that of "dear

liberty," and the only meaning they can attach to the word is precisely to do what they have been forbidden to do. Yes, they rush out like proud *philosophers;* and it would be sad indeed to disclose in detail the foul anticipations and desires towards which they feel an irresistible attraction.

Thus all the money spent by the city to give those unfortunate waifs of society a *moral* education, is absolutely thrown away. In spite of what may be said to the contrary, the evil is known by its fruits. But the chief objection the Catholics have against the continuance of the system is that their own children, who are immured within the walls of such institutions, are prevented by bigoted officials from being reached by the very influences—those of their own religion—most powerful to reform their hearts, and not only that, but these Catholic inmates invariably lose all Christian faith in the institution, and come out under no check of supernatural truths, but entirely deprived of Christian faith. This has been proved by too many instances to be at all put in question; and the Catholics think that the loss of faith by their own children is the loss of their soul. The constitution gives them the right of claiming that their offspring shall be educated in their own faith. The constitution is a more important thing to preserve than the regulations adopted from time to time by boards of management, superintendents, and keepers, which certainly cannot be superior to constitutional rules. Many papers and periodicals that oppose the broad claim of religious liberty which Catholics contend for, pretend that no religious question can be discussed in the legislature. Under our constitution the State cannot certainly discuss the doctrines taught by any denomination, unless they are subversive of peace and morality, but as the constitution guarantees the right of free worship to every citizen, it is eminently proper for the legislature to discuss and pass a bill whose only object is to enforce an article of the constitution.

Some men insinuate to the public that if Catholics are allowed to have their own worship in public institutions as Protestants have, they will in time suppress Protestant worship there and everywhere. Absurd as this idea is, it may not be idle to examine it coolly and thoroughly; because, though it is perfectly groundless, it might make an impression on some otherwise impartial minds. Arguments still more flimsy than this have sometimes produced an immense amount of mischief; and in the present case it is most important to clear up every thing calculated to throw a shade of doubt on the debate.

In the first place, let us consider the fear just expressed, that Catholics may be wishing to make their Church established by law in this country. We will confine ourselves to the remark that Catholics have uniformly in this country favored religious freedom; that

they heartily accepted the amendment to the constitution which declares that "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." It is from the day of the passage of this amendment to the constitution and of the acceptance of it by the states that their emancipation is dated. The load of disabilities which weighed on them suddenly disappeared in theory and have gradually continued to vanish in practice one after another, so that at this moment few remain. The first Catholic periodical established in this country, by Bishop England of Charleston, bore every day at the head of its columns the text of this amendment as the proud basis of our religious liberty; and we are sure that in case it was proposed to blot it out of the constitution, every Catholic in the land would oppose the intended outrage with all means in his power. In the whole history of the country there is no instance where Catholics destroyed the religious institutions or churches of Protestants, or attempted to interfere with their religious rights. Catholics have suffered, but never, even in retaliation, made others suffer.

Our chief pastors, besides, are not unintelligent; yet they would appear to be lacking in wisdom, should they make such an attempt at a time remarkable indeed by the gradual disappearance everywhere of state churches. Are they ignorant of the fact that already in Ireland the state church has been disestablished, as it will soon be in England and Scotland? Is this the time to court the favor of states? The very idea of it is silly, and it would be simply loss of time to discuss it any longer. As to the notion that the Catholics, in the present instance, aim at claiming a share at least of the public money, nobody has heard them express such an intention as this. When they do, it will be time to examine whether they have a right to it or not.

These apprehensions of those opposed to the bill being answered, another argument may be stated in the following words. "The Catholic Church maintains that out of her there is no salvation; infallibility is her exclusive prerogative; all members of the Christian flock who wander out of her visible sheepfold cannot have any share in Christ's redemption." This doctrine, they pretend, must necessarily produce a stubborn spirit of intolerance; and intolerance, we know, is the bugbear of modern liberals. To this intolerance they attribute the darkest designs, particularly that of enslaving others; and in order to obtain this nefarious object they first try to procure the support of the state, of its money, of its influence, of its laws, in order to acquire everywhere the pre-eminence. It has been said in particular that this is the purport we have in view when we insist on the freedom of worship in any state or city institution, that is, on the liberty of teaching Catholic

children the dogmas and precepts of their religion. Yet whenever liberty has been granted, not one of the supposed consequences of this liberty has yet given the least alarm to the city authorities either in England or in this country.

In order to come to a more direct answer to all those attacks, it is proper to see first whether intolerance is the necessary consequence of the Catholic tenets on exclusive salvation and infallibility.

In point of fact, Catholics have always been, and are chiefly at this moment, less intolerant than their adversaries. Balmez, in his *Protestantism and Catholicity Compared*, has written some admirable pages on this question of toleration, particularly in his chapter xxxiv. We can only select a few of his remarks. "Toleration," he says, "strictly speaking, means the patience with which we suffer a thing we judge to be bad, and which we think desirable not to punish. Thus some kinds of scandals are tolerated. . . . . The idea of toleration is always accompanied with the idea of evil. . . . . To respect opinions (contrary to our own) sometimes means to respect those who hold them, on account of their good faith or their good intentions. A man is called *tolerant* when he is able to bear opinions contrary to his own without irritation or disturbance. . . . . St. Francis de Sales was tolerant, Voltaire excessively intolerant." Balmez might have added that Voltaire, nevertheless, was a great preacher of tolerance, though he practiced it but little. "The tolerance of a religious man," Balmez continues, "arises not from want of faith; it may coexist with a burning zeal for the spread and preservation of the truth. It is born of two principles, charity and humility." And the noble Spanish writer develops at length this last idea, which the reader can easily peruse in his great work.

But who in this country can say that Catholic priests are intolerant toward persons of another creed? In former times they have been violently attacked and often deprived of their most sacred rights. Did they ever show a spirit of retaliation wherever they gained some influence owing to what Balmez calls "their charity and humility"? They at this moment occupy situations of trust in many public establishments of states or cities; and it is but proper to ask whether the freedom they enjoy as to the practice of their ministry has ever given reason to accuse them of an undue proselytism towards the non-Catholics with whom they come in contact in those houses. The fact that never a whisper of this kind has been uttered against them is a proof of the groundlessness of the contrary supposition.

And this is not in the Catholic Church a peculiarity of our time and country. If the defenders of our faith have always in their controversies with opponents displayed an ardent zeal against *errors*,

they invariably spoke courteously of *persons*. We do not allude here to state prosecutions against heresy—a principle of jurisprudence adopted formerly by all Christian nations, and indulged in by Protestants as well as by orthodox canonists. But in theological encounters, either in writing or in oral discussions, it is a remarkable fact that during the Middle Ages, particularly, it was extremely rare to hear any opprobrious epithet hurled by a Catholic theologian against an opponent. This may surprise many people, but it is nevertheless true. The works of St. Thomas Aquinas would suffice to prove it. He was undoubtedly the best type of that much-abused period. He undertook the task of confuting all philosophical and theological errors of previous times, and in his *Summa contra Gentiles* he not only refuted the old theories of Greek, Jewish and Mohammedan writers, but he anticipated the follies of our own times and gave the proper answer to the sensualistic, materialistic and agnostic ravings in the midst of which we now are living. He did it with a perfect composure and almost superhuman patience, without a single word which could offend his adversaries. No contrary way of speaking can be found in all his works.

All the great mediæval schoolmen have been remarkable for the same peculiarity; and in modern times St. Francis de Sales, Bellarmine, Bossuet and many others, can be quoted to the same purpose.

And there is nothing surprising in all this, because the Church requires of her champions that such should always be their conduct. Error they must prosecute without flinching; for the persons, they must follow the law of charity. Balmez has sufficiently proved it in the passage hinted at on a previous page.

The Catholics, it is true, believe that their Church is infallible, and that out of her there is no salvation. Does it follow that theological adversaries on earth must be considered and treated by them like reprobates, altogether out of the pale of Christ's redemption? Far otherwise, since the Church teaches that invincible ignorance exempts from sin, and that among the elect in heaven many will be found who never belonged to the visible fold of Christ, namely, to the exterior pale of His Church on earth; and because this is most important in the present question, it must be treated of with sufficient explanations and details.

Cardinal Hergenröther, in his *Church and State* (Essay xvii., on Liberty of Conscience), declares that "the Church has always recognized that people might be in error of faith and yet might be saved; that they might be in unconscious communion with the true Church, although through invincible ignorance they were not in external communion with her; that condemnation regarded false *principles*, not the *persons* in error; that towards these all the duties

of brotherly love were to be exercised; and that no Catholic had the smallest right to impute guilt to them."

This is not the private opinion of this learned cardinal. It is the common teaching of all theologians; and if in a public dispute the Catholic champion were to impute to his adversary the guilt of mortal sin for supporting his erroneous opinions, he certainly would be reproved by his superiors, because he would have taken on himself to pronounce a sentence which must come from God alone, since God alone knows the conscience of the disputant.

And this is not a matter of theory only; I wish all non-Catholics should know that it is often reduced to practice among us. We can and do pray for our friends living and dead, Protestants or not. Every one is aware that on Good Friday the Church, even in her public liturgy, prays for heretics, Jews, infidels, etc. Nay, more; the Catholic relative or friend of a deceased Protestant can apply to any clergyman of his communion (chiefly in case the dead person has given signs of earnest endeavors to know the truth) for offering the holy sacrifice of the Mass in his behalf. This charitable office is based on the common opinion among theologians, that there are persons who, though not belonging to the visible organization of the Church, are in *unconscious* communion with her (according to the expressions of Cardinal Hergenröther). The communion of saints (one of the articles of our Creed) includes them, and gives them a right to participate in our glorious privileges. Thus, because even a private Mass is always a public office in the Church, and is the highest of all Catholic rites, it can be maintained that the Church does not deny the highest prerogatives of her communion even to those who have lived and died out of her jurisdiction. The only thing she cannot grant in this case is a public display of any kind. The objects of prayer in the present case have never *publicly* belonged to her; and besides, it might be wrongly interpreted by those who constantly reproach her with a grasping spirit, and a desire of enlisting into her ranks even those who have *protested* against her. Thus Catholics follow on all occasions and with due prudence the precept inculcated by the eminent author of *Church and State*, namely, "the duty of practicing brotherly love toward those of other communions. They are not, in fact, considered as members of another communion; they belong to the Church in spirit, though foreign to her organization."

The same doctrine has been maintained by a still higher authority than Cardinal Hergenröther—by Pius IX. himself, to quote only one of our Supreme Pontiffs. All are fully aware how strongly he insisted on answering *non possumus* to all those potentates and proud statesmen who required of him anything he felt bound not to grant. To the knowledge of all he openly declared that "there

is only one true Church" and that "out of her there is no salvation." He consequently protested against all attempts at withdrawing from the pale of this Church—as they do at Randall's Island—any of those who were born Catholics. He exposed in the *Syllabus* the modern errors invented for undermining the Church's action on society at large, and particularly on Catholic commonwealths. These measures and axioms of the Sovereign Pontiff are precisely those against which the strongest arguments of our pretended unsectarian managers are based. It is but fair to examine the explanations Pius IX. gave of them on a most solemn occasion.

In an allocution to the Cardinals assembled at Rome on December 9th, 1854—ten years before the publication of the *Syllabus*—the Pope had occasion to speak of a new sect just appearing in Germany, whose members took the name of Old Catholics and became thenceforth notorious in Germany and Switzerland. Among the propositions they already advocated there was one which the Pontiff at that time condemned, and which was afterwards reprobated again in the *Syllabus*. Its purpose was to maintain that "there is *good* hope of the eternal salvation of *all* those who are not in the Church of God." This certainly was opposed to Catholic doctrine, and the Pope could not but condemn it. But what he said on this occasion and on this subject deserves a serious consideration, because the supposed consequences derived by Protestants from the condemnation of this proposition were precisely had in view by the Pontiff, and his decision on the subject must be acknowledged as perfectly satisfactory by all men of good faith.

"Far be it from us," he said, "to dare to set bounds to the boundless mercy of God; far be it from us to desire to search into the depths of the hidden counsels and judgments of God, an abyss that the mind of man cannot fathom. . . . . We must hold as of faith that out of the Apostolic Roman Church there is no salvation; that she is the only ark of safety, and whosoever is not in her perishes in the deluge. We must also on the other hand recognize with certainty that those who are in invincible ignorance of the true religion are not guilty on this account in the eyes of the Lord. And who will presume to mark out the limits of this ignorance according to the character and diversity of peoples, countries, minds, and the rest?"

On another occasion (in his Encyclical to the Italian bishops, 14th August, 1863), Pius IX. used the following words, which cannot leave the smallest loophole to the blame of the caviller. "It is known to us and to you that those who are in invincible ignorance of our holy religion, but who observe carefully the natural law and the precepts engraved by God into the hearts of all men, who feel disposed to obey God and lead an honest and upright life, may,

aided by divine grace, attain to eternal life. God, who sees clearly, searches and knows the heart, the dispositions, the thoughts and intentions of each, by no means permits in His supreme mercy and goodness that any one suffer eternal punishment who has not of his own free will fallen into sin."

In point of fact, would it not be absurd that the Church should indorse the proposition of the "Old Catholics," namely, "that there is *good* hope of the salvation of *all* those who do not belong to the Church," since she teaches even her best children that their salvation is uncertain? Was not St. Paul himself "afraid of becoming a castaway"?

To the Catholic reader the previous discussions must appear mere commonplace; but they are necessary for those who have never gone deep into Catholic teaching. Moreover, it must be said that the considerations which have been so much insisted upon are simply side issues. Even should we not be able to answer a word to the difficulties raised by our adversaries, the *main* issue of the question is sufficient for all purposes. This, namely, is the clear text of the constitution both of the United States and of the several states. The *non-sectarian* party might go so far as to call for a change in this fundamental law of the nation. It must be done in order to deprive us of our rights. The liberty of conscience for the citizen, however, is written not only on parchment countersigned with the seal of a state, it is besides deeply engraved in the hearts of all Americans; and what is more, the public peace and safety require it, owing to the multitude of denominations in this country.

The state legislature cannot enter into the discussion of those questions which have just been called *side* issues, because religious topics are out of its competence. Some men have lately pretended that on account of this want of power in the field of religion, the legislature's duty is to leave the whole affair in *statu quo*, and allow fanatical managers to have their own way. This would be a gross sophism; and the question must rest on its *main* issue in which the legislature is perfectly competent. Is not the state of things such as it exists in many places an open violation of the fundamental law of the country? and is not the legislature competent to pass bills whose object is simply to secure the execution of this fundamental law? What has the good order and discipline, and cleanliness of any establishment to do with the true safeguard of the whole country? Any board whose ideas of discipline, cleanliness, and order are in contravention of the fundamental law, must either change its discipline or disappear. The liberty of the citizen is not to be sacrificed to the petty spirit of routine set up by any set of men. This is but strict justice, and the claim of justice in this country is always heard sooner or later.

Why should a few institutions be the only ones where peace cannot exist together with one of the supreme laws of the nation? The answer to this simple question is left to the right-minded American reader.

THE PROPOSED AMERICAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY.

THIS country is practically without a great university. Spanish America boasted of some in other days, but they are gone, or exist only as a shadow of former greatness. The recently established University at Quebec is still struggling with the obstacles that prevent its entering upon its expected career of usefulness.

The collegiate institutions in the English colonies, out of which our Republic has grown, were all based on the plan of the universities at Oxford and Cambridge, as those seats of learning came forth dwarfed and crippled from the destroying and study-despising epoch of the "Reformation." As the universities lost with Catholicity the very idea of their creation, the copies were indeed far removed from the true ideal. The narrowness and insular character of the training and knowledge imparted by the universities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was strikingly seen in the vast difference between the cultured Catholic gentleman who had been trained in a continental university, and the Protestant squire whose education was limited to Oxford or Cambridge. One was versed in the schools of philosophy, science and mathematics of the day, versed in ancient and modern literature, familiar with art and architecture, in its history and best examples, the other was tolerably familiar with a certain range of Latin and Greek authors, and could occasionally make passable Latin verses, but that summed up for most their whole stock of acquirements.[1]

The great universities of Europe were the creations of the Catholic Church and an outgrowth of her life; where that life was sapped, that Church proscribed, the university lost much of its real

[1] That this may not be supposed to be an exaggeration, we need but read what Cardinal Newman wrote: "About fifty years since, the English university, of which I was so long a member, after a century of inactivity, at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities which its profession and its station involved."

motive for existence and much of its real effectiveness. In the intellectual and scientific development in England, the universities, since the "Reformation," have contributed but little. The progress has been not within their walls or effected by their scholars, but from without, and they took part tardily, if at all, in movements whose spring and origin were found in vigorous and untrained minds, under no obligation to those institutions for their fostering care. In philosophy the English universities are inferior to the Scotch schools in power and influence; in mathematical sciences, England was so far behind in the last century, that when she at last adopted the Gregorian Calendar, one of the best mathematicians she could find to take the necessary steps was not one who had won honors at Oxford or Cambridge, but a proscribed Catholic bishop whose very presence in his native land was almost high treason.[1] In the study of language the universities have followed an old routine, while the general study of the subject, certainly a fit subject for university training, was ignored, ignored even in its application to the tongues spoken in the British isles. Indeed, this study has been so strangely neglected, that not only the best works on the Anglo-Saxon, but even on Celtic grammar, are the work not of Englishmen, but of Germans; and the development given to Aryan studies is due not to the universities in England, but to the studies of scholars encouraged by a company of shopkeepers.

The Church, an active living body, an army set in array, created the universities as her auxiliaries, and, age by age, equips them to meet the foe before her. The Catholic university, to carry out the real design and justify its existence, must grasp all forms of knowledge and intellectual activity, and guide men through all by the unerring standards of a faith that has the God of truth Himself for its source. The distinguishing vice of scientific men in all times is self-conceit; religion is a yoke which chafes many of them, and as a rule they make light of it; but, while they denounce religion, they have the heartiest disdain for the scientific views as held half a century before their own day, and for anything called science of an earlier period they have nothing but the most withering contempt. Each glides down the stream of time to meet the treatment he has given his predecessors, and the Church, with her deposit of supernatural truths irradiating the whole scheme of human knowledge, looks serenely on, beholding blindfold science condemning error, but dexterously avoiding the truth to which she would willingly guide them.

The Church from her infancy fostered learning. No religious system of the older time ever made such efforts to instruct man-

[1] Bishop Walmesley (Signor Pastorini).

kind in human and heavenly knowledge. The old world had its schools; the learned philosophers, rhetoricians and sophists had their schools, but they were without uniformity or system; they did not spring from religion or uphold it. The Church was from the outset a comprehensive teacher; but, though instruction was general, the great object was the training of the men who were to minister at her altars, and who were to be the guides of the people. Cathedral and monastic schools arose with the trivium and quadrivium; courses of study directed rather to the practical wants of parochial clergy than to the mere acquisition of learning for its own sake. A sufficient mastery of theology, to insure correct instruction, especially on dogmas which had been assailed by recent heresies; rhetoric, to fit them to announce the word with efficiency; dialectics, to enable them to bring propounders of heresy to definite issues and refute them; music, for forming choirs to the Church service; astronomy, to regulate the calendar, and the movable feasts of the year; arithmetic and geometry, to fit men to become the architects, engineers and artists of the structures which the Church created in all parts of Europe,—monuments that a century of dense ignorance destroyed, but which our more enlightened ones are fain to copy. Our modern diocesan theological seminaries, in the same spirit as the old cathedral schools, aim to fit priests for parochial work; and the monastic schools still live, training religious for their especial work.

As the state of Europe became settled after the fall of the Roman Empire and the submission to the Church of the conquering barbarians, there were many scholars in cathedral school and monastic cloister whose taste and leisure prompted them to a wider range of study than the course usually pursued. Monasteries became depositories of the laws and adjudications of sovereigns, as well as of treaties between monarchs. Their force and bearing were sought at the hands of the learned men in whose custody they were, who became legists, jurisconsults, diplomatists. Men, who had no vocation for the priesthood, acquired learning to benefit by the legal knowledge of the monasteries which, to temper the savage legislation of the northern tribes, introduced the civil law of Rome and the wise canons of the Church. England, alone, clung obstinately to her old system, and retains to-day many of the barbarous elements which Germany, and other continental states, rejected centuries ago; and English and American judges have more than once had occasion to pay tribute to the wise and equitable influence exerted by the Church in favor of human rights. As it was with law, so it was with other branches. The ancient works on diseases, their nature and treatment, were in the hands of learned priests and monks, with no competitors but men, chiefly Jews, who had been

trained in the Saracen schools where the works of Greece were translated and studied. Men studied medicine under the clergy. As the number of the isolated scholars, pursuing special studies, increased, there came the sense of the need of a general institution of a higher grade where the great objects of study could be pursued. To meet the want, the Church created the University, for to her alone is due the honor of establishing and directing that form of educational institution. The faculties embraced were mainly four, and each university, as one after another sprang up, acquired renown for a special faculty, as Salerno for medicine, Bologna for law, Paris claiming a primacy in all. The general course embraced theology and philosophy as (essential and primary), jurisprudence, and medicine. Latin was cultivated rather as a vehicle than a study. Literature as distinct from the classic authors was yet almost unknown, and mathematical and scientific studies had not yet so developed as to claim an equal state with jurisprudence and medicine, but were still left to individual study and special schools.

Once universities were founded, they increased in number, in influence, in scholars, till they became like cities of learning. This continued for several centuries; and with them grew up the close reasoning, the scholastic forms, the methodical and comprehensive treatment of each department of knowledge. The "Reformation" was a revolt against learning as much as it was against the Church and its doctrines. The fickle and illogical Luther exhausted his power of vituperation in abusing the schoolmen, whose logical reasoning left him no chance of escape. The success which he and his imitators obtained by pandering to the greed and ambition of princes, to the lusts and self-indulgence of all, closed many universities and stripped others of all usefulness. Theology and philosophy sank in Protestant countries to be mere forms. Where religion depended on the will of the sovereign or a variable private interpretation of Scripture, it could not assume a form that would bear a close philosophical analysis. Each sect could live only by denouncing Rome and its rivals, and averting close scrutiny of its own claims. A summary of Protestant doctrine, like the Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas for Catholic doctrine, is impossible. The logical part would lie in a nutshell; the illogical would require libraries to state and refute. Though Protestantism began by declaring the Bible to be the religion of Protestants, it at once began by suppressing part; of course, the Maccabees, which denied the power of the state as against the Church, and maintained the independence of the Church, could not remain in the Bible of those who made all religion depend on the will of the monarch. It formed its canon and text of Scripture at random and without regard to

the general teaching of Christendom for centuries, and without any critical study of the original Hebrew and Greek texts. The Protestant universities of England to this day have never contributed the least to Biblical criticism, and as they incline to revealed religion or atheism, adopt either Catholic or German rationalistic critical theories in the slight attention they pay to what, in their theory, constitutes their religion. Nor have they ever treated the sacred books as literary productions, studied them as classics. Religion was practically excluded from the universities, and theology came to be regarded as a science that had no place there at all. Hence, when the Catholic University of Ireland was founded, Cardinal Newman deemed it necessary to show at length to those biassed by the English university idea, that theology had properly a place in university training.

Civil and canon law were, with the "Reformation," banished from the English universities, although the former held its own in the great German institutions. Thus, in the idea of English speaking people, the idea of jurisprudence as part of a university course was lost. Unfortunately, too, in England and the United States, the bench is recruited from the bar, and the judicial and legal professions, which ought to be distinct, are confounded; and no schools exist for training men for the minor and more exalted positions as magistrates. Jurisprudence, as a science, can scarcely be said to be recognized in English-speaking countries. The faculty of medicine retired to special schools, and science founded its own for the study of its various branches. Of course, it is not the province of the university to stimulate invention or discovery, to open the way to the study of hitherto unrecognized or misunderstood powers in nature; but where knowledge has been acquired and systematically treated, a university which professes to treat all knowledge cannot ignore it. The study of the nature of man and of the universe from the standpoint of science, is fully within the scope of university training. Ignored by universities, this study has grown up outside of universities and their influence, and as these studies tended to sap Christian faith, the universities, by ignoring them, afforded no corrective, but sent forth their students cultivated men in a certain sense, but not strong men; in fact, men who, meeting at the onset theories they had never learned to grapple, were more likely to adopt than refute them.

The English universities, the type of early American institutions, are certainly inadequate. This is now felt generally in the United States by the institutions founded here. They have hitherto followed to some extent the classical training of England, but the tendency is now general to abandon it and make Greek and Latin, with their literature, merely optional studies. The collegiate insti-

tutions in this country seem destined to die away into special schools. Philosophy is out of the question. Religion is to be eliminated, and, as Dr. McCosh recently reproached the President of Harvard, most of the American colleges have become or are becoming infidel, Harvard keeping up a divinity course with almost as many professors as it has pupils.

The time has come in American life when a university is imperatively needed, a real university, not in name but in fact; and a real university can be created only by the Catholic Church. The Catholic University of Ireland came into existence at the call of the Venerable Pontiff, Pius IX. He suggested its establishment to the Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, and surely he deemed that the cause of religion required it. The suggestion came from no passing fancy of a wayward ruler. Cardinal Newman, called upon to aid in organizing the great work, said: "It is the decision of the Holy See; St. Peter has spoken; it is he who has enjoined that which seems to us so unpromising. He has spoken and has a claim on us to trust him. He is no recluse, no solitary student, no dreamer about the past, no doter upon the dead and gone, no projector of the visionary. He for eighteen hundred years has lived in this world; he has seen all fortunes, he has encountered all adversaries, he has shaped himself for all emergencies. If ever there was a power on earth who had an eye for the times, who has confined himself to the practicable and has been happy in his anticipations, whose words have been facts and whose commands prophecies, such is he, in the history of ages, who sits from generation to generation in the chair of the apostles, as the Vicar of Christ and the Doctor of his Church."

What was the position of the Catholics in Ireland at that time? There were about half as many bishops, half as many priests, half as many Catholics in Ireland then as there are this day in the United States. The resources of Catholics there must have been in even greater disproportion compared to those of our body in this country, and the poverty more widespread. If the Sovereign Pontiff deemed it necessary that Ireland should then have its Catholic university, there seems to be no ground for denying the fact that one is needed in this country. Canada, a mere colony of Great Britain, lying on our northern frontier, took to heart the words of Pius IX. as a general recommendation, and created the Laval University. We have moved more slowly; yet the idea of a Catholic university in the United States is older than the project of that in Ireland; and it has required only the active zeal and energy of some member of the hierarchy to induce the Catholics of this country to do what the late Sovereign Pontiff called upon Ireland to establish. The Rt. Rev. Bishop of Peoria, John Lan-

caster Spalding, trained in university life in Europe, and fully conversant with its advantages, has been earnestly attracting the attention of the Catholic body to his great work; and the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council gave it their warm approval and indorsement. Rome has not spoken, indeed, but who can doubt that a learned Pontiff like Leo XIII. will encourage and commend it? There are difficulties, doubtless, in the way. At first the want of means to erect suitable buildings was made an objection. In reality this was unnecessary; a university could be organized in leased as well as in purchased houses. But that there will be no lack of means is evident from the spontaneous offerings made by wealthy Catholics, led by the generous Misses Caldwell, whose names will remain for all time as the foundresses of the great Catholic work.

Again, it has been objected that we have none fitted for a university course. It is not easy to understand this fully. If the Laval University and the Catholic University of Ireland can find students able to follow their courses of study, and each institution has American pupils, as other European universities have, why cannot a similar institution in the United States obtain scholars? There are nearly sixteen hundred ecclesiastical students in the diocesan seminaries of the country and the colleges and houses of study in the United States. Some of these will certainly, in the natural course of things, seek a higher divinity training than the short term of the usual theological seminary; if not members of a religious order having a higher theological school, they will seek what they desire in some European university. Were there a Catholic university here, with its professors of theology, holy scripture, ecclesiastical history, and canon law, surely there would be at the very lowest one hundred who, after passing through a seminary, would gladly avail themselves of the opportunity of pursuing a higher course in the halls of a university. The selection of professors for dogmatic and moral theology, patristics, holy scripture, canon law, ecclesiastical history and rites, can entail no difficulty. The professors of the advanced theological school at Woodstock College, men already known far and wide by their close and accurate theological learning and reasoning, the Sulpitians of St. Mary's, the Redemptorist professors who have made Ilchester famous, the studious Benedictines, the Lazarists, the faculties of the seminaries at Overbrook, Milwaukee, Troy, and elsewhere, give men not only safe and learned, but suited to the class of minds whom they are to guide; and, moreover, the great universities abroad can, if need be, send able men for the work. In the school of theological learning there need be no lack of students able to follow the course with advantage, and no lack of learned men to impart the

knowledge. Few of the young men of our time and country, who are not destined to the priesthood, will follow a course of theology, it is true; but the time may come when many will see the importance and value of such study. Indeed, many a Catholic, in the busy walks of life, trained at a Catholic college in youth, now regrets that he had not gone through a course to make him familiar with the doctrines of the Church, its polity, its influence on nations and government, social and political life, as well as its government, religious orders, discipline, ritual. And he finds no book at hand to which he can recur, where he can find all these treated in a form that he can read with satisfaction and pleasure. For the knowledge that he can acquire for use in daily intercourse with intelligent men who really wish to obtain information on these points, he must depend on desultory reading in papers and periodicals, occasional lectures and incidental passages met with in the books he reads. It is no exaggeration to say that ere long, in a country of thought like this, there would soon be men following the course of theology, to acquire knowledge for its own sake, not feeling themselves called to the priesthood.

That a university can scarcely deserve the name unless the faculty of theology is strong and comprehensive, Cardinal Newman showed ably when combating the idea that had grown up in the British Isles from the forced and unnatural exclusion of that science from the great English universities. But here we are free to follow out the true Catholic idea, unbiassed by the example of any so-called university hoary with age, which has made its errors and follies a precedent for others to follow at their cost.

In the proposed university there will be no difficulty in regard to the faculty of theology. All will admit that it is essential to the idea of a university, as the exposition of truth by the teachings of a divinely guided Church. The professors are to be obtained, we may say, in our own country, and eminent men of other lands will not refuse chairs if we go abroad for them; the pupils, in number sufficient for a nucleus, can also be obtained, men preparing for the higher work in the ranks of the secular and regular clergy, and even occasionally men who expect to take their place among the laity.

The next faculty, that of philosophy, will be attended by many aspirants to the priesthood, but by a far larger body of young men who will justly regard a more thorough course of metaphysics and ethics as of high importance in their training for future professional and political life. The active minds of our countrymen are tending to philosophical studies here as they long have tended in Scotland. There, narrowed to insular and erroneous schools, the study has borne but poor and scanty fruit. Here a university, giving to the

world in its lectures a sound course of philosophy, would attract general attention, lead to discussion, and ultimately acquire an enviable position. It is the course which, perhaps, more than any other, will give the university its standing in the minds of thinking Americans. What Dr. Brownson effected as a single individual, will be effected in a degree that we can now hardly realize by the philosophical faculty of a Catholic university. The course of study, we know, will be conducted in Latin, but its whole substance, the discussion of particular topics and heads, will in English reach readers in all parts of the country, be weighed, examined, challenged perhaps, doubted, and ultimately accepted by many.

The faculty of philosophy presents, therefore, no difficulties, but has a most promising field; for while there is abundant unreasoning prejudice against Catholic theology, as it is seen distorted in a warped mirror, there is no settled unreason to which men have sworn allegiance that will prevent them from yielding to the dictates of reason. Men may follow the *Encomium Moriæ* as their religious guide; they will not accept it as their standard of sound reason.

The faculty of jurisprudence will be new, but its fitness will not be questioned by thinking Americans. In a land of states, each with a constitution where men really sought to embody the soundest principles of right and justice, and from time to time seek to remedy defects in a similar spirit, with a national government binding all together, and framed in a spirit of concession, all will recognize that the study of the essential principles of human government, of individual rights, of the extent of the powers of rulers, of the divine sanction, must be, for all who take part in public life, one that deserves the highest attention. That we have had no institution where the great principles underlying all governments, the powers of the ruler and the governed, the responsibility of the lawmaker, and then ultimately of the force of law, its execution, its definition, the rules to guide the decision of courts, the rights of the citizen in the various capacities and their consequent duties to the government and to his fellow-men, are made the matter of thorough and exact study, is certainly a misfortune. The faculty of jurisprudence in universities like that of Bologna often became the arbiter between prince and people, between rival cities and states. The faculty of the proposed university may never attain that rank, but it will find scholars and exert an influence. If it does no more than give courses on civil law, it would meet a want felt in all parts; for that law, the basis of the law in Louisiana and the States in the southwest, underlies, too, all the equity and chancery courts, as well as those affecting admiralty cases, and is intimately connected with international law. The faculty of jurispru-

dence will be timely; it may be slower of growth, but its necessity will be admitted, and there can be little fear that it will not command enough scholars to justify its existence.

The faculty of jurisprudence ought to be a real one, and not a mere adoption nominally of some existing law school; nor should that of medicine be made by affiliating a school of anatomy and medicine, even though all the members were Catholics. They would be mere barnacles or excrescences on the institution, and as has been sadly demonstrated in Canada, will draw the university from its proper work and involve it in dissentions and disputes from which the real faculties of the university must feel to keep aloof. It would be far better to make no attempt to establish such faculties, unless they grow out of the university idea, are in harmony with the other faculties, actuated by the same spirit, and aim at the same results. The attempt to elevate schools founded independently, with a life and spirit of their own, into component parts of the university will be fraught with mischief. The university should be homogeneous in all its parts, actuated by one spirit and one consensus of ideas, not a mere collection or association of independent schools.

The faculties of arts and sciences are more easily understood, and are those which in the popular sense many consider the real and active part of the university, as being that to which the English universities dwindled when they no longer possessed the animating vital spirit of Catholicity. We need something of a higher grade than any institution we now possess, and if these have not always attained the success expected from them, it may well be that they did not aim at the highest and most effective course, and failed to give satisfaction, or deemed it better to meet the wants of the many rather than of a select few, who might elsewhere or by their own exertions supply the deficiency. That the collegiate training in this country is inadequate is conceded on all sides, and heads of colleges from Maine to California meet to discuss the situation and its remedy.

With the declining taste for classic literature and the languages of Greece and Rome, came the passion for athletic exercises, carried to such an extent that they seem to be the main and essential element of university life in many non-Catholic institutions.

Some, strangely criticising the project of a university, sanctioned as it has been by the hierarchy of the United States assembled in Plenary Council, tell us flippantly that we need parochial schools rather than a university. It is not possible that those who say this really mean that those who have passed through Georgetown, or Notre Dame, or Fordham, or St. Louis university, or Rock Hill, or Mount St. Mary's, or Woodstock, or Troy, or North East, ought

to go through a parochial school in order to acquire a completeness for their education. Yet when we speak of a university, we speak of something for young men of this class.

In regard to parochial schools, considering all that Catholics have been called upon to accomplish, much has been done both in regard to the numbers taught and the nature of the instruction afforded, although equal exertion has not been made in all parts of the country.

The question of a university is one entirely distinct from that of the gratuitous education of the poor, and the steps to be taken to save them from influences hostile to their faith, by so training them that as they must by God's providence grow up Americans, it shall be as Catholic Americans.

The question of a university is an entirely different one, and the Sovereign Pontiffs, while encouraging parochial schools, have been as explicit in regard to the necessity of universities.

Why did Pope Pius IX. advise the Irish hierarchy to establish a university? "Has the Supreme Pontiff," asked Dr. Newman, "done so, for the sake of the sciences, which are to be the matter, or rather of the students, who are to be the subjects of its teaching? Has he any obligation or duty at all toward secular knowledge as such? Would it become his Apostolical Ministry and his descent from the Fisherman to have a zeal for the Baconian or other philosophy of man for its own sake? Is the Vicar of Christ bound by office or by vow to be the preacher of the theory of gravitation or a martyr for electro-magnetism? Would he be acquitting himself of the dispensation committed to him if he were smitten with an abstract love of these matters, however true or beautiful or ingenious or useful? Or rather, does he not contemplate such achievements of the intellect, as far as he contemplates them, solely and simply in their relation to the interests of revealed truth? Surely what he does, he does for the sake of religion. . . . . And if he encourages and patronizes art and sciences, it is for the sake of religion. He rejoices in the widest and most philosophical systems of intellectual education from an intimate conviction that truth is his real ally, as it is his profession, and that knowledge and reason are sure ministers to faith."

The faculty of arts takes the range of classic literature and the studies connected with it, and in the history of literature comparing modern with ancient works of renown. The study of history and its underlying principles, the conflicting elements, which ultimately bring all human governments to an end; with the history of the gradual discovery of the parts of the world unknown to the ancients, and the occupation and colonization, by civilized Europe, of far distant lands where it planted Christianity and civilization.

Our civilization, with its literature, art, science, laws, and government, is an outgrowth of the civilization of Greece and Rome, springing mainly from tribes which were in a comparatively barbarous phase when Greece had venerated for centuries the masterpieces of poetry, eloquence, sculpture, architecture, painting, metalwork, in which utility was combined with the graces of art. To this fountain we naturally turn, for though the models were long since adopted, they are, by the common consent of mankind, still unsurpassed. The masterpieces of Greece, approached most nearly by those of Rome, are still immeasurably in advance of all that we can boast. But our civilization, though drawn from these nations, is modified by the heaven-guided civilization of Palestine, the civilization of a people comparatively children in all but their higher and clearer knowledge of the relation of man to God and of the Creator to his creatures. Its literature modifies that of Greece and Rome to form our actual civilization. But the faculty of arts is blended with that of science, and Cardinal Newman well distinguishes the two. "Science has to do with things, literature with thought; science is universal, literature is personal; science uses words merely as symbols, but literature uses language in its full compass as including phraseology, idiom, style, composition, rhythm, eloquence, and whatever other properties are included in it."

The faculty of science, embracing mathematics, does not, in a university, seek to rival technical schools, or to make its scholars chemists, mining, civil, or military engineers, architects, painters, or sculptors; but it takes these sciences in their present condition, reduces their phenomena to system, and shows their relation to theology and other branches of knowledge—their compatibility with the teaching of faith. So in mathematics, while in previous courses of study the practical application was more especially the aim, the professor in the university takes the whole subject as a matter of intellectual study to consider its meaning and bearing rather than to seek out in what way this knowledge is to be made advantageous to man.

If political economy is treated in such a university, it will be on Christian and Catholic principles. As generally understood, it is the science of wealth. The seeking, within due bounds, of a competence for the support of the individual and those whom he is bound to care for, is just and lawful; but the grasping of wealth, merely for itself, is dangerous and too often the occasion of sin. Wealth, as it accumulates, seems to fascinate men as the serpent does the bird, and, as a spiritual writer remarks, we speak of men of wealth, because men seem to belong to wealth rather than wealth to men; they become its slaves instead of being its masters. Political economy is a science of which it has been wisely said "that if

studied apart from the control of revealed truth it is sure to conduct the speculator to unchristian conclusions." From the chair of a Catholic university this science would be treated in harmony with the teachings of our Lord, and with the teachings of the Church, which honors evangelical poverty, and singling out the resistance to the promptings of avarice as a representative virtue, portrays in her office the Confessor as one "who hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures."

This is a brief and imperfect attempt to convey a correct idea of the work of a university as distinguished from inferior educational institutes, and of a Catholic university as distinguished from those with which English readers are most familiar. In the detail of the treatment of the various faculties, its scope will be extremely wide. Wherever a science, or even a question, becomes the subject of erroneous teaching either in the school or through the press, the university can and ought to counteract it by a sound teaching based on solid and recognized principles.

But, it may be asked, what has the Catholic Church and her doctrines to do with the thousand questions of the day? Would it not be better for the Church to confine herself, to confine her ministry, to the altar, the pulpit, and the catechist's chair? The answer is found in the very writings in which the questions of the day are discussed. Why do arbitrary governments, or liberal governments as they are called, but acting the tyrant as they too often do,—why do these governments and the anarchists, the systematized sansculottism of our century, alike regard the Church as their enemy, and make her the object of their unremitting hostility and assaults? Why do the scientific men, who treat the mind as a mere outgrowth of matter and man as a mere animal developed from irrational stock,—why do these men regard the Church as an enemy, and lose no opportunity to impugn her? Why cannot a school of astronomy discuss the nature and relations of the planets and stars without introducing accusations against the Church? Why must works on the origin of the American Indians and the structure of their language enliven the dulness of their topics by malicious innuendos and accusations against the doctrines and practices of the Church? Why do men, who hold themselves as truthful and honorable in the ordinary affairs of life, resort to falsehood and to every possible stratagem and trick to prevent Catholic ideas from influencing public opinion and legislative action? Why has history, as generally written, become, as Cardinal Wiseman truly said, a conspiracy against Catholic truth?

It is not difficult to answer. These men, all acting from different points, on different lines, recognize the Church as a great living fact, a great institution, a power, with a fixed set of doctrines, clear, distinct, logical, all interdependent, all mutually supporting each

other, an institution which upholds some system they seek to destroy. They find its influence surrounding them like the atmosphere, pressing on them, penetrating into their very being, and they rebel against the Church. They acknowledge that the Church at all times can and must examine their theories.

There is, indeed, not a question, political, scientific, social, which can be treated fully without at some point reaching a position accepted or condemned by the Church, as it harmonizes or conflicts with revealed truth. And she meets the multiform error by her multiform presentation of the truth. Surely there can be no greater tribute to the majesty, the serenity, the wide-reaching power and influence of the Church than this consensus of the fallible, the fallacious and the false. While they recognize her as the universal teacher, can we question her right, her duty of showing herself clearly in the university form the reasserter of impugned truths, and their expounder in the clearest light by human intellect, to mankind?

Our country pullulates with strange theories on every possible subject, which show a mental activity, but they are in the main wild, not from innate evil, but from the fact that men have been trained with false ideas and false systems, and whether following them or breaking from them, can reach no safe conclusion while their premises are false. The Catholic university will save the next generations of Catholics from being drawn into any of these schemes, and will send out its envoys of truth fitted to enlighten and save many who are groping in darkness and would be thankful for light. Men everywhere are breaking away from Protestantism, satisfied of its hollowness; and we should have and must have master minds, fully imbued with the spirit and teaching of the Church of God, who can show these active, logical minds where the real basis of truth is, expose the weakness of the theories that attract them, and bid them render the homage of their intellect to that God whose spouse the Church is, and who illuminates her to do His work.

The Catholic university must come. The present generation seems ready to undertake it. Means are not wanting, professors and pupils will not be wanting. We may not live to see it, like Alcalá, number its thirty thousand students, or, like Paris, have all civilized nations represented; but if it is not cramped and thwarted by half-hearted assent and real opposition, we shall see an institution producing a host of intellectually trained priests and laymen whose influence will be felt in every department of thought, who can make the American contributions to literature, science and the arts instinct with the life and the light that can come from but one source, Divine Truth.

ST. CHARLES BORROMEO AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS.

Histoire de Saint Charles Borromée, Cardinal Archevêque de Milan, d'aprés sa correspondance et de documents inédits. Par l'abbé Ch. Sylvain, Chan. honoraire, membre de plusieurs sociétés. Collection historique. Société de Saint Augustin. Desclée, de Brouwer & Cie. Lille, 1884.

The Life of St. Charles Borromeo, Cardinal Archbishop of Milan. From the Italian of John Peter Giussano, priest and Oblate of St. Ambrose. With Preface by Henry Edward Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminster. Burns and Oates. 1884.

ON the eve of the tercentenary of St. Charles, a new Life of the Saint appeared in French. Almost simultaneously with it the Oblate Fathers published, under the auspices of Cardinal Manning, a translation in English of the old and well-known biography by Giussano. The two works are distinct types of their kind; the one, a sort of autobiography, inasmuch as it consists in the main of data furnished from the vast correspondence of the saint, the other, originally written by an intimate friend, a daily witness to the truth of what he writes some fifteen or eighteen years after the death of the saintly cardinal.

Apart from the relative value of the two lives thus written from different standpoints, the Abbé Sylvain has been the first to give pointed expression of—and in a manner to supply—a want which must have been felt heretofore by many admirers of the great saint. And so far the latter work constitutes a criticism upon that of Giussano and his followers. Its author shows how the conception we form of St. Charles from the older existing biographies must needs be partial and incomplete, and he leads us to a height whence we may view him differently and more to advantage. From that elevation, too, he points out mines hitherto in great part unexplored, whence we may gather precious material wherewith to raise a monument at once worthy of the saint and useful to posterity. He himself has collected some stones from these hidden treasuries, and offers them, fit tribute of love and gratitude, to his holy patron, in the hope that they might serve some masterhand in future days to rear the edifice, which he modestly, yet withal justly, confesses he has not attempted.

And, in truth, the more we examine the subject, the more must we become convinced how inadequately the ground really occupied

by the great archbishop has been covered by his historians, numerous and singularly favored in their tasks though they were. We see in him the austere and humble cardinal, friend of the poor and of plague-stricken Milan; the priest of God, consumed with burning zeal, to whom the honor of His Church was dearer than all other glory, and who defended her rights with a courage proportionate to that zeal. But we know hardly anything of his early boyhood; of the influences that were at work in forming his mind and heart, particularly during his years of study at Pavia. We can form no proper estimate of his qualifications as a statesman, vindicating the action of Pius IV., if not wholly from the charge of nepotism, certainly from that of imprudence, in making the young Count Borromeo Cardinal Secretary of State at the early age of twenty-two. Giussano and his co-laborers give us no true idea of how far the saint deserves to be accounted one of the most influential patrons of letters both ecclesiastical and secular, and in some respect of Christian art. Yet, it is true that, in those troubled times of political and social upheaval, it was St. Charles, above all other men, who raised the moral and intellectual level not simply of Italy, but of the greater part of Europe, by his direct interference in the action of foreign courts. These are subjects that have hitherto received but the most passing and unsatisfactory attention; unsatisfactory all the more when we consider the vast material which is actually at the command of the writer who, with adequate ability, might undertake the task of utilizing it. Canon Sylvain has, as we have said, pointed out the most important sources. He has searched the correspondence of St. Charles, together with other pertinent documents, and, as the result of his labor, he places before us letter upon letter, making a united whole that lays open to us the thoughts, feelings and motives which guided and accompanied the actions of the saint. Yet all this, whilst it gives us a more correct outline of St. Charles than we have had hitherto, is still but a small part of his history. Oltrocchi had drawn, long years before, from several of those sources to which our attention is newly called; and his excellent notes to the Latin edition of Giussano's work are in many instances, as Sylvain himself attests, precious chronicles and full of profound and rare erudition. The English translators have availed themselves in many instances of these notes.

But, when we remember that the history of St. Charles is perhaps more the history of his times than that of any of his contemporaries; when we see the vast amount of authentic manuscript-matter that offers itself to elucidate much of that history which was hitherto doubtful or wholly unknown, we can hardly content ourselves with what has been actually put before us in the form of biography, even though it were given us in a manner and in a

spirit that could satisfy our actual needs. Yet, herein also we lack. If the history of all great men, but especially that of the saints, be given to posterity for its instruction and emulation, account must assuredly be taken, not only of the time in which they lived, but of our own time and selves. Not, indeed, as if the present offered always, or even generally, a proper balance by which to determine the motives of the past; but the present cannot receive the lessons of the past, unless in its own language, interpreting the meaning of the old characters. Enough is being constantly said of the ceaseless and rapid growth of the human mind; of its swiftly changing attitude towards absolute standards of morality and truth, to dispense us from entering on the subject here. It will not be denied that, whatever flaws and sophisms this tendency of changing thought has been employed to cloak, it forces upon all teachers of truth the necessity of casting a different, hitherto unused, light upon old-standing facts; of taking emphatic notice of all the countless microcosms which arouse the eager zeal of impatient students; nor to be slow and hesitating in doing so, for the art grows daily longer, and life with its opportunities in all much shorter.

The life of St. Charles is of course in an especial manner the pattern of the priestly life. "The character of that saint," says Cardinal Manning in his Introduction,[1] "will be best understood by reading his life." And he singles out what might be termed the prominent feature of that life. "The work of St. Charles was the renewal of the pastoral fervor of the Good Shepherd." His model is in this respect of more than ordinary importance to us, because ours "is the age of pastors, and to every pastor's heart St. Charles is dear."[2] And as if to emphasize this characteristic view of the saint, he adds that "he was not a great theologian, or a great orator, or a great statesman. But he was a great pastor," etc.[3] Such is in reality the impression we receive from reading Giussano's book. But when we take up Sylvain, our estimate of the great saint gradually changes.

> Tum partes auctus in omnes
> Crescit in immensum.

Even if his published works or his connection with the council of Trent, which was not confined to an activity of a merely executive or pastoral nature, does not in our eyes entitle him to the name of a great theologian, the voice of his contemporaries seems to yield him that right abundantly. His knowledge in every branch of theology was, we are told, simply extraordinary. He

[1] Preface, page xxii. [2] Ibid., xix. [3] Ibid., xxii.

never gave an opinion—and the wisest heads, both clerical and lay, in Europe often sought it—without citing at once the authority of councils, or canonists, or theologians, and this with a marvellous correctness and precision.[1] "His library," says Carlo Canneta, "was one of the richest and most precious in Italy."[2] We know how incessantly he used it at night and on his travels. Truly, he had asked God and wisdom came upon him, "the spirit of understanding, holy, one, manifold, subtile."[3] (Wisd., chap. vii.) Not all his writings in which that gift is manifested are published. Besides, many of the best theological works of that day were written under his inspiration and at his suggestion, by disciples and friends, as we shall have occasion to notice. Whether he was a great orator is difficult to say. He was assuredly a great preacher. The defect of enunciation which had hampered his speech in earlier years yielded to his unwearying efforts, and so well did he succeed in this that, says Sylvain, "like a new Demosthenes" he began to exercise a singular fascination by his sermons upon all who heard him. As for his written discourses, they are models of lucidity, elegance of expression, and full of erudition.[4] There are some eight volumes of his sermons in the Ambrosian library at Milan, still unpublished. Some of them are written in a different hand from that of St. Charles, most likely Possevino's, who himself relates in his account of the saint[5] how he used to take down the sermons whilst they were being preached. In order to form some estimate of the talents of St. Charles as a statesman, one need but read Bascapé's account of his political connections, of the correspondence that passed between the cardinal and the Roman pontiffs, or the chapters in Sylvain's book entitled "St. Charles and France" and "St. Charles and the Princes of Europe."[6] If Giussano did not bring out sufficiently all these traits, it was, no doubt, because his own bias leaned—as all his still extant works show—towards the pastoral virtues of St. Charles, which he himself had learned so well to imitate. No wonder, then, that this should constitute the all-pervading feature of his book. Yet it is plain, at the same time, that however edifying or otherwise useful that life may prove to the average reader, we are not enabled to obtain from it a sufficiently correct and complete view of the saint, so that it is no exaggeration to admit, with Sylvain, that

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[1] Sylvain, vol. iii., pp. 277–280. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 266.

[4] A modern critic says of these sermons: "Des sermons . . . . . l'on remarque de l'élégance, de la methode, un style simple et naturel, et un ton de douceur et de piété qui attache et touche singulièrement. Le style des discours au clergé a plus de noblesse et d'élévation." (Bibliographie univers., art. Charl. Borr.)

[5] Discorsi della vita ed attioni di Carlo Borr. (Roma, 1591, page 46.)

[6] Sylvain, vol. ii., chaps. 35 and 36.

"the holy archbishop of Milan has not as yet found his proper historian."[1]

It may be opportune, then, to consider the question of what would constitute such a history and how far the elements of it are already given and within our reach. Accordingly, it is not so much our purpose to review the two above-mentioned biographies,[2] as rather to make them the occasion of passing a general glance over the entire biographical field of St. Charles Borromeo. Or, to state our object more precisely, it touches three points. First, to ascertain in some measure the real value of the written lives of St. Charles Borromeo and to see how far they are of service in the composition of a history at once worthy of the subject and equal in importance to the material offered for use. This will be partly done by noticing in brief the leading intellectual and moral qualities of the writers, as well as the opportunities with which they entered upon their work. In the second place, we shall point out some of the sources whence the principal material may be drawn, and particularly those to which Canon Sylvain directs our attention. Lastly, we shall ask ourselves in what spirit a history of St. Charles should be properly conceived, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned resources on the one hand, and the high order of the subject, together with the just aim of such a work for our times and conditions, on the other.

When Giussano, still in the mid-vigor of his life, retired to the fertile and lovely district of Monza, there to mourn the loss of his dear master, and to devote himself to a life of pastoral charity and literary labor in the same spirit, he had, apparently, no thought of writing a life of St. Charles. Before a few years had elapsed after the death of the saint, other men had done so, and their works bore the stamp of ability and love. When, therefore, on the eve of the canonization of the holy cardinal, Giussano took up the task at the request of Frederico Borromeo, he was able to avail himself of the collected labors and judgments of several writers of acknowledged ability and trustworthiness. These latter did not,

[1] Sylvain, avant-propos, page ix.

[2] We might here say that the English translation requires a careful revision. If Sylvain's work, which was evidently in the hands of the translator, was made use of in correcting Giussano's text, it has not been done consistently throughout. Notice, for example, the statement on page 465, vol. ii., as contradicting page 8, vol. i. There are other material errors not warned against in the *errata*, as vol. i., 347; vol. ii., 185, 417, etc., besides some annoying inaccuracies in the paging of the Index.

It is to be regretted that the otherwise superbly gotten-up edition of Sylvain should contain any disfiguring misprints, such as *amorte* for *amore* in the illuminated frontispage, and elsewhere. Why the author prefers throughout to write Bescapé for Bascapé we are at a loss to know. If some Italian writers have followed that spelling, it is evidently a local corruption for the originally adopted name Bascapé, a contraction for "Basilica S. Petri."

of course, contain the detailed testimony of the heroic virtue of St. Charles, brought out in the process of canonization, but they summed up as much in brief from their own experience. Giussano makes mention of the work of Cardinal Valerio, who published a life of St. Charles[1] as early as 1586, that is, two years after the saint's death. Two other noteworthy publications which he occasionally cites are *The Life and Actions of St. Charles*, etc., by Possevino,[2] which appears to have been the first written in the Italian vernacular; and *The Life of St. Charles*, by Bascapé,[3] which had been printed in two editions before Giussano began his work. In fact, there must have been a great deal in the form of biographical attempts of more or less importance before that time, as Giussano himself says: "Many of the cardinals of Holy Church have written in praise of St. Charles."[4] Among those written in foreign tongues he mentions an English life, of which there appears, however, no remaining trace.[5] Botero, another of the saint's secretaries, had already published a collection of the letters of St. Charles.[6]

All this, together with the papers belonging to the Ambrosian library, the documents of the process of canonization, and, in fact, the bulk of the material lately re-examined by Sylvain, was placed at Giussano's disposal, who was requested by Cardinal Frederico, nephew of the saint and his second successor in the See of Milan, to write a life of him, in order to give fit expression to the celebration of his canonization. It appears from the circumstances that not very much time was allowed him. But he was the only one of the illustrious household of the late cardinal who enjoyed the privilege of literary leisure,[7] and had the necessary qualifications for the task which the intents and purposes then required. Yet, looking at the matter from our own standpoint, and at the character of the men who could have been induced to take up the work, we regret almost that it was not intrusted to other hands. There is every reason to believe from what we know of Valeria and Bascapé, of whom we have the earliest biographies above mentioned, that they would have brought to the work, at this stage of its history, not simply ability of a far higher order, but a more comprehensive view

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1 Vita Caroli Borromei, Verona, 1586.

2 Discorsi della vita et azioni di Carlo Borr., Roma, 1591.

3 De vita et rebus gestis Caroli card. archiep. Mediol., Ingolstadt, 1592; Brescia, 1602.

4 Vol. ii., p. 273.

5 Vol. ii., 280. A note suggests that the life here alluded to was probably written by Father Campion, S. J., who had known the saint personally.

6 Preserved in the library San Sepolcro, Milan.

7 Almost all the private secretaries and other superior officers of St. Charles' household had, at this time, been chosen to fill important positions as bishops, papal legates, or ambassadors to foreign courts. See Sylvain, vol. i., p. 337.

of the entire subject than did Giussano. The latter's character was marked by a singular devotion to St. Charles, a burning pastoral zeal, and, as we judge from his occupations during the life of the saint, a certain talent for finance and economical administration. But both Cardinal Valeria and Monsignor Bascapé, and we might even add Possevino and Botero, were men no less remarkable for their saintly lives, whilst they joined to this a consummate knowledge of the world, superior literary tastes, and, what above all we miss in Giussano, a keen appreciation of those subtler qualities which made the saint incessantly active in creating that under-current of moral purification in the political stream of his day, wherein these very men had served him as instruments in raising the tone of European court society. They would, in short, have given us a more historical, more influential, whilst no less attractive and edifying, work. They were, in fact, the principal historians, both ecclesiastical and civil, of Milan at that time. As secretaries of St. Charles, they, with the exception of Valerio, acted as his diplomatic agents and legates in foreign lands. They knew him fully as intimately as, and loved him no less than, Giussano. As for Valerio, he could bear ample testimony to the worth of St. Charles in the sphere of theology, philosophy, science, and the arts; for he had been one of the first who gathered around the young Cardinal Borromeo at those brilliant evening coteries in the Vatican palace, where the genius and culture of the best society, clerical and lay, of Rome assembled for the purpose of mutual intellectual and moral improvement. And later St. Charles had, out of Rome and Milan, no dearer friend, no wiser counsellor, nor more generous colaborer in his furtherance of learning and of social beneficence. What these different biographers of St. Charles wrote about him may by all these accounts be supposed to have its value. Still, there is only one of the number, besides Giussano, whose work has really survived to our day, having been repeatedly published both in Latin and Italian, and that is Carlo Bascapé. This fact of itself sufficiently indicates that his history of St. Charles differs in some respect from that of Giussano, which has been hitherto most popular, and, especially with important additions by Oltrocchi, justly so. How far later writers, as Godeau[1] and Touron,[2] have adhered to the texts of their predecessors we cannot say,[3] both being, we believe, more than a century out of print.

Comparing Giussano and Bascapé, we shall probably obtain some estimate, sufficient for our purpose, of the entire body of biogra-

[1] Vie de S. Charles Borromée, Paris, 1747; 2 vol.

[2] La vie et l'esprit de Saint Charles Borr., Paris, 1761; 3 vol.

[3] The writer of art. S. Ch. in Michaud's Biogr. Univ. says of these: "G. avait composé une vie de St. Ch. qui est trop succinte. Celle de P. Touron est trop diffuse."

phers, which they may be said to represent. Both resemble each other in many points. They labored together, side by side; accompanied the saint at all times and in all sorts of affairs; they enjoyed in an equal degree his fullest confidence, and neither of them yielded to the other in devoted and affectionate attachment to him. Almost equal in age, of the best families in Milan, their tastes were high and of a cultivated character, they having received the best advantages of the education of that time. The tone in which Giussano habitually speaks of his friend assures us how highly he esteemed him. Indeed, there is a certain romantic parallelism in the circumstances which brought them under the influence and into the service of St. Charles, as we shall presently see. Like brother spirits in all things, they differ only in the particular bent of their genius—and in this differ, like the subjects of all their writings, their histories of the saint.

Giussano, a young Milanese nobleman, we find spoken of in the annals of his native city as a successful and highly promising physician at the early age of 19. Almost at the same time the aula of the Pavian University rings with the applause from an admiring assembly of dignitaries and students upon the first brilliant defence of a young lawyer, a patrician by birth, Giovanni Francesco.[1] At once he is appointed to his native city of Milan and entered upon the list of noble jurisconsults. But the world of cabal and intrigue ill suits his discerning love of justice, and the frank and noble youth turns with lofty disdain from the tortuous ways of high-born associates. Unwilling to prostitute his genius or his eloquence to low designs, he seeks St. Charles for advice. The result is that he forsakes the world, dons the ecclesiastical garb, and places himself at the service of the saintly cardinal. In the episcopa palace he meets Giussano, who, too, having recognized the vanity of earthly pursuits, had denied the beck of ambition and entered the community of Oblates of St. Ambrose. Both youths had yearned, indeed, after retirement, but St. Charles, whilst he permitted them to give their vows to religion,[2] reserved to himself the right to employ them in his service. He felt how valuable both their talents and the pure ardor of their zeal would prove to him; for the son of Margherita de' Medici had inherited not only the magnificent appreciation of culture which had distinguished his illustrious relatives, Cosmo and Lorenzo de' Medici, but, as the living historian of Milan, Cesare Cantù, assures us,[3] he possessed that singular gift, the supreme art of administrative power, which

[1] He assumed the name of Bascapè later on entering religion.

[2] Bascapè joined the Clercs Regular of St. Paul.

[3] Storia di Milano del Cav. Cesare Cantù; p. 184, vol. i. of Grande Illustrazione del Lombardo-Veneto, 1857, Milano.

quickly recognizes the symptoms of true worth and sterling ability. And he knew how to single out and gather around him,[1] as well as most fitly to employ, the men who would prove useful to the Church in its then crisis of reform. "And about him was the ring of his brethren, and as the cedar planted in Mount Libanus. As branches of palm trees they stood round about him, and all the sons of Aaron in their glory."[2]

This is one of the most striking features in the economic activity of St. Charles. We distinctly trace in the labors of his many secretaries and officials, long years after his death, the direct influence which he inspired for some line of work. He had marked out, as it were, the field to each, suitable to their peculiar talent, and when his word and cheering look were no longer there, his spirit still hovered over them, and under the charming spell of that stewardship they kept on laboring until they would meet him beyond the tomb to give him their account. Certainly, the persons who occupied positions of trust in his palace were not, in any case, simply well-trained or highly competent officials who obtained a natural and ready insight into his affairs and were pledged to the customary bond of diplomatic secrecy. They were his most intimate friends, bound to him by a sincere and reverent affection, which arose from his disinterested care for his subjects and the daily example of his virtue. Thus they did not merely copy for him, but from him. They labored in his spirit and carried out his every suggestion with a readiness which made it, in effect, a command. And whether we view him as the priest or the statesman, as the missionary toiling along the narrow pathways of the Alps, or as the munificent patron of science and of art, as the ecclesiastical reformer knowing no mercy but the mercy of God, or as the adviser of kings and of princes—in each case these men whom he held around him were but so many copies of himself, doubling his work in an undivided spirit. Thus we find the young Bascapé exercising his legal and diplomatic skill in arranging the affairs of St. Charles in the latter's capacity as grand protector of the several kingdoms, as adviser and representative of the princely houses of Italy, with most of whom the Borromeo family was connected by marriage or descent. We see him principal agent in adjusting the tangled difficulties between the Spanish government and the see of Milan. In 1581 he is actu-

[1] In Rome, among the literary circles, St. Charles was well known as a "rapacissimo ladro di savj," for he never went there without carrying away to Milan some of the best talent. He had in his household not only members of the various religious communities, but men of almost every nationality. There is a curious letter of St. Philip Neri to the Saint, wherein he refuses to allow the illustrious Cesar Baronius, of the Oratory, to join St. Charles's household at Milan. Vid. Vita St. Phil. Neri (Boll., 26 Maii).

[2] Eccli, l., 13, 14.

ally on his way to Portugal to find the king, on precisely such a mission, of which he himself gives a detailed account in his Life of the Saint. When the latter breathes his last, Bascapé is at his bedside. He closes those dear eyes which had, thus far, been the light unto his own. Now, at length, weary with sorrow and the ceaseless toil of the past years, which had made him encounter through loving obedience the very intrigues from which once he had fled, he shall find rest in the solitude of his cloister. But no! He is only half-way on the path of life and not yet to lay down the burden of responsibility. His brethren elect him superior-general of his congregation. Here, during the scant hours of repose, when mind and heart revert to St. Charles, his first true love, he writes down his recollections of him to whom his hand would point as the form by excellence according to which the youth, now in his own care, might shape and bind their missionary zeal. The work was published for the use of ecclesiastics mainly, in seven parts and in Latin. It appeared first at Ingolstadt and soon after at Brescia. About this time Clement VIII. accidentally meets Bascapé. Charmed with his talent and humility, the pontiff sends him as bishop to Novarra. Henceforth his activity is absorbed in carrying out the lessons he had learned in the administration of the diocese of Milan, so faithfully, indeed, that, as we are told in the traditions preserved by local writers, the people commonly called him "un altro san Carlo."[1] And the recollections that had been to him his joy and strength, the breath, as it were, of his nostrils when at eventide he rested from his labors in his cloistral home at Milan during those eight years which he had spent there, were to become, in the latter end, the solace of his reflecting old age. During the last years of his life he himself published a beautiful translation in Italian of his *Vita S. Caroli* under the name of Luca Vandoni.[2] This was two years after Giussano's life had appeared, which in its turn was translated into Latin two years later by Bart. di Rossi.[3] We have, therefore, both Latin and Italian versions of the two biographies made during the lifetime[4] of these two men intimately connected with the saint. That there was no thought of rivalry is evident from the circumstances. From what we have said regarding the bent of mind in these two friends of St. Charles some idea may be formed of the different character of their writings. Bascapé

[1] Vid. Raff. Notari—Storia della letteratura Italiana.

[2] Bologna, 1614. It appears that a translation had actually been made by a certain Luca Vandoni (Vanione) who died before its publication. The MSS. were sent to Bascapé, and he, not being pleased with the work, re-translated it entirely under the original author's name. This we gather from one of his letters. (Ibid.)

[3] Bart. Rubeus, 1615.

[4] According to the writer in the Bibl. Univers., Giussano died in 1615, but this must be an error. Argellati, "Bibl. Script. Mediol.," assigns it to the year 1623.

is probably superior in style and critical quality, but less exhaustive and naturally less read than Giussano. The writings of the latter are all more or less of a pastoral theological temper; and this tone predominates accordingly in his view of the saint.

We said that Bascapé would, had he been commissioned to do so, have probably given us a more complete picture of St. Charles, a truer and in every way more excellent history of his life. It might be justly asked, why then did he not do so, since he wrote that life and afterwards even translated it? It will not be difficult to explain this, however, if we remember the time at and the object for which the latter composed his work. His charge at the time when he wrote was such as to induce him to give only a particular view of our saint. He never meant to write his history. It was rather a panegyric or a meditation on the life and deeds of St. Charles which he contemplated. He wished, for the purpose of imbuing his clerics with the spirit of their saintly patron, to leave them a memorandum of what he had seen, thus to perpetuate among them that inspiring presence which had often visited those very halls with young Bascapé by his side. In all else it was labor of the heart much more than of the intellect. But had he been given the leisure, had the purpose and scope of the work been set before him, together with all the material for a complete history, as was done in the case of Giussano, we can hardly doubt that a man of his mould would have reared an edifice which it was, perhaps, not in the nature of Giussano to conceive.

But we have laid special stress upon the character and activity of these two intimate associates of the life of the holy archbishop for a further reason beyond that of comparison between them. It was because we are thus enabled to judge to some degree of the value of their remaining works as a contributing source to the desired history of St. Charles. Both writers have left behind them considerable works reflecting the state of the Church and duchy of Milan in their day.

To Bascapé, above all, are we indebted for much original research. A beautiful style, vast and varied erudition and critical power, are marked characteristics of his writings and lend them considerable prominence in Italian literature.[1] Yet, like the letters of St. Charles, the bulk of his literary labors is far from being known or accessible to the public.[2] The same might be said of

[1] "Ingegno, dottrina, critica, lingua propria, stile vago e senza delicatezza ornato rendono preziose tutte le scritture del Bascapé." Raff. Notari—Storia della letteratura Italiana.

[2] His manuscripts, of which there are over forty volumes, are preserved in the Collegio San Marco at Novarra (Michaud. Bibl. Univ.).

Valerio[1] and other contemporary writers. Ripamonte, too, furnishes much lore on the subject of those times, which, however, is to be used cautiously, as he has been convicted of many material errors in his history.

Looking at the biographers of St. Charles, irrespective of their individual characteristics and differences, there appears in them one aspect common to all, and which has been brought out in the publication of some of St. Charles' earliest correspondence. The friends of the holy archbishop exhibit to us the saint, but in their affectionate regard they forget the man. As one of them, Gagliardi,[2] expressly says: "He attained to so high a degree of perfection that it is not so much to be imitated as rather to be held up for admiration." Whatever they saw in him bore the stamp of the supernatural. Nor need we wonder that they, who in the chivalrous ardor of their early years had fled to him for refuge, should behold in him the object of that loving admiration which not only realizes all the actions of its hero, but avoids with the instinctive caution of a lover whatever may be out of harmony with the sweet music of its worship.

Specto cultum faciemque gradumque;
Nil ibi, quod credi posset mortale, videbam.[3]

And yet it would be so much more encouraging to our poor aspiring nature to know how all came to be gradually supernaturalized. Giussano seems not to have realized this need. He does not even care to inform himself correctly concerning certain facts of the saint's earlier life, because they bear not with them the evidence of his sanctity. Hence arise errors, such, for instance, as the age at which the young Count Borromeo entered the University of Pavia. But it is a pleasant thought withal that this fault of the saint's biographers lay in their personal virtue. We, of course, account it more valuable, in our own struggle towards life eternal, to know that St. Charles once had faults, that he went much the ways of human prudence ere he recognized their feeble stay, that by essaying and finding wanting the world he renounced it gradually, struggling with common faults; whilst of a truth he always hated evil and was endowed with noble instincts, as many a man to-day who yet falls short of sanctity.

However, we cannot ignore that, though this attitude of devoted attachment was naturally an impediment to furnishing a history of

[1] Valerio's writings are of so exquisitely beautiful a style and merit that Card. Mai exclaims: "Invidiamo a un secolo che diede alla chiesa un tale vescovo e cardinale" (ibid., art. Ag. Val.).

[2] P. Achille Gagliardi, S. J. Documents of the Process of Canonization. Giuss., vol. ii., 277.

[3] Ov., Metam., iii., 610.

St. Charles such as we might require in these days of wanton skepticism on the one hand and slow and low aspirations to sanctity on the other, the time and circumstances of the earlier writers did not, perhaps, call for so complete a history. This appears corroborated by the fact, already mentioned, that the two lives by Giussano and Bascapé, written in days when the memory of the saint was still fresh in the minds of every one, went through many editions and translations up to our own day.[1] Later writers could hardly have changed anything in this respect; and an atmosphere of pure faith among the people where these lives were read prevented any realization of other wants. But of late there has been a momentous change in the world's psychical attitude. The universal spirit of investigation suddenly confronts us with problems in the concrete which not only were hitherto unknown, but never existed before. The real agencies, for example, that brought about and shaped the religious revolution of the sixteenth century have but of late had turned upon them a new and stronger light. And that this new knowledge, coming to us from old forgotten documents, is of real worth in this age of novelties, is amply attested by the unwearied activity among the archives of the Vatican library. Is Providence thus renewing the flagging interest to combat old and ever-recurring errors? Then it is well that we equip ourselves afresh, burnish and whet the old weapons, since their steel is the true Damascene and serves its purpose of striking down error better still than the new-fashioned sword of gilded brass and tinkling sound. At the same time, the development of the body requires a refitting of the garb. On this account, no less than because he has uncovered many dusty boxes of parchment and manuscript, owe we thanks to Sylvain. Botero, who had made his selection of the letters of St. Charles with a view to show the esteem and influence which the saint had enjoyed at foreign courts, played precisely the same part of secretary to the holy cardinal as Bascapé had done, and acted, in fact, as substitute of the latter during his absence in Spain. Soon after the saint's death, he was appointed ambassador to the Court of France by Carlo Emmanuele I., Duke of Savòy. In 1599 he went to Spain, acting a decided part in the administration of that kingdom whilst having in charge the education of the Princes of Savoy. These facts give evidence of his ability and so far of the value of his works, a considerable portion of which remains still unpublished.[2] He was the first writer who successfully refuted

[1] An edition of Bascapé's work—the latest we know of—was published at Lodi in 1858.

[2] Preserved in the library of Turin and said to be of much value (Mich., Bibl. Univers.).

the political theories of Machiavelli.[1] His works on social politics are said to be equal to the best written on the subject.[2] Some of those treating of ecclesiastical subjects were composed at the request of St. Charles.[3] Nor was he averse to the muses, for Vallauri praises his poetry.[4]

During the last century a choice collection of letters was printed in French by the advocate Pineault,[5] with notes and the Italian original by the side of the translation. These letters are said, however, to be of less importance and less numerous than those of a similar edition which had previously appeared in Lugano.[6]

Of decided importance are the documents, drawn from the archiepiscopal archives, which the Abbé Aristide Sala has published.[7]

We must not leave out of sight the annotations that have been made from time to time to the lives of St. Charles, and which in some cases exceed in importance the works to which they belong. Among them stands foremost Oltrocchi,[8] who annotated, as has already been said, the elegant Latin version of Giussano's book. Whether the Abbé Sépher's notes to Godeau's life[9] of St. Charles have any specific value, we are not able to ascertain. It may suffice to have pointed them out. We might here mention Sassi's notes to the saint's own works.[10]

Leaving aside the ordinary sources with which a historian of the time of St. Charles must and would naturally make himself acquainted, we come to those more direct ones to which Sylvain calls our attention. The letters he has examined and from which he has culled to make up his biography, amount to some 30,000. They are drawn from the secret archives of the Holy See, from the registers of the various nuntiatures of France, Germany, Spain, etc. In the city of Milan he has examined the archiepiscopal archives, the treasures of the Ambrosian library, the library of the Oblate Fathers, containing, besides thirty-one volumes of letters

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[1] "Della Ragione di Stato," 10 vol. The work has been many times republished and translated into almost all the modern languages and even into Latin. Bossuet has modelled his "Politique de l'Ecriture Sainte" after it (ibid., art. Botero).

[2] Vide "Vite degl' illustri Piemontesi"—Conte Giamb. Napione.

[3] As titles like "De praedicatione verbi Dei, lib. v., jussu Caroli Cardin. Borr. editi," indicated.

[4] Storia della Poesia in Piemonte. Thom. Vallauri (ex R. Notari).

[5] Paris and Venice, 1762.

[6] Michaud, Bibl. Univers., art. Borr Charles.

[7] Documenti circa la vita e le geste di San Carlo Borr., publicati per cura del Canonico Aristide Sala. 4 vol., c. suppl. Milano, 1857–1863.

[8] Edit. Mediol., 1751.

[9] Vie de S. Charles B., corrigée, augmentée et ornées de notes. Paris, 1748.

[10] Opera omnia S. C. B., cum notis. J. A. Saxii. Mediol., 1717.

written by the saint to eminent persons, a detailed digest of the process of canonization. At the Barnabite convent "ai Catinari," in Rome, he found a large collection of authentic copies of letters made evidently a short time after the saint's death. He seems, moreover, to have had access to some private libraries containing original documents, such as that of the Marchese Trivulzi. Over and beyond all this, he has wisely inquired into the traditions religiously handed down in the convents and among the people of Milan. And before presenting the fruit of his gleanings to the public, he submitted it, in the main, to the superior-general of the Oblates of St. Charles at Milan.

We ask, in passing, whether there be nothing in the library of Vercelli, which is said to be rich in valuable manuscripts, since we know that St. Charles left his MSS. by testament to the Bishop of that see? It is noteworthy, too, that in those times the city of Milan had its regularly appointed historiographer, kept by the municipal government.[1] A certain Bugati[2] is mentioned about this time. A few years later we read of Ottavio Ferrari, who has left much of local history. Less known, but perhaps more serviceable in this connection, may prove the writings of Francesco Bernardo Ferrari, uncle of the last mentioned, who was one of the first directors of the Ambrosian library,[3] and went to Spain for the purpose of collecting material for the same. He had seen the saint and was greatly devoted to the interests of the Borromean family. Some effort might also be made—we should think successfully—to recover part of St. Charles's library, from which, according to the extant catalogue, the most rare MSS. are missing, said[4] to have been carried off by the French, who were lodged in the library of the cathedral chapter during the days of the Republic.

We have repeatedly, in the course of these notes, alluded to the desirability of having all this heterogeneous mass of lore concerning the history of St. Charles placed in a certain order and light which would be more true to the memory of the saint, and probably more acceptable to his lovers and imitators. What most impresses the modern reader of the old lives is the careful avoidance of all that might tend to destroy the beautiful ideal image to which in truth St. Charles corresponded only in the latter end. Aside from this, we are constantly kept in mind of the predominance of what was supernatural in his life, and that frequently by the relation of

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[1] Cantù remarks, rather sardonically: "La città aveva allora una istituzione che la cianciera vanteriò del nostro tempa non oso rinnovare, cioè uno storiographo." (Storia di Mil., p. 216.)

[2] Gaspardo Bugati, † 1588.

[3] Opened formally in 1609.

[4] Vid. Archivio Storico Lombardo. September, 1882. (Cited by Sylvain.)

facts unquestionably true, yet which of themselves and as related bear the interpretation of most obvious and natural occurrences. Both features are easily explained. They accorded at once with the personal attachments of the writers and the mental attitude of the people for whom they wrote, possessed of a spirit of simple faith, with the living monuments, created by that faith and serving as an ever fresh impulse to act according to its dictates, around them. For the people of Milan do not believe that St. Charles is dead: "Mortuus est pater ejus et quasi non est mortuus." Yet, however satisfactory this mode of writing the saint's history may have been to a generation no more, it is tellingly insufficient for the present. Not that we would or could consider the manner of the old writers as in any real sense a fault. They simply do not cover the space which our eyes can take in now that we stand on different ground. On the other hand, we should in some cases have to shade our sight, grown unaccustomed to certain strong lights from our habitual bending towards the earth. The lives of great men are much like paintings. The artist, however grand his subject, however great his own inborn genius, may fail from want of attention to *technique*, to what is called the proper pronunciation, the bringing out into sufficient contrast his lights and shades. His picture may be all neutral tint or *sepia;* and then our first impression would be that it is a study merely. No matter, then, how otherwise perfectly finished, it does not appeal, as works of lesser merit might do, to certain predominant sentiments within us. Or even supposing that there were no such deficiency of accentuation in the work, that, moreover, we who look at it were possessed of all the requisite knowledge which would make an appeal to our æsthetic faculties possible, still, in order that the picture should speak to us, it would be necessary to take a certain distance between it and ourselves, to get a certain light upon it without which it could be seen but partly or distorted or blurred. Nay, not the light alone that falls upon the picture, but the light that falls upon ourselves is of importance. A picture seems different when we view it with the broad reflection of noontide upon us, or from the dark corner of a gallery. So is it precisely with our view of the history of St. Charles. We have a grand subject. But they who delineated it for us failed to give it that becoming *claro-oscuro*, that interesting piquancy, which has become a kind of necessity to us, who are much influenced, whether we will or not, by the wares offered in our marts of taste and intelligence by Doré, Wagner or Marian Evans. It might be a symptom of a generous soul to clamor for the staid old honest faith of bygone times, or to avow that truth, above all truth about God's saints, should not be tempered because of a simpering society that derides what it cannot estimate the

value of; but it would hardly be in accordance with the tactics of prudent charity to alienate the weak and lose our chances of profiting a society to whom we owe a duty. A doubtful champion of ancient prowess in sooth were he who first puts Richard's armor on our youth, and bids them fight as did of old their sire! To kill is not at all times to conquer. So, in the lives of the saints there are phases which the devout must admire and most of us will rightly understand and reverence, but which to the great body even of Catholics will have no meaning and create in some a skeptical and aggressive spirit. Many of the saints are simply miracles of God's holiness and omnipotence. They are to us like sudden lights revealing the simple fact of the supernatural in tangible form, so as to set us thinking of that fact and of our destiny in consequence. But this is not the case of all, nor even of the majority of canonized saints. It is not so, we are quite sure from the facts before us, of St. Charles Borromeo, who seemed raised not merely as a stupendous luminary to rouse us into energy of admiring submission to God's holy law, but who is to serve as a beacon-light in our narrow way, passed over before, step by step, by one who differed from us only in this, that he had to grope his path with more care, and did not lose his courage till he reached the end of it.

Cardinal Newman tells us that when he had read the life of St. Antony written by the holy anchorite's friend, St. Athanasius, he felt convinced of his extraordinary greatness.[1] Nevertheless, he seems to have felt it incumbent upon him to defend that saint in the eyes of believing men from the charge of having been an exaggerated visionary. Indeed, even the average reader in good faith of that life of a saint, pictured by another saint who knew him personally, and whose veracity and intelligence are alike above suspicion, would experience something of that feeling. "Had St. Antony lived in this day, and in this country, he would have been exposed to a considerable—though of course not insuperable—temptation to become a sectarian."[2] It is obviously wise, then, to anticipate the necessity of repelling analogous charges. This can be done by giving to such works that cast which would produce views and feelings harmonious and congenial to our own, without abating in the slightest the truth, but without at the same time placing, with no sufficient reason, in the foreground facts, however true of themselves, yet not likely to be rightly and quickly apprehended by the general reader. St. Paul himself calls the attention of the Corinthian preachers to this manner of setting forth truth. He draws the distinction between "speaking in tongues" and

[1] Miscellanies. Hist. Studies, VI.
[2] Ibid., page 74. Edit. 1872.

"prophesying." By tongues he means the mysteries of faith as set forth by the word of God; by prophesying he means the interpreting of them so as to rouse others to piety. "I would have you all to speak with tongues," that is, to study and meditate the holy law, "but rather to prophesy. He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself; but he that prophesieth edifieth the Church. Unless you utter by the tongue plain[1] speech, how shall it be known what is spoken?"

As to recognizing that the saints had their faults—and that this was not only the case with such as St. M. Magdalen or St. Augustin, who were suddenly converted by some miracle of divine grace, but with the great body of those who struggled onward with unwearied zeal until habit overcame habit and begot that "inward character" which necessarily follows from frequently repeated acts of virtue—it will hardly weaken our admiration for them. The heroism is only the greater whereby action begets sanctity than if it were the reverse. "The lingering imperfections of the saints surely make us love them more without leading us to reverence them less and act as a relief to the discouragement and despondency which comes over those who, in the midst of much error and sin, are striving to imitate them."[2] And this is in accordance with the general meaning of the term sanctity as applied in ascetical theology. St. Isidore[3] interprets the term *sanctus* as *sanguine tinctus*, that is, having undergone that process of purification by which a person or thing, before in a manner unclean, is rendered a pure and acceptable instrument for the service of God. Hence, sanctity is that quality of the human soul by which the latter disposes itself and its actions towards God, in order to the proper worship of Him.[4] "Let us remember," says St. Ambrose,[5] "that the saints were not of a superior nature from our own, but rather more observant of the law; they were not without faults, but they amended them." "Is not holiness the result of many patient, repeated efforts after obedience, gradually working on us, and first modifying and then changing our hearts? Thus the separate acts of virtue are of service to us, as gradually severing us from this world of sense, and impressing our hearts with a heavenly character."[6]

And surely this element duly observed in modern hagiography

[1] Εὔσημον, *i. e.* bene significantem, intelligibilem. Corn. a Lapide ad 1 Cor. xiv., 5 *sq.*

[2] Histor. Sketches, J. H. Newman, vol. i., p. 13.

[3] Lib. Etymol.

[4] St Thom., Summa, Sec. sec., quæst. 81, art. 8.

[5] "Discamus ergo et sanctorum invidiam, ut imitemur patientiam; et cognoscamus, illos non naturæ præstantioris fuisse, sed observantioris; nec vitia nescisse, sed emendasse."—Lib. de S. Joseph, in Off. Dom. III. Quadrg.

[6] Miscell., Holiness and Fut. Blessedness.—J. H. Newman.

will serve all the better the purpose for which the Church holds out to our veneration and imitation the saints whom she places in honor upon her altars. If she claims their intercession in her militant state, she also wishes to inspire her battling children by their heroic example: "Be followers of me, brethren, and observe them who walk so as you have our model."[1]

In this sense, no less than in view of the different special avocations in the priesthood, all of which St. Charles united, as it were, within himself, may his life be considered as an eminently practical pattern of the priestly life to-day. Its attentive study will not only show to us what it is under the grace of God within our ready reach to accomplish for the kingdom of heaven without and within us, but it will also mark with a peculiarly apt emphasis for us what it is needful in these times for us to do. So did we understand our Holy Father Leo XIII. when, lately in the assembly of ecclesiastical students gathered from every quarter of the globe, to do honor to St. Charles, he recommended urgently the imitation of the saint. Keen in the penetration of the needs as of society so of the priesthood, he lays emphatic stress on the pursuit of science and letters. St. Charles, he said, was a priest not simply of signal charity and apostolic zeal, but he was a man possessed of extraordinary and extensive knowledge. And so he was. A devoted student of the ancient philosophers, he began at Rome, in the midst of the countless distractions of an intensely severe official life, to give a new impulse to these studies in their proper direction, and thus he counteracted that excessive leaning towards the Pagan element brought on by the Humanists. He placed himself silently, but withal effectively, at the very head of secular progress. At a time when but few printing presses were to be found in Italy, we see him establish one in his diocesan seminary for the use of professors and students. And the persons whom he raised and inspired incessantly to labor in confuting errors, religious, social, or scientific, are the glory of their day. The most able men, whether in science, law, or theology, were the constant companions of his labor and his leisure, if indeed he can be said to have had leisure. The learned doctor, Ludovico Settala, a layman, is by his side during those dreadful days of the pestilence, never leaving him, whether in the haunts of the plague-stricken city or in the rough mountain-passes around the Lago Maggiore. All Europe tempts this man to accept its honors,[2] but he prefers the company of the humble cardinal.

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[1] Phil., iii., 17.

[2] St. Charles had met him at Pavia in 1568. When Settala had passed his doctorate, at twenty-one years of age, he was at once appointed first lecturer of practical medicine at the university. Two years later, the saint called him to Milan, and made him

And what in all this is of importance to us is that the knowledge of the life and character of St. Charles will contribute to a revival and perpetuation of his spirit in our priesthood so as to exert its legitimate influence upon society at large. For, whilst every lover of that sublime calling must be anxious to see in its ministers the full growth of a spirit of prayer, of a habit of self-denial, of a pure and single-hearted faith, and an ever-ready charity, yet have we not found that these gifts alone are insufficient to check the wanton infidelity or to rouse into animation the drooping indifference of our present society? Nay, we want the very keenest apprehension of all the special needs of our time. The study of the world and of mankind is gained, indeed, by the study of our own hearts, with prayer guarding against self-absorption; but no man has ever successfully studied his heart in the dark. We can arrive at no knowledge of ourselves, and consequently of the world of human hearts, without recognizing our surroundings, without making the world, as it were, the basis which somehow by its very existence will shape the angle of our introspection.

"The priest of our day," says a modern writer,[1] whose special task it was to know, "is cast amid a population partly hostile to his teaching, often mistrustful of his intention, but ever merciless to his weakness. That world it is impossible for us to win unless by a genuine ascendancy of our own superior character combined with an indefatigable self-devotion and the tenderest charity. Henceforth we shall have to prove even our right to be believed. Thus it becomes essentially necessary that we should recognize in its colors the social system of which we are a part; we must become acquainted with its dangers and with its resources, its weakness and its strength, so as to be able rightly to use the one, nor be disheartened by the other." The life of St. Charles covers this ground much more than we would at first suspect, and this not only in principle, but in fact. Did he live to-day, he need hardly—as in the case of St. Antony—be other than he was three centuries ago, in order to command the same influence and achieve similar results. If the people of Milan are said to be the most religious people in the world, it is probably because its religious life is so intimately interwoven with the traditions of St. Charles. Wherever you turn, not only in Milan and Arona,[2] but

protomedico of the duchy. Shortly, Philip of Spain appointed him historiographer to the kingdom, but he declined. The Elector of Bavaria offered him the directorship of the University of Ingolstadt. Bologna, Pisa and the Senate of Venice made him similar offers, all of which he declined in favor of the laborious life with St. Charles. His works are all of a scientific and philosophical character, full of original research and observation. They were published both in Italy and Germany.

[1] Oratoire de France.—Ad. Perraud, in "H. Perreyve," by P. Gratry, p. 114.

[2] The birthplace of St. Charles.

all along the Lago, that tradition confronts you, in all its attractive vividness, to this day. How the contadine, old and young, cling to that memory, uttering with lovely reverence the name of him

Di cui dolente ancor Melan ragiona,[1]

whose charities to their fathers long centuries ago are fresh upon them as if of yesterday. And so far as ecclesiastical legislation is concerned in all its branches, the rules and discipline of the see of Milan, as instituted by St. Charles, are still the norm of nearly every episcopal see in the Western Church. Sylvain makes us realize this and much more that casts new light upon the mental constitution of the saint. He leads him to tell himself what he thinks and feels. "Loquere, adolescens," he says, with Socrates, "ut te videam," and a new life,

ut sol, qui tectus aquosis
Nubibus ante fuit, victis ubi nubibus exit,

rises up before us.

Assuredly it is a great help to our knowledge of any man to have him explain expressly or unawares of himself, in his own words, the motives of action and the circumstances which prompted them. Nor is there in this case any danger of lessening the saint's greatness. But few persons in public life would willingly endure the indiscriminate publishing of their private correspondence. One can understand and appreciate the prudence of men like Sydney Smith, who called in all his letters before he died, because, as Chorley says, "he was averse to the misuse which could be made, according to the flagrant fashion of our time, of every scrap of written paper by literary ghouls who fatten ther purses in the guise of biographers."[2] But it is very different with men like St. Charles. His aim had been, what precisely constitutes his merit in the eyes of the Church, not to do great things merely, but to do them singly and solely for the love of God. Free from the bias of human censure and applause alike, what judgment need he fear who sought approval only in the eyes of heaven?

Nevertheless, there might be an objection to an autobiography made up entirely of letters, even if we aimed merely at a complete picture of the person of the saint, without measuring the impulse of his activity by its results. Just as we see the traveller in his true size when he begins to ascend the mountain, but gradually lose sight of him as he nears the summit, discerning no longer his proportions and only estimating his height by the very fact

[1] "That name never uttered without tears in Milan."—(Carey), Purg., xviii. 120.
[2] Autobiography, Memoirs and Letters of Henry F. Chorley.

that we see him no longer—so with the saints. We lose accurate measure of them as they near the summit of their heavenly Father's perfection. They become more and more impersonal as they go on. To our gaze they are no longer discernible in the same way as when they commenced their earthly pilgrimage up the mountain of God, where their self is gradually lost in Him who is their highest aim and end. Accordingly, their letters and words about themselves would really tell us less of them than we would like to know. At such a period it is a real advantage to have an estimate of them by men who were their friends and associates. This we have, as has been seen, in the life by Giussano and others. Sylvain has not entirely ignored them. He could hardly have done so without creating much useless labor for himself. But to complete a history, this may be done to a much greater extent, and many of the facts given us by Bascapé, Valerio, and others, may be wrought into the general plan by which a proper picture of the saint would be formed with its right historical background, so as to make it a true portrait and at the same time a genuine piece of art.

Beyond this it is a real advantage that three centuries have elapsed, allowing us an unbiassed judgment upon all there is of ripe and substantial fruit, giving forth the original seed. An ingenious woman [1] has aptly compared the work of contemporary history to that of the celebrated Arras tapestries. Looking over the shoulder of the skillful workman, each thread appears distinct as wrought into the composition. Still the whole is but a confused surface giving us no idea of the design, for we see as yet only the back of the carpet. But when, after years of labor, all is done, when the first assorted thread has found its match in the last, as cause and effect in history, then we come to form some judgment of the whole and may estimate the value of expended labor of brain and hand.

It may be our privilege to recur to the subject another time, giving some faint illustration of what can be gleaned from the material history of St. Charles, to which we have referred in these notes. Perhaps no one would be more capable of undertaking the grateful work of writing that history than the Oblate Fathers themselves. There is an obvious advantage in a number of persons engaging in such a task under the guidance of one controlling intellect. The Dominican Fathers have long ago given the example in their history of Dom Bartolomew de Martyribus,[2] one of

[1] Countess Ida Hahn-Hahn; Reisebriefe I. 102.

[2] "*La vie de Dom Barthèlemy des Martyrs* etc. Tirèe de son Histoire ècrite en Espagnol et en Portugais par cinq Auteurs dont le premier èst le Pere Louis de Grenade. Avec son esprit et ses sentiments pris de ses propres écrits." Paris, 1664.—

the most intimate friends of St. Charles. But we need hardly point to a model where we have a subject that of itself is so suggestive as this great servant of God who was "commended for the gift of discipline and understanding—eloquent, active, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving that which is good—beneficent, gentle, kind, steadfast, assured, secure, having all power, overseeing all things."[1]

THEISM AND THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE.

Walks in the Regions of Science and Faith. By Harvey Goodwin, D.D., Lord Bishop of Carlisle. Murray, 1883.

IT will have been observed by those who follow the current of popular literature, that a sharp dispute has arisen recently between two agnostic philosophers as to whether an unknowable God, an "Infinite and Eternal Energy, by which all things are created and sustained," is or is not a fitting object of religious veneration. Into the merits of that controversy, which, from the appearance in the lists of two other able combatants, has been styled a quadrangular duel, it is not our purpose to enter; but we avail ourselves of the lesson that is taught us by the fact of such a discussion being continued month after month in the pages of a widely-circulated magazine, and thus brought prominently before the public eye, to suggest to educated Catholics the desirability of acquainting themselves more and more with the solid grounds on which their faith rests, and not only their faith in revealed religion as taught by the Church, but also in natural religion, or, to use the words of the Vatican Council (in its first canon), in "one true God, of things visible and invisible the Creator and Lord." Modern sophistry calls in question the existence of such a Being, and not merely in books such as are read chiefly by thoughtful and studious men, but in miscellaneous periodicals, in ephemeral publications, that meet us at every turn, and sometimes, though more rarely, in casual conversation. It is well, then, that Christians, exposed to so many incidental dangers of this

This is in scope, of course, less pretentious than a life of St. Charles would be, owing to the more extended influence of the latter saint.

[1] Wisdom, VII.

description, should know something of the strength of their case, lest casual remarks, heard or read, should weaken their grasp on the vital truths they hold.

There are, of course, several valid arguments, such as man's natural reason can apprehend, for the being of a personal God. It is said by those who converse with the literary agnostics of the day, that they are little moved by the proofs drawn from design in creation, less so by moral considerations. Be this as it may, the recognition of God from His works in the visible universe is one that Catholics are not at liberty to disregard, as is manifest from another canon of the Vatican Council,[1] and indeed from the words of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, where those who cannot read this lesson are said to be inexcusable. It is, therefore, well worth our while to inquire whether this time-honored argument can be presented in a really cogent form. It is sometimes said that it has been overthrown by the Darwinian theory of evolution; but that is probably because the *imagination* of men, more easily affected than their reason, is excited by a plausible hypothesis, which, without denying a Creator, tends to put Him as much as possible in the background. No doctrine of evolution accounts for the first commencement of organic life, or for the laws which every particle of matter obeys.

We ought, then, to welcome any contribution that tends to strengthen our position as to design in creation, even when it proceeds from one who is a stranger to our faith; and we think a special welcome is due to an excellent little volume from the pen of Dr. Harvey Goodwin, the Anglican Bishop of Carlisle, which deals very ably with this question. It is a collection of essays, reprinted with modifications and additions, which had previously been published in magazines, or delivered in the shape of lectures. Bishop Goodwin is a great mathematician; he was second wrangler of his year at Cambridge, and has since then been mathematical examiner in the University. We mention this to show that he is no mere novice in science, but on the contrary well acquainted with at least those branches of physical science which are based upon mathematics. In a religious point of view, he writes, with some slight exceptions, almost like a Catholic; in answering the sneer of an infidel writer about the morality of certain Popes, he lets us see that his sympathies are on the right side; and his tone is invariably reverent.

He explains in his preface that his book contains "the record of wanderings through that land which belongs exclusively neither

[1] "Si quis dixerit Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quæ facta sunt naturali rationis humanæ lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit." (De Revelatione, I.).

to science nor to faith, but appertains more or less to both." And he gives a caution (which some of our newspaper controversialists might well lay to heart), that the protection of the territory of morals and religion—a protection the necessity of which he fully recognizes—"if it is to be wise, righteous and successful, must take account of the nature of the attacks made upon it, and must not expend itself in charging windmills, nor court defeat by the use of antiquated or worn-out weapons."

The essays, though not entirely disconnected, yet to a certain extent have a fragmentary character which is slightly embarrassing to one who is endeavoring to state their substance concisely and without repetition. One cannot always avoid being brought back upon the same ground. We hope, however, to be able to convey a fair idea of their purport, or at least of the more important among them. There is also another difficulty, so far as the general reader is concerned: the author in several places introduces mathematical reasoning and uses technical phraseology, intelligible only to those acquainted with that science. We shall endeavor to give a sketch of the argument employed in those passages (so far as is necessary) in popular language, and insert in notes the strict mathematical details, which are, after all, of an elementary character.

We ought to observe that the first essay has but little to do with the main purport of the book; its subject is: "The Connection between Mechanics and Geometry," and it is a modified reprint of a memoir read before the Cambridge Philosophical Society many years ago. It will well repay the attentive perusal of any one familiar with the subject, showing as it does the close relation that geometry and mechanics bear to one another, and how the same symbols are applicable to both.[1]

The essay closes with the following words, after a prediction that the elementary truths of mechanics will gradually present themselves with axiomatic clearness: "It cannot, I think, be doubted by any one who has reflected on the foundations of truth, that this is the natural course, that all demonstrations tend to merge in intuition, and that human knowledge, as it becomes more clear and is more thoroughly apprehended, converges towards that absolute intuition which is the attribute of the Divine mind."

This is followed by an essay on "The Unity of Nature; a

[1] Those readers who know the principles on which the Calculus of Quaternions is based will at once see how it illustrates this connection; a point moving with infinite velocity along two sides of a triangle (taken in their proper consecutive order), arriving at the same position and at the same moment as another point moving (also with infinite velocity), along the third side; which side is therefore said to be *equal* to the two others.

Speculation,"—which, in fact, is one of the most important in the volume.

Bishop Goodwin lays down, as an indubitable fact, that there is a certain unity pervading nature. Theists, whether Jews, Christians, or Mahometans, virtually assume the existence of it. To them "the oneness of the creating mind implies a corresponding oneness in the created work;" phenomena apparently pointing in a contrary direction are treated as the almost necessary results of the partial understanding of a complicated system.

Now, he does not propose to discuss this theological aspect of the subject, but passes on to that which is scientific and experimental; and here the presidential address delivered by Dr. Allman to the British Association in Sheffield in 1879, furnishes him with a theme. "The ground-tone of that discourse, if I rightly understand it, is the unity of the principle of physical life, whatever that principle may be. Dr. Allman traces life up from the simplest form of protoplasm to its highest exhibition in the bodily systems of mammals and men." Again, "the life of the animal and the life of the plant," Dr. Allman remarks, "are, like their protoplasm, in all essential points identical." He illustrates this by stating that plants are capable of being acted upon by anæsthetics,—and the sensitive plant, when under the influence of ether, loses its peculiar properties.

The bishop, however, feels that the real difficulty of conception is this: Suppose all this to be true, grant protoplasm as the prime form of universal life, take the hypothesis of evolution to assist you, and still you find strangely different results; there is, as he says, "an enormous difference between a squirrel and a codfish, between a dog and a cabbage;" that is to say, the real difficulty is, that there should be so much *diversity* in nature, assuming it to rest upon one all-pervading principle. He thinks this combination of unity with diversity will never admit of a complete solution. Mr. Darwin's hypotheses and investigations may be described as an attempt to solve the problem; he waives the question whether the attempt has been successful, and suggests, as his own speculation, that there may be a law from which the existing order of physical life, with all its apparent anomalies, flows as a necessary result; and the knowledge of this principle or law, if attainable, might exhibit the order of nature to us as one consistent system. There must have been what he terms a "delicate adjustment of the initial circumstances"; in other words, the phenomena of the universe, including the existence of man, are easy to account for if you suppose an intelligent First Cause, but difficult otherwise.

He illustrates this view at some length by mathematical considerations. After alluding to the story that the acute mind of

Sir Isaac Newton regarded the propositions of Euclid as necessary truths requiring no demonstration, he speculates on the extent to which the intuition of geometrical truth, as also of mechanical science, can be carried. He suggests that the law of gravitation, as we now know it, that is, the attraction of every particle of matter by every other in the inverse proportion of the square of the distance between them, may be possibly reduced hereafter to a necessary truth,—meaning, apparently, not the fact of such attraction itself, but the law that regulates it—just as some other such laws are seen to be simple mathematical results which could not be otherwise than what they are.

Continuing his mathematical speculations, the bishop endeavors to account for the anomalies that seem to present themselves in animal life, by showing that there are also in astronomy certain things strange and unaccountable if astronomy were merely a science of observation like botany or biology; that there are movements of the heavenly bodies which, to a person viewing them and judging of them *under such conditions only*, would doubtless appear to be utterly anomalous; the great difference being that we happen to know the law that regulates the orbits of the heavenly bodies, and we do not know the law which has governed the many varied phenomena of biology.

May not, he asks, certain parts of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, though apparently useless, hold a place similar to that of comets or meteoric stones, which latter are really inseparable in connection from the more orderly planets?[1]

[1] We know that if particles were projected with different velocities about a centre of force, the law of attraction being the inverse square of the distance, they would describe conic sections of one or another kind. We see in nature that the earth and other planets describe ellipses of small eccentricity, nearly circular in fact, and that comets move in orbits frequently resembling parabolas, sometimes, however, in hyperbolas; in which latter case they use only *one* branch of the curve, which, nevertheless, consists of *two* branches mathematically inseparable. We happen to be acquainted with the law to which all this is due, but if we were not so, we should regard all these bodies as *anomalous*, much as we now regard some things in biology,—the existence of noxious snakes, mischievous insects, etc. Bishop Goodwin suggests that the nipples and lacteal vessels of male animals, the rudimentary feet of certain snakes and other unused organs of sundry living things, may possibly be like "branches of a hyperbola, involved in the definition of the creature, inseparable from its existence, and yet forming no part of its active life." And soaring to still loftier heights of imagination, he suggests that, as the variety of planetary motion corresponds precisely to the variety of the locus of the equation of the second degree, some other development of natural forces may correspond in variety to the locus of the equation of the third, fourth, or higher degrees, and that we may gain from our knowledge of the complications of such curves some notion of the variety of phenomena corresponding to the same development of natural force. Again, taking another illustration from pure mathematics, he alludes to an argument drawn by Babbage (in the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise) from the *conjugate points* of certain curves, to show the relation in which miracles may stand to the ordinary course of nature. Conjugate points stand absolutely separated

The object of this reasoning is to counteract the arguments employed against design in creation by the infidel school among the evolutionists, such as, for instance, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel, who denies the existence of "purpose in nature" and of the supposed "beneficence of the Creator"; the bishop's argument cannot be quite apprehended in all its force excepting by those who are acquainted with the technical phraseology of mathematics (and it is for such readers that I have given it in fuller detail in a note); but the drift of it is to show that the seeming anomalies, which cross us in our study of natural history, might vanish if we did but know the *law* to which they owe their origin. The orbits of the heavenly bodies do not depend *only* on that law of attraction which we term gravitation, but also on the conditions under which they were first set in motion; and if these conditions had been different from what they were actually in the case of the earth, if its orbit, in fact, had been similar to that of many comets, then the earth would not have been fitted to be the home of the highest form of life; this looks like the working of design, and we may infer in a similar way the "necessity of original delicate adjustment in the process of the evolution of a highly organized creature from a protoplastic germ."

A passage from a work of the late Professor Jevons is quoted which confirms this view: "The general tendency is, I think, to suggest that neither gravitation nor evolution carries us up to the prime cause of existing nature, or renders the hypothesis of such a cause unnecessary."—(*Principles of Science*, by Professor Stanley Jevons.)

The argument of Bishop Goodwin does not proceed, as we have already intimated, in regular logical order, from chapter to chapter; nor could it under the circumstances have done so. Thus the essay following the one last mentioned, entitled "God and Nature," is partly devoted to an examination of the position a scientific

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from the curve's continuous branches, and to a mere ocular observer seem to have nothing whatever to do with them; but their coördinates satisfy the equation of the curve, and they are then shown to be truly a part of it, algebraically speaking. He proposes, therefore, to substitute the words *apparently anomalous* for miraculous in Babbage's argument, and thus to utilize it against the deniers of a Divine purpose in creation. If nature is the work of a beneficent Creator, the law expressing the action of that beneficence must be of a very complicated kind; certain anomalies may be like conjugate points, truly a part of the curve to the mathematician who knows the equation, though not to the casual observer; and these apparently useless excrescences cannot be removed without destroying the system of which they form a part. Besides which, it has been shown by an able writer that conjugate points probably belong to branches of the curve that lie *out of the plane of reference*, but *cross that plane* in these very points. We, as observers of nature, are compelled to move in one plane; but if we were free from the ordinary trammels of human experience, we might discover the "anomalies" to be parts of a continuous law.

investigator ought to hold towards God. The bishop coins the word *atheous*, in contradistinction to atheistic, to express his idea of the attitude that a student of pure mathematics or astronomy would for the moment occupy; for he concerns himself, for the time being, with results, without sounding the depths where the origin of existence is to be found, or entering into any speculative questions whatever. The phraseology he uses is not, I think, what any Catholic theologian would fully approve; but his meaning is to draw a very real and legitimate distinction; thus, in combating the views of Haeckel, who denies the moral order of the universe and the fact of a beneficent Creator, he condemns them as not merely *atheous* but *athcistic*.

On the other hand, he gives a salutary caution for the benefit of inexperienced persons who, in their zeal for theism, do not always discriminate between things which are really indications of a Divine purpose and things necessary in themselves, such as those which are the simple results of an arithmetical or mathematical law.

There is one curious point that our author mentions: some people have fancied that the moon would be much more useful if it were always at the full; and even so great an astronomer as Laplace has lent the weight of his name to some idea of this kind, and pointed out an arrangement by which the earth would have received much more light than it actually does.

It has, however, since then been shown that Laplace's arrangement would be dynamically *unstable*,—no more to be relied on than the balancing of a pin on its point; and if such an unstable system had existed, the moon might have flown off into the regions of space and the earth have been left without a satellite to give light at all.

Several of the essays contained in this little volume, though full of interest in themselves, must receive but a passing notice, because of the more important matter treated of in the other essays, and because space does not suffice to do justice to them all. This remark applies to the one on the "Philosophy of Crayfishes," which is a review of Professor Huxley's book on that subject; also to the essay on "Man's Place in Nature," which, however, well deserves attentive perusal, relating, as it does, in great measure, to the distinction that exists between the mental powers of man and those of the lower animals. Again, there is one on "Evolutism and Evolution," on which I do not propose to dwell at any great length; yet, like the rest, it is quite worthy of study; the author, while believing, in some sense, in evolution, such as that to which the geological strata with the fossils they contain bear testimony, guards himself from expressing an opinion upon it in its more extensive signification; and as to Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of "Natu-

ral Selection," he deems it "entirely inadequate to explain the facts of the case." If we consider the material universe and assume the truth of the nebular hypothesis, if we contemplate the forces in action,—light, heat, electricity,—also the order pervading the whole system, as well as the phenomena of life upon this earth, we still cannot account for the results; we cannot conceive of nebulous evolution as taking the place of the fundamental idea of a creative mind. And in the organic world we do not get life out of evolution; "life has never yet been evolved in any material substance which had not in it the element of life already." Nor can we believe that man was produced by a mere natural and necessary process without any volition. The subject is too extensive, perhaps, for treatment in so small a compass; but the essay contains a powerful protest against the atheistic notion of a blind evolution regulated by no creative power and devoid of all unity of design.

There is one production in the work before us which, we think, appeals less to our sympathies than the rest; it stands last in the volume, and is a sermon preached in Westminster Abbey on the Sunday after Mr. Darwin's funeral. There is much in it that is good and true; and, moreover, whatever we may think of Mr. Darwin's opinions, it is fair to say that he had the refinement and good taste to abstain from all direct assaults on religion; indeed, Bishop Goodwin goes so far as to say that he has "every reason to believe that such attacks had not his sympathy, but were contrary to his most solemn convictions." There is some conflict of testimony as to what Mr. Darwin's convictions or opinions on the subject of God and of religion really were; and we may gladly adopt the more favorable hypothesis; but we have always felt that there was something incongruous in the interment of the author of such a work as the *Descent of Man* in a building which is, nominally, at any rate, a Christian Church, which is hallowed by many sacred associations of the past, and in which the body of St. Edward the Confessor still rests.

To return to the more important portion of Bishop Goodwin's book: His essay on "Law, Physical and Moral," merits considerable attention. He commences by a quotation from the Duke of Argyll's *Reign of Law*, showing the different senses in which the word *law* is used, one of them being simply "an observed order of facts," though the true signification of the word is (as the Duke of Argyll holds) the expressions of a will enforcing itself by power. The ambiguous use of so important a word being injurious, the bishop, after giving what he conceives to be a better definition from Hooker, "that which doth assign unto each thing its kind, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the

same we term a law," proposes to get over the difficulty with regard to the word law by distinguishing between what he would call *objective* and *subjective* law.[1] In the one case we are concerned with orders of facts, in the other with that which lies beneath such orders. The subjective laws that lie beneath the objective may be indefinitely numerous, one depending on that immediately below it, and the objective law may be the result of several coöperating subjective laws. He illustrates this by supposing that you notice that the houses in some street are almost uniform in height and pattern, etc.; this seems to be an objective law, the order of things as you observe them; you probably, however, find that there is something else beneath, some conditions as to plan and pattern prescribed by the owner of the soil, and this may be called the subjective law; but the analogy is more complete if you take in the intermediate chain and consider the builder's contract and the architect's instructions, and so forth, as links, until, at last, you come to the volition of the owner of the ground.

On the other hand, there may be a class of facts resting on no subjective law at all, but complete in themselves. This is the case with the facts of space and number; and it may be illustrated by reference to geometrical laws such as we find proved in Euclid, as, for instance, that the tangent of a circle is at right angles to the diameter; and to arithmetical laws, such as that the sum of any two numbers multiplied into the difference between them, is equal to the difference between their respective squares.[2] These are simply objective laws. Other illustrations may be given from the higher branches of mathematics and from the fundamental propositions of mechanics.

When we come, however, to physical laws, properly so called, the case is different; we have the objective law as expressed in an observed order of facts, and the subjective law or laws that lie below it. If we take the well-known astronomical laws called Kepler's, we find that to Kepler himself they were simply objective; but in the hands of Newton they ceased to be so, and the subjective laws beneath them appeared. The first and third of these laws (for the case of the second is somewhat different) involve the law of gravitation as we now know it to exist. The question then arises, can we push our law further still? Is this law of gravitation something which, like those of space and

[1] The distinction, he says, is analogous to that between plane and physical astronomy, or between geometrical and physical optics.

[2] This is expressed algebraically by the simple expression $(a+b)(a-b)=a^2-b^2$. Take as an example the two numbers 3 and 7; their sum is 10, their difference is 4; multiply these together, and you have 40. Subtract their respective squares from one another, take 9 from 49, and the result is 40.

number, could not have been otherwise? Or does it carry us up to the expression of a Supreme Will? It may be difficult to answer these questions confidently. It is possible that the particular law by which gravity acts (the inverse square of the distance) may be hereafter proved to be a sort of physical necessity; but why need you have such a force at all? Why attraction rather than repulsion? Why need any force exist? Why need matter itself exist? If its existence is necessary it must be so "in consequence of some other law, the nature of which it puzzles the mind even to imagine." I shall return later on to this question of gravitation, which is evidently a profound mystery. But, the bishop says, "the result of this discussion, and probably of all similar discussions, is to point to a supreme will as the mainspring of all."

To illustrate the difficulty that a mere observer has in detecting the law which underlies certain arrangements if it happens that he has not the true key,—the case is supposed of a person endeavoring to find out by inspection of the calendar the law (unknown to him) by which Easter is regulated,—he might make some curious guesses,—and a chart is given in the book marked with dots following some apparent order,—but no rule could be discovered that would not eventually fail. A similar table is given of lines indicating the length each year of the Epiphany season, to which the same remark applies. And yet how simple the subjective law of Easter is, when you once know it, depending as it does on the date of the Paschal full moon (not necessarily the astronomical full moon, but an ecclesiastical and conventional one), and how complicated an order of facts flows from this simple law, in itself merely the result of an act of human volition! The inference is that if such be the case in a matter involving human will, there *may be* something similar, unknown though it be to us, that would unravel the causes of those phenomena of the material world that have been such a puzzle to the mind of man. There is one more curious point about the calendar; it was reformed by Pope Gregory XIII., and the change then made is now a part of the law of Easter. It is possible that natural laws (though from a scientific point of view we can quote no such thing) are sometimes also changed by an act of the Supreme Will?[1]

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[1] To give clearness to the conception, we may "denote these successive strata of law by a series such as the following:

$$L^0, L^1, L^2, L^3 . . . . . L^\infty .$$

In this series L^0 represents an observed order of facts and nothing more. L^1 represents a subjective law upon which L^0 depends. L^2 is a law which underlies L^1, and so on. Following this series, we may conceive of it as tending ultimately to L^∞, which would represent the volition of an infinite mind." Some writers confuse law and cause, and seem to think that when the law has been discovered and defined the whole mystery is explained, which is far from being the case.

One word may be added on the subject of moral laws, which differ from physical laws on account of the interference of other volitions, that is, of the free will of man, which disturbs the chain of consequences; still, we conclude that the basis of both is the same, and both may be resolved into the ultimate conception of an Omnipotent Will.

The essay following the last one, and having for its theme "Science, Human and Divine," is full of information as to certain modern discoveries, which however do not bear immediately on the subject before us. There are one or two things worthy of notice; as for instance Sir William Thompson's opinion, to which allusion is made, to the effect that the present state of things on the earth, with all the results to which geology bears witness, has not existed for more than about 10,000,000 years; this depends "upon considerations of heat or of energy," and if true is somewhat embarrassing to a certain important school of geologists, and not less so to evolutionists of the Darwinian type.

There is also an important remark in answer to the unwise argument of the agnostics that God cannot be known; which is met by the following forcible reply: "Grant that in a certain sense God must be unknowable, and how foolish it is to regard this admission as at all equivalent to this other assertion, that nothing can be known about God. Once more I take the analogy of physical science, and I say that matter is unknowable; but I ask whether this admission proves that no knowledge of matter is due to the discoveries of Newton." That is to say, we know little indeed of the ultimate constitution and origin of matter, but we do know something of the laws that it obeys and the attributes which belong to it.

Before going on to other subjects, we take the opportunity here of observing, that some modern writers have disputed the generally accepted doctrine that geometrical axioms and theorems, which we find, for instance, in Euclid, are *necessary truths;* and have attempted to show that they are merely the results of experience, an experience which is limited by our existing circumstances and which we presume they would say might conceivably be reversed by a more extended knowledge of nature. These imaginary difficulties, for such we hold them to be, are not touched upon in the volume we are reviewing, and it would be impossible to discuss them at length on the present occasion; those, however, who are curious on such matters may refer to Professor Cayley's Presidential address to the British Association in 1883, where some questions of this kind are skilfully sifted by a master hand.

There are some points well deserving of record in an essay on "Pessimism," which is defined to be "the doctrine of a hopeless

predominance of evil, against which it is of no use to contend; of a fundamental blunder which can only be cured by the extinction of the human race," and against such a doctrine (as held by Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and others) we must protest, though it does not necessarily involve atheism. The following hypotheses, it appears, can be held consistently with the assumption of pessimism. "I. That there is no God. II. That there is a God, who is (1) evil and therefore desiring pessimism; or (2) weak, and therefore unable to check it; or (3) good and powerful, but for some inscrutable reason permitting it." Now, the physical aspect of the universe is an irresistible argument against both atheism and pessimism; if that be so, we may dismiss the first supposition. Then taking the first head of the alternative hypothesis—the principal reply to it is that if it were true, the world would have been *purposely* made much worse than it really is. Bad as the world is, there is too much good in it to admit of "the horrible conception of a Creator who desires and designs pessimism."

Taking in the next place the second head, we come to the supposition, which was that of the late Mr. J. S. Mill, that there is a weak God unable successfully to oppose pessimism; this resembles the old doctrine of the Manicheans, and is, of course, antagonistic to monotheism, and therefore to the true conception of God as held by Christians and even by Mahometans. It leads, in fact, to polytheism, for if you have one weak God, why not more than one? Most persons will indorse the bishop's observation: "With regard to the Divine Nature, it seems to me to be true that there is no resting-place between zero and infinity." The remaining head is the doctrine (held by Christians and other theists) of a good and powerful God, permitting evil to exist for some *inscrutable* reason; and this, though it may have its difficulties, is the one satisfactory solution. We must not assume that our faculties are adequate to comprehending all the elements of the system. There are things physical that we cannot well conceive; take, for instance, the totality of material existence; "there must be a total, and, therefore, you can conceive an envelope which shall contain the universe; but what will there be outside the envelope? You cannot say. Again, think of the ether which fills all stellar space, and to the vibrations of which light is due; has it a limit? What can it be? What exists beyond? The intellect simply breaks down." Now, we may fairly speculate that the highest act of a Creator would probably be the production of a creature having an independent will. We may easily imagine that any creation not including this would fall short of what the Divine will and the Divine perfections require. But it is this introduction of an inde-

pendent will that is at the root of the evil existing in this world. Then an independent will cannot be tried without some opportunity of choosing between right and wrong, and if this be so, we see at once that any amount of evil may occur; and this may well be the key to the whole difficulty. We have given a brief sketch of the bishop's able reasoning on this point, but we forbear to enter on a full dissertation upon a subject that would require a treatise to itself.

There remains an essay on "Natural Theology," which, though not standing last in the volume, we have left till the last because we consider that the others lead up to it, and it may be more conveniently taken in this order. It is the substance of an address delivered to the "Carlisle Scientific Society and Field Naturalists' Club" in 1878, and the place where it was delivered, the city of Carlisle, suggested, not unreasonably, the name of Paley and his well-known work on this same subject as a topic for the lecturer to handle; for Paley held the office of Archdeacon of Carlisle, and appears to have resided there for several years. After defining natural theology to be the knowledge of God as it can be obtained from the knowledge of nature, and after some other preliminary observations, Bishop Goodwin introduces Paley's remarkable treatise, as he justly calls it; he admits that the work may be said to be, in a certain sense, out of date, for whole sciences have come into existence since the time when it was written. Science is more extended and more accurate; difficulties have been raised which were then unknown; and, on the other hand, some of the objections against a belief in God which were then prominent have mainly vanished and given place to others. Yet the principle of the argument is solid, and "perhaps there will never be a book more permanent in its character."

Paley's *Natural Theology* opens with the celebrated argument drawn from the supposed finding of a watch, upon the ground, by a casual traveller, presumably ignorant of watches and their mechanism; and it is shown that such a person, after a thorough examination of it, would, inevitably, draw the inference that the watch had had a maker, and "that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction and designed its use." The writer's object, then, is to prove that "the material universe, like the watch, has a purpose and had a maker;" he adduces a variety of instances and a multitude of details to demonstrate this, but his first and best instance is that of the human eye, and he takes great pains to show that it presents the same unmistakable proofs of design

on the part of a Divine Creator that the watch does of a human artificer.

A great part of Paley's arguments, however sound intrinsically and confirmatory of the faith of a man who already believes in God, cannot be used with effect against modern agnostics, who would appeal to Darwin's theory of natural selection in reply. Not that such theories were unheard of in Paley's time; in fact he expressly notices the hypothesis now known as "the survival of the fittest," which had probably reached him in some crude form, and to which he attaches no great weight. At the date when he wrote (A. D. 1802), when the doctrine of evolution was, if not unknown, almost unheeded, it was not unnatural that while expatiating on the marks of design in the organic world, he should treat astronomy as a good but subordinate topic in proving the agency of an intelligent Creator; some time previously—so we are informed in one of these essays—an outbreak of infidelity had been caused by the first reduction of the mechanism of the heavens to mathematical rules and formulæ, as was done by Laplace, a result which, to us at the present day, seems almost grotesquely absurd, accustomed, as we are, to the idea of astronomical laws acting with inflexible regularity and reducible to mathematical expressions; and it is a curious instance of what we have already mentioned—that it is the imagination rather than the reason that in the case of the generality of men is acted upon by scientific theories or discoveries.

To return, however, to the essay before us: Bishop Goodwin holds that Paley's principal instance, that of the human eye, is a forcible one. "Much progress," he says, "has been made in the science of optics since Paley's time; and in one recent book, at least, the eye is described as an instrument having defects of which a modern optician would be ashamed; nevertheless, I cannot perceive that Paley's fundamental argument is weakened."

The passage to which he alludes is from the *Popular Scientific Lectures* of Helmholtz (translated into English, 1873), and it runs as follows: "It is not too much to say that if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument which had all these defects, I should think myself quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the strongest terms, and giving him back his instrument. Of course, I shall not do this with my eyes, and shall be only too glad to keep them as long as I can—defects and all. Still the fact that, however bad they may be, I can get no others, does not at all diminish their defects, so long as I maintain the narrow but indisputable position of a critic on purely optical grounds." This quotation, however, which has a strange and unpleasant tone about it, does not give a fair impression of the very interesting lecture on "The Eye as an Optical Instrument" from which it is extracted. It is necessary

to read the whole lecture, and not to confine one's attention to extracts, that it may be properly understood and appreciated. There is nothing to show that the writer opposes the idea of design and of providence in treating of the construction of the eye; thus, he says, "the adaptation of the eye to its function is therefore most complete, and is seen in the very limits which are set to its defects. Here the result which may be reached by innumerable generations working under the Darwinian law of inheritance, *coincides with what the wisest wisdom may have devised beforehand.*" And in another place, after stating that actual examination of the performances of the eye had revealed its imperfections, he goes on to say: "But, as again in similar cases, reasonable admiration rather increases than diminishes when really important functions are more clearly understood and their object better estimated, so it may well be with our more exact knowledge of the eye." Helmholtz also explains that the defects of the eye are so counteracted, chiefly by the continual and rapid movement of the organ, that some of them were very difficult to discover, and it was only by careful observation that they were shown to exist at all; the principal one, perhaps, being that the image of an illuminated point is not accurately formed by the human eye, owing to the construction of the crystalline lens; there is an irregularity about it, as may be noticed in the rays that we see around stars and other distant lights. This is obviously a very slight inconvenience.

The bishop goes on to explain Paley's argument, and, without dwelling on the imperfections (whatever they may be) of the eye, shows what a marvellous optical instrument it is; how easily it adapts itself to the reception of a greater or less amount of light under different circumstances; how it adjusts its focus according to the greater or less distance of the object; again, how there is a wash that lubricates it; an eyelid that protects it, even as a case protects an artificial instrument; also a drain opening into the nostril to carry off the superfluous brine; and the eyebrow above, in the form of an arch, to prevent the moisture that runs down the forehead from entering. It is well worth the trouble to read Paley's reasoning *in extenso*, as also that which he founds upon the structure of the ear.

To illustrate the difficulty of believing that this world, or the whole universe, can be a mere piece of mechanism, having no moral purpose connected with it, the bishop supposes some one to visit a modern iron-clad vessel, to inspect the machinery, and the enormous guns, capable as they are of throwing shells to a considerable distance; assuming for a moment that the visitor stops there and ignores any ulterior purpose, such an expenditure of money and mechanical skill must appear to be simply wasteful ex-

travagance. On the other hand, if he is told that there is a purpose in all this, that vessels of this description can, by their movements, affect the whole policy of Europe and the interests of mankind, an entirely new light is thrown on the machinery and the guns, and the mind is satisfied. So in a similar way "we need the hypothesis of some great moral or spiritual design to justify the existence (as it were) both of the world and of ourselves."

Now all this, true though it be, is not inconsistent with the position laid down by some persons to the effect that "the being of God, regarded as a bare intellectual proposition, may be incapable of strict logical proof." . . . "There is great danger of the want of perfect logical demonstration of a positive proposition being regarded as proof that the negative of that proposition is true. No greater mistake can be made."

The bishop, after exemplifying this fallacy in the case of a recent atheistic work, illustrates his own position by alluding to the well-known difficulty, raised by some philosophers, of demonstrating the existence of an external world; also by the question as to the certainty of one's own personal existence, which has exercised the minds of some of the most profound thinkers that the world has ever seen; again, by the controversy about man's free will, a thing we all know that we possess, notwithstanding the materialistic argument to the contrary. In all these points it is evidently almost impossible to frame a demonstration so cogent as to convince a determined opponent.

Returning however to the main subject of his essay, our author says: "The great argument of natural theology is this: that look where you will, either in small things or great, whether it be the construction of a fly's foot, or the high intellect of man, or the movement of the heavenly bodies, or the universe taken in its completeness, you see everywhere the suggestion of purpose." And before concluding he thus expresses himself: "I feel convinced that by refusing to acknowledge a living creating God, we fall into a greater difficulty than any which belief in God involves."

It strikes us that this last remark of the Bishop of Carlisle is very much to the point, and may assist us greatly in summing up the case (if we may venture to use such an expression) for theism. It is not pretended that the argument can be put into that compulsory form which would *force* belief even on the most reluctant. Cardinal Newman tells us in a passage in the *Apologia* that he finds it difficult to put the proof of the existence of God into strict logical mode and figure, though his whole being is penetrated with the conviction of its truth. If it could be demonstrated like a proposition of Euclid, atheism and agnosticism would be almost

impossible amongst men of intelligence. But though this is not so, there are abundant proofs, even in the phenomena of visible creation, on which to found a belief amounting to moral certainty. We have specified the phenomena of *visible creation*, because moral considerations, and the powerful argument that may be drawn from the working of the human conscience (as done in such masterly language by Cardinal Newman in the *Grammar of Assent*) are, strictly speaking, no part of our present subject; they must not, however, be omitted if we wish to exhibit the *convergent* proof arising from various indications of the creative hand of God, no one in itself absolutely conclusive, yet strong in the cumulative force of the united whole. This reasoning is to some minds more satisfactory than anything else; it proceeds on the same principle as other inductive reasoning, upon which, in fact, so many scientific theories are based. In applying it we must bear in mind Bishop Goodwin's suggestions, which we have quoted above, that the apparent anomalies we observe in animal life (as well as in other things) may probably be explained by the existence of some law, to us unknown, or at least imperfectly apprehended. We may then be able to say that a belief in theism is the only solution of the problem of the universe, to which everything points; and that the denial of it would only land us in greater difficulties than any we now perceive. But there is another and we think most valuable method of stating the case, by selecting what may be termed *crucial* instances, where there seems to be irrefragable proof of design. Of these we will take three, which approve themselves to our own mind, though there may be many others—the human eye, the human intellect, the law of universal gravitation. They have all been touched upon in the volume before us. To begin with the human eye (and we suppose that most of what we say respecting it is applicable also to the eyes of animals)—it seems that the attempt to account for such an organ on the principle of natural selection alone involves such violent improbabilities that we may safely reject it as untenable. If Paley's opinion is less trustworthy because he wrote before the birth of Darwin, let us refer to an author who is still living and well acquainted with the advances of modern science, and, in fact, wrote with the *Origin of Species* before him: we allude to the Rev. C. Pritchard, now Professor of Astronomy at Oxford. And here we would observe that it is possible for a man to be a great biologist, well versed in all the details of natural history, and yet to know very little of certain other sciences, as, for example, of optics. Now, Professor Pritchard, in an appendix to a volume of sermons preached before the university of Cambridge and also before the British Association (*Analogies of Nature and Grace*, 1868), selects the structure of the human

eye as a critical instance of the failure of the Darwinian hypothesis. He tells us that optics is a branch of physics with which it is his lot to be most familiar, so he takes his instance from it. "From the cornea to the retina" he says "the eye is an optical instrument" (it is in fact a natural camera obscura); "but," he continues, "what an instrument! The computation of the curves and distances of the refracting surfaces in this instrument, and the assigning of the proper law of density for the several layers in its principal lens, would require the application of a mathematical analysis, such as I hesitate not to say was never yet possessed by a human geometer. The mechanism required for instantaneously changing the forms and distances, and in one instance the magnitude of its component parts, would require a handicraft such as never yet was possessed by a human mechanic." Professor Pritchard had not apparently read Helmholtz's work, which, indeed, was not published (at least in English) until the year 1873, or he would perhaps have modified his language; but we do not think he would have been at all shaken in his conclusion. He quotes Mr. Darwin's imaginary history of the formation of the eye, and points out with great force the unreasonableness of supposing that "natural selection (as this author suggests) has converted the simple apparatus of an optic nerve, merely coated with pigment and invested by transparent membranes, into an optical instrument as perfect as is possessed by any member of the great articulate class." He then takes Mr. Darwin's theory of successive improvements in the structure of the eye by *accidental* variations extending over millions on millions of years, and shows how utterly incredible it is that so complex an instrument could have been optically improved by any such process; "not less improbable, than if all the letters in the *Origin of Species* were placed in a box, and on being shaken and poured out millions on millions of times, they should at last come out together in the order in which they occur in that fascinating and, in general, highly philosophical work." Professor Pritchard, whose remarks well deserve to be quoted in *extenso* if space permitted, concludes that nothing but a *constantly exerted* intelligent will could have caused such a succession of circumstances as have resulted in the formation of the human eye.

There is, of course, considerable reason to doubt, upon astronomical grounds, as to these "millions on millions of years" which Mr. Darwin imagined to have elapsed while the eye was being gradually elaborated; but without entering upon that question, we may, we think, safely say this much: the hypothesis which regards the eye as having assumed its present form merely by the operation of natural selection is so unlikely that it may be dismissed;

and we must adopt the alternative supposition of the workmanship of a Divine Being. If this be so, the first crucial instance is a successful one.

The second is one upon which we must not here enlarge; the mental powers of man, as compared with all other creatures on earth, have been discussed fully by many learned writers, and it would be simply impossible to do justice in a small space to so great a subject; a few remarks, however, may be permitted. Now, it must always be remembered that the real question is not whether the lower animals have *any intelligence at all*, not strictly referable to instinct; but whether such intelligence as they have does or does not differ *in kind* from the intellect of man. Every one, of course, admits the enormous difference in degree; the controversy hinges upon the other and far more important distinction. As to the reality of this difference in kind, we think there is no reasonable doubt. Those who are interested in the subject should consult Professor Mivart's work on *The Cat*, in which there is a chapter bearing upon it; also an article by the same author in the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW (April, 1883), where there occurs the very forcible remark that "if animals had capacities similar to our higher mental powers, they would quickly make us unmistakably aware that such was the case." Mr. Mivart holds that the so-called intelligence of animals is but a "sensuous simulation" of true human intelligence. Indeed, there is good ground for saying that as plants in some way *simulate* the consciousness of animals, so do animals occasionally *simulate* the reasoning faculties of man. A book has been quite recently published with the strange title of *The Sagacity and Morality of Plants* (by J. E. Taylor, Ph.D., etc.). This author actually leans to the opinion that plants are possessed of some sort of consciousness. Allowance must be made for a certain amount of figurative language, but such seems to be really the view to which he inclines. He is an evolutionist of the school of Darwin, and yet apparently a theist; his book contains several statements about plants scarcely intelligible excepting on the supposition of design in nature, and the concluding paragraph expresses his conviction that "underneath and behind all are the untiring purposes of divine wisdom and love." To return, however, to animals, we must be on our guard against the numerous stories (often very foolish stories) that are published under the head of animal intelligence. In a work entitled *Ten Years Among the Wild Beasts of India* (by Sanderson), the author, who has had some experience in the matter, states that the popular belief as to the extraordinary sagacity of the elephant is wholly unfounded; moreover, that the natives of India, who know the elephant well, who catch him, train him, and make him what he

is, do not consider him to be at all exceptionally intelligent. The popular error has arisen partly from apocryphal stories, the absurdity of which he points out, and partly from the real docility and obedience of the animal, which cause him to respond to the least touch of the driver who guides him.

If, then, we are right in holding that the human mind differs altogether, and in kind, from any faculties possessed by the animals, we must conclude that that was something of the nature of a separate creation; something that evolution cannot account for, where man, such as we see him to be, first appeared on the earth. Now the advocates of natural selection admit, we think, that if you could show cases of separate creation, the inference in favor of Providential design would be irresistible. Here, then, is a case in point, and the second crucial instance is a sound one. We may mention, before quitting this subject, that there is in the September number of the *Nineteenth Century* an article by Mr. Romanes on "Instinct" from the Darwinian point of view, in which some curious examples of instinct are given, which seem almost inexplicable unless on the hypothesis of design. Mr. Romanes does not draw this inference, but his article is written with ability and moderation.

We now come to our third instance, the force of which we regard as very great indeed. We must premise that there are two things to consider, the fact of universal gravitation and the law by which it acts. And a word must be said, too, about that law before we proceed further; we are sufficiently certain that everything in the solar system, great and small, is under the well-known law already enunciated, that every particle attracts every other particle with a force that varies jointly as their masses and inversely as the square of the distance between them. But we are not equally certain that this same law holds good for the whole universe, and that all the stars are subject to it. We cannot doubt that *some* law of attraction exists even in those distant regions, and, indeed, one which insures stability, but it is not physically certain that it is the same as our own. Still, there is some good evidence to show that it is so, and the probability in favor of it is so great that, for the purpose of our present inquiry, we may safely assume it to be true, and we shall consequently make that assumption.

Now we have seen that Bishop Goodwin is half inclined to think that this law of the square of the distance may be shown hereafter to be a kind of mathematical necessity, as is the case with light, which varies in its intensity inversely as the square of the distance between the object that receives and the object that gives out the light; this, however, depends on the fact that the greater the diffusion of light, the less in exact proportion is its intensity, from whence it follows mathematically that we have the law just men-

tioned.[1] But gravity does not act in this way; it is equally powerful whether it has a large surface to deal with or a small one, and loses nothing of its intensity; it varies as the *mass* of the bodies concerned, but not either one way or the other according to the extent of their surfaces. Moreover, it requires no time to travel (as light does); it acts instantaneously, as if by a magical touch. Newton himself seems to have struggled with questions of this kind, and to have investigated the possibility of gravitation being a case of some wider law, underlying it; but he struggled in vain, and the question was never solved either by him or by subsequent thinkers. It has all the appearance of an unfathomable mystery.

Supposing, however, it should hereafter be shown to be the result of some more general law, which, as Bishop Goodwin would express it, is the *subjective* law,—that law in its turn must have something within it that involves the principle of order and stability, and so carries one back to the volition of the Creator. Mathematicians have occupied themselves in making suppositions as to the effects of imaginary laws of gravity, some of which would no doubt lead to sufficient order and regularity for the sustenance of the universe, while others would cause hopeless confusion; and the remarkable thing is that the present law, as we now know it, perfectly answers its purpose.

Indeed the case may be put more strongly; modern writers have maintained that, besides the law of attraction, there must be a subordinate one of repulsion, for otherwise the particles of matter would be dashed against each other with an *infinite* velocity, with results that we can scarcely conceive.[2] Now, if this be so, and if a repulsive force exists of *less* intensity, but sufficient to avoid such destructive collision,—surely this is the work of intelligent design, or it resembles it so closely that we cannot detect the difference. It ought, however, to be remarked that no less an authority than Sir William Thompson has, on a recent occasion, expressed a doubt as to the existence of any repulsive force in nature, and proposes to account for existing facts in another way. Be all this as it may, we can, at any rate, say that this law of gravitation, as it now stands, is one to which the whole stability of the universe is due, and which, in a word, brings order out of chaos. Only let us imagine no law of

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[1] Light may be considered as being diffused over the surface of concave spheres, the respective radii of which are the various distances from the centre whence the light emanates; then the surface of a sphere varies as the square of its radius.

[2] If the ordinary expression for attraction be taken in this shape, $m\ m' \frac{c}{r^2}$, where m and m' are the masses of the bodies, c the attraction between two bodies of unit mass at unit distance, and r the actual distance; then if $r = 0$, the attractive force becomes infinite; so it has been suggested that the true expression is $m\ m' \left(\frac{c}{r^2} - \frac{c^1}{r^2 + n}\right)$.

attraction to exist at all, neither a force of repulsion, nor a force of any kind, there would simply be no coherence, no fit abode for human or animal life, but universal reign of anarchy. And what a contrast to all this is the physical universe as we now contemplate it, under the action of this mighty law! Here, if anywhere, we must acknowledge the agency of a Creator, of a real and personal God; and if so, our third crucial instance is a successful one.

We have enlarged upon this argument because the Bishop of Carlisle has, we will not say undervalued, but slightly understated its cogency. How highly we respect his work has already been stated, and we would venture to take leave of him in the trite and well-known phrase, originally applied to a clever, bold, bad man, but more fittingly addressed to one in whom high moral and intellectual qualities are combined: "Dum talis sis, utinam noster esses."

BOOK NOTICES.

THE LIFE AND MARTYRDOM OF ST. THOMAS BECKET, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY. Second and enlarged edition. By *John Morris, Priest of the Society of Jesus.* London: Burns and Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company, 1885.

The republication of this work in a new and enlarged edition is eminently timely. St. Thomas's long-continued struggle, culminating in his martyrdom, in defence of the rights and liberties of the Church, involved the same questions and issues which now, after a lapse of seven hundred years, form the subjects of contention between the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church and the temporal rulers of nearly every Christian country. Then, as now, the Church asserted her right to be supreme within her own sphere, and free from all state interference in the administration of her own affairs. And then, too, as now, temporal rulers enforced their pretensions to supremacy over the Church, and to interference in and control over her government and administration. The enforcement of these pretensions by temporal rulers and their resistance by the Church cause her, to-day, to be persecuted in Russia and Germany and France, to be restricted and hampered in Austria, Spain, Portugal, South America, Central America, and Mexico, and have led to the Church's despoliation, the suppression of her religious orders, and the imprisonment in the Vatican of her Sovereign Pontiff.

The contention of St. Thomas of Canterbury with Henry II. of England involved precisely this issue. It was not, and it was felt and clearly understood both by St. Thomas and by the Norman tyrant that it was not, a dispute merely over Church revenues or the filling of certain vacant episcopal sees, or any other matters of detail, but a struggle in which the

latter and the former refused to concede the supremacy of temporal rulers over the Church, and its right of free action as regards its own affairs.

This is confessed even by James Anthony Froude. He endeavors to confuse the issue by representing the principle at stake as involving consequences which it does not involve; but he acknowledges that if the principle upon which the Church bases her claims to freedom and supremacy in her own sphere be true, then St. Thomas was right. His language is: "If it be true that the clergy are possessed in any real sense of supernatural powers; if 'the keys,' as they are called, have been actually granted to them; if, through them as the ordinary and appointed channel, the will of God is alone made known to mankind, Becket was right and the High Churchmen are right. . . . If, on the other hand, the clergy are but like other orders of priesthoods in other ages and countries—mere human beings set apart for peculiar functions, and tempted by the nature of those functions into fantastic notions of their own consequence—then these recurring conflicts between Church and state resolve themselves into phenomena of social evolution, the common sense of mankind exerting itself to control a groundless assumption."

The underlying thought of this is plain, though skilfully wrapped up by the specious writer in phrases adroitly adapted to conceal its naked hideousness. "*If* the clergy (of the Christian Church) are but like *other* orders of priesthoods in other ages and countries"—such as those of ancient Greece and Rome and Egypt, or of China and Hindostan, to-day—then it is right that "the common sense of mankind" should "control the *groundless* assumption."

This is the true meaning of Mr. Froude's alternative, put into plain English. *His* notion is that the claim of Christianity to being of divine origin, and to its possessing and exercising divinely-given powers and authority through its own divinely-constituted ministers, is a "*groundless* assumption," and hence that Henry II. in his day, and temporal rulers in our times, only exercise common sense in "controlling" and seeking to crush out the "fantastic notions" of the Church's priests and hierarchy.

This, too, is the underlying idea of all the efforts made to-day by temporal rulers to limit and fetter the Church, and deprive her of her rights and liberties. It has its roots and ground in a real though unexpressed disbelief in the divine origin of the Christian religion.

On this account, the life of St. Thomas of Canterbury and the history of his contentions with Henry II. have a special interest to every one who wishes to understand the real and primary reason why, in all ages, since the commencement of her existence, the Church has been involved in almost constant conflicts with temporal rulers. And, because these conflicts have increased of late years both in number and intensity, it is all the more important that this be understood.

The work before us clearly sets forth the truth we have referred to. It is strictly a biography of St. Thomas of Canterbury, and simply states the successive occasions of controversy between him and Henry II., and the issues that were involved, with but little of comment upon those issues. Yet, still, they are brought clearly and prominently, though incidentally, into view.

The first edition of the work was published in 1859. The demand for it was such that the edition was soon exhausted, and for twenty years it has been out of print. In the interval much valuable historical material, throwing fuller light upon the life and character of St. Thomas, and upon obscure and disputed facts in his life, has been discovered and

made accessible. Of these the author has industriously availed himself, and incorporated them into the present enlarged edition. Among these are six volumes which have appeared in the "Rolls' Series," entitled *Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury*, edited by the late Baron James Craigie Robertson.

The work bears evidence on its every page of most careful and painstaking study and research. Nothing is taken for granted or asserted at random. Legends are sifted thoroughly, and separated from authentic history. Disputed points are carefully examined, and the evidence for and against them impartially stated. Incidentally, yet very clearly, the lives and characters are brought into view of those of the bishops in England and France who took prominent parts in the controversy between St. Thomas and Henry II. In copious notes at the end of the volume, explanatory statements and extracts from many ancient documents elucidate the text of the work itself and add to its interest. The illustrations, showing the plan and structure of the Cathedral at Canterbury, both before and after the saint's martyrdom and canonization, add to the value of the book.

To those who look at the subject superficially, it may seem that St. Thomas, in giving his life for the rights and liberty of the Church in England, died in vain. But it is not so. True, Henry II., false to the promises he made to prevent his own excommunication and the placing of England under a Papal interdict, and false as well to his short-lived contrition and penitence—perhaps at the time sincere, and perhaps entirely insincere—renewed his tyranny over the Church, and his successors followed his example in various ways, and with different degrees of audacity. Yet, still, St. Thomas, by his life and death, delayed for four centuries, till the time of Henry VIII., the day when the king of England would dare to assert in unqualified terms his pretended spiritual and temporal supremacy.

By this long delay, the act was, when it was consummated, indelibly stamped by historical evidence, as well as by the principles of religion and sound reason, with the plain marks of usurpation and tyranny.

The Life of St. Charles Borromeo, Cardinal Archbishop of Milan. From the Italian of John Peter Giussano, Priest and Oblate of St. Ambrose. With Preface by Henry Edward Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminster. In two volumes. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1884.

John Peter Giussano, the author of this Life of St. Charles Borromeo, was closely associated with the Saint for twenty-one years. At the age of nineteen, after a course of study, he took the degree of Doctor of Medicine. This profession he followed only a few years, when he devoted himself to the office of the sacred ministry. He was received by St. Charles into his immediate household, and became Priest and Oblate of St. Ambrose. On the death of the Saint, he retired to Monza to write this work, being appointed a conservator of the Ambrosian library. He died at Monza in 1623.

Thus Giussano had ample opportunities for acquainting himself accurately not only with the events of St. Charles's life, his labors, and their results, but also with his private personal habits and character. His work is thus both a biography and a history. The text of Giussano's work is supplemented in the translation before us by notes taken from addi-

tions made to it by Bartholomew De Rossi, of the Congregation of Oblates, in 1751. The translation was made by the Oblates in the diocese of Westminster, and was published in England a short time before the Tercentenary of St. Charles's death.

The work is made more convenient for reference by a very full table of contents and a minute chronological table of all the important acts of Saint Charles, in the order of their occurrence, month by month and day by day. His Eminence Cardinal Manning has contributed a very valuable Preface, describing the special work which St Charles did, particularly in his relation to the Sovereign Pontiffs of the Church, to the reforms inaugurated by the Council of Trent, and his influence in giving effect to the decrees of that Council, and incorporating them permanently into the life and action of the Church. Without a knowledge of what St. Charles did in these respects, it would be impossible to clearly understand the interior history of that great Council, or the way in which, after many interruptions, sometimes for months and sometimes for years, it was re-assembled in January, 1562, and closed in December, 1563. Appointed a member of the Sacred College in 1560, at the age of twenty-two, and made Secretary of State by Pius IV., the Sovereign Pontiff consulted him on all important affairs, and the whole guidance of the Council of Trent by the Holy See passed through his hands. In an archivium fitted up for the purpose at his residence, all the documents and correspondence of the Council were deposited and carefully preserved. The couriers who brought letters from Trent were admitted at any moment day or night, and he gave strict orders that he should be immediately awakened up if they arrived when he was asleep in the night. When it is remembered that the proposition of all matters to be discussed in an Œcumenical Council belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff of the Church, and that no new matter can be introduced and none withdrawn without his authority, it becomes obvious how close an oversight this implies.

Indeed it was chiefly through the advice and influence of St. Charles that, despite formidable obstacles, the Council was re-opened for the last time; and it was his firm and vigilant will that pressed it to its conclusion, so that no accident, such as the death of Pius IV., of which at one period of the sessions of the Council there seemed to be serious danger, might prevent the confirmation of its decrees, and thus the fruit of all its labors might be lost.

Immediately upon the termination of the Council, which was quickly followed by the confirmation of its action by Pius IV., St. Charles put forth all his energies to secure the execution of its holy decrees. He classified them according to subjects, and studied their minutest details. In the first Consistory held after the return of the Apostolic Legates from Trent, he proposed that a Congregation of eight Cardinals should be formed for the purpose of deciding upon controversies that might arise in the interpretation of the decrees. This Congregation was soon afterwards appointed by Pius IV. He also obtained from the Holy Father various provisions and constitutions concerning the residence of Bishops and Archbishops in their Sees, and of Canons and other ecclesiastics in their proper fields of labor, and had the time fixed for commencing to carry the decrees and constitutions into execution. He presided over the compilation of the "Catechism of the Council of Trent," and the revision of the Roman Breviary and Missal.

But while St. Charles was thus abundant in labors at Rome for the reformation of abuses in the entire Church and its edification, he was

constantly mindful of his immediate episcopal flock. When he was consecrated Archbishop of Milan, in 1563, no one of its Prelates, for eighty years previous, had resided in his See; but in spite of all efforts to detain him at Rome, St. Charles was resolved to live in the midst of his flock. Accordingly, within less than two years afterwards, having concluded his work at Rome, he obtained by his importunities from Pius IV., who reluctantly consented to part with him, permission to proceed to Milan. There for nineteen years he wore out his life amongst his people, never leaving the city, except on short visits to Rome or to make visitations of different places over which his jurisdiction extended. The record of his Episcopate, as found in the *Acta Ecclesiæ Mediolanensis*, is a model of diocesan legislation. They consist of the decrees of six Provinicial Councils and eleven Diocesan Synods held by St. Charles; of the rules and constitutions of various confraternities of devotion, and especially of the Oblates of St. Ambrose, Patron of the Church of Milan. Cardinal Manning in his admirable preface says: "There is no part of a bishop's diocesan administration which is not to be found in these Acts reduced to the most precise order and system. . . . . It is a whole of great proportions, complete in outline and finished in the minutest details. Next to the collection of the Œcumenical Councils, there is no work of ecclesiastical and spiritual legislation so perfect as the Acts of the Church of Milan. In them the Council of Trent is to be seen translated into provincial and diocesan administration for the reform of all orders of the Church."

St. Charles was one of the three men who, by Divine Providence, were the chief leaders in the Church's special work in the sixteenth century. They were warm friends. Possessed of very different gifts and inspirations, and working with great diversity of operations, they yet were of one will and labored with perfect unanimity of purpose for the one great end. To St. Ignatius was given the work of combating the intellectual errors and heresies engendered by Protestantism, and of adapting the way of life of the regular orders of the Church to the needs of the modern world. To St. Philip was given the work of recalling Rome from worldliness and the fascinations of a revived heathenism. To St. Charles was committed the office of raising the Priesthood from the condition into which it had fallen, and restoring it to the state of perfection in which its Divine Founder had created it and left it.

Each of these Saints shines in the Church of Christ with a lustre different from the others. They each represent different aspects or perfections of Him who is the sum of all perfections. St. Charles Borromeo represents the Good Shepherd. He is peculiarly the Saint of the Episcopate and the Priesthood; the Saint for bishops and the clergy to study and imitate.

The volumes before us clearly exhibit this. They contain full details of the manner in which he carried on the work of a shepherd of souls; his methods for reforming the clergy, and for raising them to a higher degree of perfection; his being the first to set an example of executing the decrees of the Council of Trent with regard to establishing diocesan theological seminaries, and training in knowledge and virtue candidates for the sacred office of the priesthood; the manner in which he regulated his own episcopal household, and in which he vigilantly acquainted himself with the character and habits, the competency and degree of faithfulness of every priest in his vast diocese; his abounding charity, austerities, and self-mortification; his holy life and happy death; his beatification and canonization.

THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT REV. JOHN ENGLAND, Bishop of Charleston, S. C. With Memoir, Memorials, Notes, and Full Index. By *Hugh P. McElrone.* In two volumes. Vol. I. Baltimore: The Baltimore Publishing Company.

The collecting and republishing of the most important writings of Bishop England was a happy and timely thought. The previous editions have long ago been exhausted. Nor was it desirable to reprint them in the form in which they issued from the press. They contained much matter, some from the pen of Bishop England, and some too from the pens of others, that was then undoubtedly interesting from its relation to circumstances then still existing, or still clearly remembered. But those circumstances have now entirely passed away, and are forgotten except by a very few. The papers of Bishop England on those subjects, therefore, and the copious references to them in papers from other pens included in the previous editions of Bishop England's works, are properly omitted in the present collection.

Yet many of his writings are of great and permanent value. He was learned, eloquent, acute and strictly logical. In controversy he had no superior and perhaps no equal—unless it be Archbishop Hughes—among the Prelates of the Church in the United States, who are now living, or who have forever ceased from their labors. His zeal for the interests of religion, his personal piety, devotion, humility, self-mortification and abundance of labors in the discharge of the duties of his exalted office, were even greater than his natural gifts and his acquirements by study. He was a perfect and polished Christian gentleman. By his urbanity and geniality, his evident consideration for others, his abounding charity, he won all hearts, even of those who were bitterly opposed to the Catholic religion, and exerted an influence for good upon public opinion in the Carolinas and Georgia, all of which were then included in his diocese, that is felt to this day. He understood perfectly the value of the press as an auxiliary in the defence of truth. He established the *United States Catholic Miscellany*, which was practically the first Catholic journal established in the United States. But, recognizing the fact that through it he could hope to reach, at most, only a few Protestants, he had recourse also to the secular press. In it articles from his pen constantly appeared, correcting misrepresentations of Catholic doctrines and practice, refuting fallacious arguments against the Catholic religion, castigating malicious enemies of the Church, and defending the truth. It was no easy matter for him to gain admission to the columns of the secular press. At first it refused to publish his letters as communications. He persevered, and had them inserted as advertisements, for which he paid the regular price. At last, however, the secular press, recognizing the avidity with which the public read whatever emanated from his pen, opened their columns to him. He was "a born" controvertist, fitted for it by natural gifts; and those gifts were developed by educational training and assiduous study. Yet the controversies in which he engaged were not needless, nor the outcome of a naturally combative disposition. There was an earnest practical purpose in them; and he engaged in them from no mere fondness for disputation, but from a desire to dispel error, to extend knowledge of the truth, and to promote the greater glory of God.

Hence, even his controversial writings have a positive value, independent of the time and circumstances that elicited them. But Bishop England has left many other writings besides those of a controversial character. His fruitful cultured mind was ever active, and employed itself on a variety of subjects, literary, historical and theological; and it

may be said of him without the least exaggeration that he touched upon nothing that he did not elucidate.

The volume before us well illustrates this. His address on *Epochs of Irish History* has a solid historical value, while his paper on the *Irish Franchise* may be studied with profit by those who desire to thoroughly understand the political state of Ireland to-day. The *Pleasures of the Scholar*, *Classical Education*, the *Descent of Æneas into Hell*, are productions of a thoroughly cultured and scholarly mind, and will be read with pleasure by all who appreciate those qualities. His discourse on *Duelling* is a convincing argument against that barbarous and senseless practice, and tended greatly to influence public opinion in the right direction. His address on the *Character of Washington* and his *Discourse before Congress* were, each of them, masterly disquisitions on the subjects which they respectively treated. The *Pen-Pictures of Rome* are graphic descriptions of the chief objects of interest the Capital of the Christian world presents to the observing Christian visitor. The *Waldenses*, *Historical Sketches* of Denmark, Sweden, Russia, European Turkey, and the Greek Schism are models of concise, lucid, historical articles. *St. Peter's Roman Pontificate* is a complete exhibit of the historical proof that St. Peter was the first Bishop of Rome and suffered martyrdom there.

These papers make up the first volume. The second, we presume, will contain the writings of Bishop England that are of a more strictly theological character, and will be of even higher value, though not of greater interest, than those which the first volume contains.

Prefixed to the first volume is a memoir by the editor. It is concise, and delineates the character of the deceased prelate in strong lines. Yet we regret that the writer has not incorporated into it copious extracts from the "Memoir of Bishop England" written by his successor in office, Bishop Reynolds. This, if not necessary to the completeness of the editor's sketch, would, at least, have given it greater fulness of detail. It would also have placed Bishop England more clearly before the reader's mind, in his relation to the Church in this country and the work which he did in building it up, almost creating it, we may say, in the region over which his labors as a Bishop and Christian missionary extended.

REGISTER OF FORT DU QUESNE; Translated from the French, with an Introductory Essay and Notes. By *Rev. A. A. Lambing, A.M.*, author of "A History of the Catholic Church in the Dioceses of Pittsburgh and Allegheny," etc., President of the Ohio Valley Catholic Historical Society. 4to, 97 pp. Pittsburgh, Pa. 1885.

Pittsburgh, grimy beneath the murky cloud always settling above it, with the din of anvil and the glare of furnace, gives not the faintest clue of French origin, suggests in nothing the gay, light-hearted, adventurous sons of Gaul. Yet, its earliest civilized record, dated beyond the day when it received its present name in honor of an English statesman, attests that it once owed allegiance to France, and was a shrine of Catholicity. It was a bold and decisive step to seize the point where the northern and southern streams united to form the Beautiful River; and it was held so brilliantly and gloriously as to make Fort Du Quesne one of the most interesting points in colonial history. Where the French monarch planted a military post, he reared a chapel and maintained a chaplain, generally a priest of the Recollect or reformed branch of the Franciscan Order. The registers kept at such posts have in many cases been preserved, and that where the friars who sang mass in the chapel

of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin on the Beautiful River is preserved to this day in the prothonotary's office, Montreal. From a copy which he had made for the illustrious Bishop Michael O'Connor of Pittsburgh, Mr. Shea printed a hundred copies of this early record in a quaint series, antique in form and type, which he issued for amateurs. Scholars received it with interest, as it led to new and more accurate knowledge of the French commander and officers who with a few gallant men routed Braddock's well appointed force. Rev. Mr. Lambing, successor in a measure of the French Franciscans who ministered at the point, is filled with true and reverent antiquarian taste. His church revives the memory of the early chapel of the Assumption, and he has written the history of the two dioceses which, in our time, have grown up in Western Pennsylvania, and founding an Historical Society, over which he presides, seeks to perpetuate his own antiquarian spirit and taste, and imbue others with a love for recording and preserving the early annals of the struggles of the pioneers of the Faith. In the same spirit he has issued, in a very well printed quarto, an edition *de luxe* of the *Register of Fort Du Quesne*, reproducing the French, and giving, what was by no means an easy task, a correct rendering into English, and notes in which his local knowledge enables him to afford the student valuable aid. The notes show extensive research, and cover a multitude of topics, on some of which, like his adopting the old story of La Salle's descending the Ohio, cautious scholars will be reluctant to follow him. These are but slight points. The *Register*, in its attractive shape, is now made accessible and intelligible to all, and takes us back vividly to the French post where the chaplain, looking on the unbroken forest, said his mass, confessed officers and men going forth to battle, and gave Christian burial to those who fell fighting nobly for their king and country. There was no village of French settlers, no farms of men who had held the plough in Canada or France, with mothers bringing children to the sacred font; yet, Father Baron records baptisms of some children born in the fort, of Indians at the point of death, of white children carried off by Indians from the English frontiers. The most interesting entries are those of Daniel Lienard de Beaujeu, who commanded the fort, and set out to engage Braddock, falling gloriously in the hour of victory, and of Lieutenant Carqueville, Ensign La Pérade, Cadets Sennonville and Hertel, who all met their death on that famous field.

THE MIRACULOUS EPISODES OF LOURDES. By *Henry Lassere*. Continuation and Second volume of "Our Lady of Lourdes." Translated from the Seventeenth Edition with the express permission of the author, by *M. E. Martin*. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. 1884.

This book is a continuation of the one written fourteen years before by Henri Lasserre. The first work gave an account of the apparition of the Blessed Virgin to Bernadette Soubirous, at Lourdes, of the spring that was there miraculously opened in the solid rock floor of a dry cavern, and of miraculous cures wrought through employment of its water and devout invocation of the Blessed Virgin. The work, of which an English translation is now before us, is a continuation of the history of the wonderful work of God there performed.

Since then the miraculous cures of all manner of diseases and physical infirmities, wrought at Lourdes, and elsewhere by the use of its water, have multiplied, until it has become a shrine to which pious pilgrimages are made from every land.

The volume before us recounts a number of these miraculous cures.

It recounts them, too, not in a hurried or superficial manner, but gathers all the facts connected with them, all the threads of testimony which converge upon the miraculous event, and weaves them into a body of irrefragable proof.

The writer's motives for writing this sequel to his first work on the subject—written after an interval of fifteen years, during which he has watched and studied the continual series of miracles at Lourdes—and his plan are stated in his preface.

"It is not our intention," he says, "to offer to our readers, in a compact series of short accounts, a hurried narrative of each and all of the innumerable miracles that have been accomplished at Lourdes. We think, and we have always thought, that such accumulations of superficial facts can only produce a superficial effect on those who read them. . . . . To examine the supernatural event on all sides, and in all its details; consider its course; study its causes and its most distant preparations; penetrate, so to speak, to its very essence; determine its real character; and bring its chief features into relief:—such is . . . . . what we have tried to do."

The miracles, of which the writer gives a full and detailed account, and a history of all important preceding and subsequent circumstances connected with them, were accomplished in the healing of persons whose infirmities were pronounced incurable by natural means, by the most eminent medical authorities in France. In each case recounted, the miraculous cure was wrought upon a person so well known that the knowledge both of the affliction and of the cure was wide-spread.

The latter part of the work is occupied with a fuller account than was given in his previous work of the writer's own miraculous cure. His first account was confined to a bare statement of the case as connected with himself. The recital contained in the volume before us gives the names of those whom God made the chief instruments to induce him, contrary to his own intentions, to employ the water of Lourdes. Prominent among them, the first to advise and most persistent in urging recourse to the water of the miraculous spring, and also his amanuensis in writing the letter addressed to Mgr. Peyramale, Curé of Lourdes, requesting a package of the water to be sent to Henri Lassere, was *M. Charles de Freycinet*, Lasserre's intimate friend, then director of works on the Southern Railway of France, and subsequently carried by the revolutionary storm to the highest offices of the French Government; first as Minister of War, then of Public Works, then of Foreign Affairs, and then President of the Council.

In an appendix, photograph copies of letters—M. de Freycinet's among them—and other evidences of the miracles are furnished.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST. Translated by various Oriental scholars and edited by *Max Müller*. Vols. XX and XXI. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1884.

The first mentioned of these volumes contains translations by Max Müller of seven of the oldest and most important of the Upanishads of the Vedic philosophy, viz.: The KATHA, MUNDAKA, TAITTIRIYAKA, BRIHADARANYAKA, SVETASVATARA, PRASNA, and the MAITRAYANA-BRAMANA. The second contains the SADDHARMA-PUNDARIKA, or "the Lotus of the True Law," translated by H. Stern.

The enthusiastic industry with which oriental scholars prosecute their studies of ancient Hindoo literature is not at all surprising. They find themselves in a world of ideas entirely different in its forms of thought,

its philosophy and logic from those which European nations have appropriated from the Latins and Greeks. And the farther they go back, the more elevated and purer, the more closely approaching the truths of Christian revelation, they find those ancient Sanskrit writings are. In those which bear evidences of the most remote antiquity, the ideas of God are purely those of monotheism, and not of monotheism in a pantheistic sense, as many modern skeptics now use the word, but of Christian monotheism.

Max Müller and other skeptical orientalists contend that these ideas were arrived at by a system of gradual development or evolution; that at first the notions of deity were crude and low, but that gradually, by eliminating the grosser elements, they became more refined and elevated. The simple fact, however, that the oldest remains of ancient Hindoo literature are incontestably the purest and most sublime, completely overturns this rationalistic theory. The steps can be clearly traced of a process not of advancement and elevation in the Hindoo mind, in the lapse of ages, but of retrogradation and debasement. First there was belief in the one God, supreme, uncreated, self-existent, the Creator and Preserver of the Universe. Then this belief gave way to a vague and broad pantheism, and that by gradual corruption was supplanted at last by atheism and the doctrine of total annihilation, or, as it is called, *nirvana*.

The study, therefore, of the ancient Hindoo theology and philosophy is important, as furnishing incontestable evidence of the existence of a primitive revelation to man in the earliest ages, a revelation which embraced the same fundamental ideas of God which Christianity has again made known; and as showing how men, from worshipping the one true God, fell first into worshipping His works in the natural world, then into gross idolatry and atheism.

Thus Max Müller and his co-laborers are doing a work of high importance in furnishing the means for a more general and accurate knowledge of the most ancient literature extant, and, contrary to their own intentions, or, at least, their own theories, are furnishing Christian philosophers with proofs and arguments to overthrow the popular doctrine of man's starting in existence as an ignorant brutal savage, devoid of all ideas of deity, and gradually developing or creating those ideas for himself.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH, FROM ITS FIRST ESTABLISHMENT TO OUR OWN TIMES. Designed for the Use of Ecclesiastical Seminaries and Colleges. By *Rev. F. A. Birkhauser*, Professor of Church History and Canon Law in the Provincial Seminary of St. Francis de Sales, near Milwaukee, Wis. New York: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1884.

There is manifest need of a good English text-book on Church history for the use of students in colleges and theological seminaries. Such a text-book, however, it is not easy to prepare. On the one hand, there is the danger of making it too lengthy and voluminous, and on the other that of excluding important matter, and obscuring the significance of important events in their relation and consequences, by too great condensation and conciseness. Most of our present English histories of the Church are either for popular use, and, therefore, to some extent, superficial, or else are too extensive to be used as text-books.

Judging from the volume before us, the undertaking of Prof. Birkhauser promises to be fairly successful in striking the happy medium. In the course of 252 pages he has given a reasonably clear and sufficiently full exhibit, for the use of students, of the leading events and

movements of the period intervening between the nativity of our Blessed Redeemer and the year A.D. 313.

This period in the history of the Church, it seems to us, is insufficiently studied, and, we were going to say, too lightly passed over in many of our theological seminaries. It was a period when the Church was in the formative process of her external organization; and was intensely active not only in diffusing the faith, but also in resisting both the external opposition of heathenism in its efforts to oppose her progress, and in combating the outcroppings of heathen errors among her own members, in the form of false philosophy and subtile heretical opinions.

The careful study, therefore, of that period, cannot be prosecuted too earnestly. For "there were giants in those days"—giants among the leaders of the Gnostic and other heretical sects, who sought to corrupt the Faith, and giants among the Christian Fathers who, with equal learning and intellectual gifts sharpened and developed by the Faith itself, opposed those heretical leaders. The fundamental ideas and principles of all modern heresies are found in the false opinions of heathen and heretical sophists of those early ages of the Church. A study, therefore, of the refutations of those errors by the early Christian writers cannot well fail to arm our college and theological students with answers to all the heresies, scientific and philosophical, of modern times.

THE VIRGIN MOTHER OF GOOD COUNSEL. A History of the Ancient Sanctuary of Our Lady of Good Counsel in Gennazano, and of the Wonderful Apparition and Miraculous Translation of her Sacred Image from Scutari in Albania to Gennazano in 1467. With an Appendix on the Miraculous Crucifix, San Pio, Roman Ecclesiastical Education, etc. By *Monsignor George F. Dillon, D.D.*, Missionary Apostolic. Rome: Printed at the Offices of the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda Fide. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. 1884.

Among the many beautiful devotions to Mary, the Immaculate Mother of God, there is one that has very long been practiced in Italy, and which has spread into different regions of Continental Europe, but as yet has not made much progress in English-speaking countries. It is the devotion to "Our Lady of Good Counsel." The volume before us has been prepared for the purpose of making this devotion more fully known and propagating its observance. In the prosecution of this design the author has carefully traced the history of the venerable shrine at Gennazano in Italy, and of the miraculous picture of which it has been for four centuries the resting place. In order to make this clearer and to elucidate the reasons on which this special devotion is based, he has also described the physical features of the locality, the magnificent scenery with which it is surrounded, and its previous history both in Christian and in antecedent pagan times. He also recounts the evidence of the existence of the sacred picture in Scutari, Albania, on the other side of the Adriatic Sea, previous to its miraculous translation to Gennazano.

Thus the scope of the work has been extended so that it embraces a very large amount of valuable information respecting the special history of famous localities in Italy, in both Christian and pagan times, its shrines and churches, the habits and sentiments of the people, the extent of their devotion, their firmness of faith, etc.

The work is written in charming style, narrative rather than didactic, and cannot fail to interest those who read it.

CATHOLIC BELIEF, or a Short and Simple Exposition of Catholic Doctrine. By the *Very Rev. Joseph Faá Di Bruno, D.D.*, Rector-General of the Pious Society of Missions, Church of SSmo Salvatore, in Orda, Ponte Sisto, Rome, and St. Peter's Italian Church, Hatton Garden, London. Fifth Edition. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Catholic Publication Society.

CATHOLIC BELIEF, etc. (same work as above). Author's American Edition, edited by *Rev. Louis A. Lambert*, author of *Notes on Ingersoll*, etc. Fifteenth Edition. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers.

These are two different editions of the same work, severally brought out by the publishing houses named above. The latter, as we learn from the introduction to it, by the Right Rev. S. V. Ryan, D.D., Bishop of Buffalo, has been "revised and accommodated to the wants of our country."

The motive of the work is explained by the author as having its ground in his thirty years' experience as a missionary priest in England. In the course of his long-continued labors in that capacity, he found that nearly all the objections so often repeated against the faith and practice of the Roman Catholic Church, come from misunderstanding the true teaching of our holy religion. Influenced by this conviction, he set himself to the work of preparing an exposition of the Catholic faith, in which the doctrines of the Church are concisely and plainly expressed, and the common objections to them are answered. In the performance of his work, the author has aimed at simplicity and plainness, and has succeeded admirably well. He has avoided using technical expressions and language that might give even seemingly just cause of offence to any one. Yet, at the same time, he has never compromised or disguised the truth.

This book evinces rare ability and tact in "setting forth Catholic principles in few words, and with winning simplicity, yet at the same time with scholastic accuracy." It is pervaded, too, by a spirit of the warmest charity. While lucidly explaining and logically proving all the chief doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church, it is entirely free from polemical acerbity. It shows a delicate consideration and a just appreciation of the difficulties, intellectual, social, and moral, which converts to the faith must encounter and overcome, and endeavors, in the kindest manner, to remove misconceptions and deep-rooted prejudices from the minds of persons who are otherwise well-disposed, by instructing and edifying them, and thus leading them to the truth.

Another admirable feature of the book is, that the learned and able author, though thoroughly familiar with the principles, arguments, and facts involved in the subjects discussed, does not rely entirely on them. He fully realizes that the salvation of souls is the work of God. Hence he treats also of grace and the means of obtaining it, and the spirit of prayer pervades his whole work. Indeed, the latter part of his book is specially devoted to this subject.

The work is well calculated to benefit every one who reads it. Catholics will acquire clearer knowledge and deeper love for their holy faith. Protestants will have their misconceptions dispelled and their anti-Catholic prejudices softened and removed.

THE ROMAN HYMNAL. A Complete Manual of English Hymns and Latin Chants for the use of congregations, schools, colleges, and choirs. Compiled and arranged by *Rev. J. B. Young, S.J.*, choir master of St. Francis Xavier's Church, New York. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati.

One of the chief difficulties in the way of congregational singing is the scarcity of English hymns suited to large numbers of voices and in-

tended for use in the Church. Attention seems of late to be earnestly directed to this fact, and very praiseworthy efforts have been made by several different compilers to supply the deficiency. Among these the author of the work before us seems to us to have been one of the most successful. Without in the least detracting from the merits of other publications having the same or a kindred object in view, we think that the work before us will aid largely in supplying the deficiency already referred to.

The compiler has very properly drawn largely upon the grand old hymns of Catholic ages, which are full of devotion, and impress themselves on the mind as well by their own interior spirit as by the pious associations which are inseparably connected with them. He has supplemented them with a careful selection of the best modern English Catholic hymns diligently gathered from various sources.

His work, therefore, if not complete, is certainly very full and comprehensive, and carefully discriminating. It contains the melodies and words of 194 English and Latin hymns, all the music of the Gradual and the Vespers for every Sunday and holyday in the year, with the Psalms written out under the music of all tones and endings; and also a number of choice prayers and meditations.

Additional value is given to the work by its first pages being occupied with matter which adapts it to use as a Manual of Devotion; consisting of Morning and Evening Prayers, Devotions for Mass, Manner of Serving Mass, Devotions for Confession, Prayers before Communion, Prayers after Communion, Prayers for Various Occasions, Pious Reflections and Meditations for every day of the Month, the Little Office of the Immaculate Conception, and the Little Office of the Holy Angels.

CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN UNBELIEF. A Plain and Brief Statement of the Real Doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, as Opposed to those Falsely Attributed to her by Christians who Reject her Authority, and by Unbelievers in Revelation. By the *Right Rev. J. D. Ricards, D.D.*, Bishop of Retimo, and Vicar Apostolic of the Eastern Vicariate of the Cape Colony. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers, Printers to the Apostolic See. 1884.

It seems rather strange that a book which deals with fiercely debated questions in Europe and America, and treats them, too, with far more than ordinary ability, and far more than ordinary insight into the interior meaning of those questions and their practical consequences, should come to us from South Africa, written by a missionary bishop, whose time is necessarily occupied with the duties of his office. It reminds us of a pen-picture we once read, describing the followers of St. Benedict in ancient times. Secluded from men, taking no part in their pursuits, their plans, and their conflicts, they looked down from their mountain top upon the world beneath them and understood, better than the active participants themselves, the motives and causes, the results and consequences of all their movements. So it seems to us with the author of this work. A bishop, engrossed in missionary labors, in a country only partly civilized, separated from the civilized world by a dreary waste of waters and a distance compared with which that of Europe from us is short, he yet finds time to write a book which exhibits a familiarity that is extraordinary with the questions around which, to-day, in Europe and America, the hottest polemical contests are waged. He is as well acquainted as a resident of France, or Germany, or England, or of the United States, with the various forms disbelief assumes in all those countries; their fallacies, their self-contradictions, and their irreconcilable hostility to Christianity.

In refuting these various forms of unbelief the author casts his statements and arguments in popular form and style, discarding all resort to metaphysical technicalities. Yet, at the same time, he states the objections of infidels to the doctrines of Christianity with precision and clearness; and the answers to these objections, though discursive and popular in form, are strictly logical, direct, and conclusive.

The work immediately on its publication obtained the warm commendations of the South African press, and on its reception in England it at once elicited favorable critical notices. We warmly commend it as both useful and interesting to all who desire to acquaint themselves with conclusive answers to the current infidelity of our country and times.

REASONS WHY WE SHOULD BELIEVE IN GOD, LOVE GOD, AND OBEY GOD. By *Peter H. Burnett*, Author of "The Path that Led a Protestant Lawyer to the Catholic Church," and "Recollections and Opinions of an Old Pioneer." New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1884.

In the first part of this work the author brings forward the evidences of the existence of God that are furnished by the natural world, and points to the proofs of divine purpose that are found in the structure of various plants and animals. He then answers various objections to the line of argument he adopts.

In the second part of the work the subject of Evolution is discussed and with much fulness of detail. The theory of Natural Selection is examined and the gratuitous character of many of its assumed premises—as well as the inconsequence of its conclusions—are pointed out. It is shown that many of its alleged facts are unproved, and that others lead to conclusions just the opposite of those which evolutionists deduce from them. Numerous citations, too, are made from naturalists of the evolutionary school, showing that they are at direct variance with each other, as regards their premises in some cases, and that in others, where they agree upon common premises, they differ as regards the conclusions to be deduced from them.

In the third part of his work the author considers and exhibits the evidences furnished by the Old Testament Dispensation of God's existence and of His having revealed Himself. In distinct chapters the Mosaic Record of Creation, the giving of the Divine Law through Moses and the Pentateuch, are examined, and the evidences, both internal and external, to their having been inspired, are adduced. Various objections of infidels and rationalists are then taken up seriatim and refuted.

In the fourth and last part of the work the external and internal evidences of the divine origin of the Christian religion are exhibited under several different heads, and the leading objections are separately considered and their falsity exposed.

ANNUS SANCTUS: Hymns of the Church for the Ecclesiastical year. Translated from the Sacred Offices by various authors, with modern, original and other hymns and an Appendix of Earlier Versions. Selected and arranged by Orby Shipley, M.A. Volume I., Seasons of the Church; Canonical Hours; and Hymns on Our Lord. London and New York: Burns & Oates. 1884.

The compiler of this work says in his preface, that two main objects are proposed to be promoted by its publication. One of these is devotional; the other is literary. *Annus Sanctus* is intended, in the first place, to be used as a book for spiritual reading, the contents of which

have been compiled from the sacred Offices, or authorized sources, and arranged according to the sequence of the seasons of the Church. It is intended, in the second place, to be "made a store-house for the ingathering and preservation of much valuable hymnological labor, which, from the lapse of time, is in danger of being forgotten, and, from the decay of books, of being entirely lost."

At the same time other important objects are incidentally yet effectively promoted. The work is a valuable contribution towards the study of English Catholic hymnology. It is a collection, and is intended to be a very complete collection, of the efforts of English Catholics in this direction, so as to furnish the materials whence could be drawn the component parts of a Catholic hymn-book of the future.

The hymns in the volume before us are confined to general hymns for the seasons of the Church and their subdivisions, to a selection of hymns for the Canonical Hours, and to hymns specially addressed to our Divine Lord. The materials from which *Annus Sanctus* has been compiled consist, first, of hymns which are already well known and highly prized by English Catholics; secondly, comparatively recent hymns that are little known; and thirdly, earlier hymns that, once popular and widely used, are almost forgotten and are in danger of being entirely lost to the Church.

The compiler has diligently devoted several years to the compilation of his book, ably assisted by many friends, who have generously placed at his disposal manuscripts and rare books not within reach of the general public. Should the present work secure a favorable reception, which it certainly merits, the compiler will supplement it with another volume.

LIFE OF SISTER ST. PIERRE, A CARMELITE OF TOURS, FRANCE. Written by herself. Collated and Completed by Means of her Letters and the Annals of the Monastery, by the *Rev. P. Janvier*, Dean of the Chapter of the Metropolitan Church of Tours, Director of the Priests of the Holy Face. With the approbation of the Most Rev. Charles Colet, Archbishop of Tours. Translated from the French by Henri Le Mercier de Pombiray. Baltimore and New York: John Murphy & Co. 1884.

The name of the holy Carmelite of Tours has become so familiar in Religious Communities, and among devout persons in the world, that all are eager to know more of her, and especially of her communications with our Divine Lord. This desire the volume before us will gratify. The seal once placed by ecclesiastical authority upon her writings and letters, has been removed by the same authority, and the holy Sister is allowed to speak for herself to the pious Christian public.

The special object of the biography now published is to promote devotion to the Holy Face, and reparation for the blasphemies constantly uttered against our Blessed Redeemer. Nor could any purpose be more opportune or more urgent in its present necessity. Never was blasphemy more prevalent, and never was reparation for it more needed.

The work before us is a clear and graphic portrait of the virtues of Sister Saint-Pierre, her interior struggles and sufferings, and of the special revelations made to her; and especially of those by which the devotion to the Holy Face is encouraged and enjoined.

The book is a very interesting one, and that it is eminently calculated to excite to devout and pious thoughts and practices the high commendations it has received from numerous holy ecclesiastics are a sufficient guarantee.

MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR. Collected from Different Spiritual Writers and suited to the Practice called a *Quarter of an Hour's Solitude.* Edited by *Rev. Roger Baxter, S. J.*, of Georgetown College. New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis: Benziger Brothers. 1884.

"This precious book," to use the language of the Most Rev. Archbishop of Baltimore, was first written in Latin, in the year 1639. Manuscript copies of it were made and handed around among holy persons in the days of persecution in England. In 1669 it was translated into English, and in 1822 it was revised and modernized by Rev. Roger Baxter, S. J., of Georgetown College. It is now revised afresh and republished by Rev. P. Neale, S. J., of St. Inigo's, Md.

The work consists of short selections from the best ascetical writers of his period. The ordinary Christian, as well as the devout contemplative, may use its Meditations with great advantage.

HISTORY OF THE SODALITIES OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. A Memorial of the Tercentenary Jubilee; 1584—1884. Boston: Thomas B. Noonan & Company. 1885.

This little work, the title of which sufficiently suggests its scope and contents was first written and published in French by Father Louis Delplace, S. J. The translation into English was made by several ladies who are members of a Sodality of Children of Mary. The work contains matter that will be specially interesting to members of sodalities.

WILD FLOWERS FROM "THE MOUNTAIN-SIDE." Poems and Dramas by *Mercedes.* Press of J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia. 1885.

A volume of poems and verses, which, though put forth with a very modest and apologetic preface, yet, to use the words of the Most Rev. Archbishop Ryan, "exhale a true poetic fragrance." The latter part of the volume consists of dramas, which were written for actual performance at Commencements, and like occasions, in Catholic female academies. They are brief, spirited, and full of action—as dramas written for such purposes should be.

The spirit which pervades them, as well as all the poems, is an admirable one. We heartily commend the volume to our readers. The author is a lady originally from Philadelphia, and a Religious. The proceeds of the volume are devoted to the support of a hospital in one of our western cities.

RITUS CELEBRANDI MATRIMONII SACRAMENTUM, cum Formula impertiendi Benedictionem Nuptialem; accedunt versiones vulgares omnium Orationum, Anglice, Germanice, et Gallice conscriptæ. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.

Nothing more useful for the priest has, for a long time, appeared than is this separate publication of the marriage ceremonial. It will enable the reverend clergy to officiate without using either the Missal or the Ritual, as all the instructions and prayers are given in full, on four pages of convenient size (6½ by 9½ inches), and in four languages, Latin, English, French, and German. It is printed in large type, with red and black ink, and bound in strong leather cover. The price is only $1.

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